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Abstract
Environmental regulation often has to be designed using asymmetric and incomplete informa-
tion. Polluting ﬁrms, for instance, are normally privately better informed than the regulator
with regard to the costs of reducing their emissions. However, even regulated ﬁrms may not
have accurate information about their own abatement costs. The regulator is eager to know
this private information in order to implement the most eﬃcient environmental policy given
the information at hand. In this thesis, I study, among other things, how auction mechanisms
can be used to incentivize ﬁrms to reveal their private information to the regulator.
One of the central questions in pollution control theory is whether a price instrument like an
emission tax or a quantity instrument like tradeable permits is better in environmental or
climate policy. In climate policy, emissions trading programs have been more popular both
in Europe and the U.S. Also, auctions and in particular uniform price auction formats have
been used as an initial allocation method in many trading programs.
In the ﬁrst two essays of this thesis, I study two-stage mechanisms for controlling pollution.
In the ﬁrst stage, the regulator conducts a generalized multi-unit Vickrey auction in order to
allocate emission permits to ﬁrms. More importantly, the auction mechanism aims to collect
private information from regulated ﬁrms. In the second stage, the regulator implements a
range of environmental policy instruments, in the light of the information from the auction.
In the ﬁrst essay, the regulator uses either a constant price regulation or a program of
tradeable permits with a ﬁxed supply of permits. I show that ﬁrms have less incentive to bid
sincerely in an auction when using a tax instrument compared to emissions trading.
In the second essay, the regulator implements a tradeable permits program in the second
stage, where the permit supply is elastic in price. Moreover, the permit market suﬀers some
frictions, which increase the costs of trading. I derive incentive compatibility conditions for
ﬁrms to bid sincerely in the ﬁrst-stage auction given the regulation in the second stage and
the various information structures.
In the third essay, I compare the Vickrey and uniform price auction formats in allocations
of emission allowances without an allowance resale market. Firms may collude and thus
coordinate their bidding behavior in auctions. The Vickrey auction is eﬃcient but the rev-
enues decrease the more ﬁrms collude. However, the eﬃciency and revenues of uniform price
auctions depend heavily on the coalition game and the structure of the market.
i
Tiivistelmä
Ympäristöpolitiikan ohjauskeinot on usein suunniteltava ilman täydellistä tietämystä päästö-
jen vähentämisen kustannuksista tai hyödyistä. Vaikka saastuttavien yritysten käsitys mah-
dollisista päästövähennysteknologioistaan voi olla epävarmaa, saattaa yrityksillä olla viran-
omaista parempi ymmärrys niiden kustannuksista. Viranomainen haluaisi saada yritysten tie-
don käyttöönsä suunnitellakseen ohjauskeinot paremmin. Tässä väitöskirjassa tutkin muun
muassa, miten huutokauppamekanismeja voidaan hyödyntää yritysten palkitsemiseksi, jotta
ne paljastaisivat totuudenmukaisesti tietämyksensä viranomaiselle.
Yksi keskeisimmistä ympäristökontrollin teoriaan liittyvistä kysymyksistä on perinteisesti ol-
lut, tulisiko saastuttamista ohjata hintainstrumentilla kuten veroilla vai määräinstrumentilla
kuten kaupattavilla päästöoikeuksilla. Ilmastopolitiikassa päästöoikeuksien kauppaohjelmat
ovat olleet suositumpia niin Euroopassa kuin Yhdysvalloissa. Huutokauppaa on sovellettu
monessa kauppaohjelmassa päästöoikeuksien alkujakomenetelmänä.
Väitöskirjan kahdessa ensimmäisessä esseessä tutkin kaksivaiheista ympäristöohjausta. En-
simmäisessä vaiheessa viranomainen huutokauppaa päästöoikeuksia saastuttaville yrityksille
hyödyntäen Vickrey huutokauppaa. Huutokauppamekanismin avulla viranomainen oppii yri-
tysten puhdistuskustannuksista. Ohjausmekanismin toisessa vaiheessa viranomainen asettaa
yrityksille erilaisia ympäristöpolitiikan ohjauskeinoja hyödyntäen oppimaansa.
Ensimmäisessä esseessä viranomainen valitsee joko kiinteän hintaohjauksen tai päästöoikeuk-
sien kaupan, jossa markkinoille jaettavien päästöoikeuksien määrä on kiinteä. Osoitan, että
yritysten halukkuus paljastaa tietonsa totuudenmukaisesti huutokaupassa on rajoittuneem-
paa, kun käytössä on vero-ohjaus, kuin jos varsinaiseksi ohjauskeinoksi valitaan päästökaup-
pa.
Toisessa esseessä viranomainen valitsee toisen vaiheen ohjauskeinoksi päästöoikeuksien kau-
pan, jossa päästöoikeuksien tarjonta on joustava hinnan suhteen. Lisäksi päästöoikeusmark-
kinoiden toimintaan liittyy kaupankäynnin kustannuksia lisäävää kitkaa. Johdan ehdot tie-
torakenteelle, jolloin yritykset paljastavat tietonsa totuudenmukaisesti huutokaupassa.
Kolmannessa esseessä vertailen Vickrey huutokauppaa ja mm. EU:n päästökaupassa sovel-
lettua yhtenäishinnoittelun huutokauppaa, kun yritykset eivät voi käydä kauppaa päästöoi-
keuksien jälkimarkkinoilla. Yritykset voivat kuitenkin koordinoida käyttäytymistään pääs-
töoikeuksien huutokaupassa. Vickrey huutokauppa jakaa päästöoikeudet tehokkaasti, mutta
huutokaupan tuotot alenevat yritysten koordinoidessa käyttäytymistään. Yhtenäishinnoitte-
lun huutokaupan tulokset ovat riippuvaisia markkinarakenteesta ja koalitionmuodostuksen
luonteesta.
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Chapter 1
Introduction
1
1.1 Background
In a competitive economy, where all goods and services are private, all goods and services have
markets, all markets clear, all producers and consumers are price-takers and have complete
information, there are no externalities, and consumers' preferences and producers' production
functions satisfy certain conditions, a market mechanism with an appropriate price vector
results in a Pareto optimal (eﬃcient) allocation of resources. This is the ﬁrst fundamental
theorem of welfare economics. The second fundamental theorem of welfare economics says
that any desired Pareto optimal allocation can be achieved by introducing appropriate lump-
sum transfers. Once such transfers are instituted, the competitive market mechanism will
take care of the eﬃcient, ﬁrst-best allocation. (E.g. Mas-Colell et al. 1995.)
In practice, the market mechanism is never completely perfect, and the famous invisible
hand does not lead to the Pareto optimal allocation. In this thesis, I consider a number
of market failures and examine regulatory mechanisms to correct them. In particular, I
study the interactions of the pollution externality problem together with asymmetric and
incomplete information. I examine how auction mechanisms can be employed to manage
market failures, and particularly the problem of asymmetric information.
Pollution is a traditional example of a negative externality. Producers (or ﬁrms) produce
valuable goods and services for consumers. Often, as a by-product, ﬁrms produce bads such
as pollution. That is to say, ﬁrms use e.g. clean air or water as inputs in their production.
Clean air and water are common resources. They are owned by all the agents in the economy
and, at the same time, by none of the agents. Thus the property rights to these common
resources are not clearly deﬁned and it is impossible for agents to negotiate the use of these
resources. Without any intervention by the social planner, pollution is not internalized into
the pricing system. When the bads are external to the economic system, producers do not
take them into account in their production decisions.
Information is complete when all the information aﬀecting the values of goods and bads is
completely known by all the agents in the economy. Under these conditions, i.e. when the
pollution externality is the only market failure, the social planner can correct the pricing
system and fully internalize the externality problem. The social planner may use various
regulatory instruments to achieve the Pareto optimal allocation. However, the distribution
of wealth may vary depending on the instrument used. On the other hand, if the relevant
information is not available, the intervention is not ﬁrst-best and the instruments may also
diﬀer in their eﬃciency properties.
Furthermore, information may also be distributed asymmetrically between economic agents
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and the social planner. Firstly, if producers or consumers know more about the external-
ity problem than the social planner does, then incentive mechanisms to reveal this private
information to the social planner are called for. In this thesis I examine the performance
of auction mechanisms in revealing the private information of ﬁrms about their emission
reduction costs. Secondly, the market mechanism may fail if the information is distributed
asymmetrically between market participants. Also, in this case, auction mechanisms may
improve the functioning of markets by providing more accurate and more evenly distributed
information and bringing the allocation of resources closer to the Pareto optimal allocation.
The study also covers two other types of market failures: transaction costs and market
power. The perfect market hypothesis assumes that transactions between economic agents
are costless. However, when the number of agents is large, it may be a time-consuming task
for an agent to ﬁnd someone who is willing to trade products with him. Moreover, even if the
market participants are matched, the bargaining process and decision-making may be costly
for them. Also, monitoring pollution and enforcement of regulations may cause costs for the
social planner and economic agents. (E.g. Hahn and Stavins 2011.)
Economic agents have no market power if they assume that their actions have no impact
on market prices. They take prices as given. This is a somewhat contradictory assumption,
because in the general equilibrium theory, under certain conditions, every action aﬀects
everything in the economy. The price-taking assumption is based on the large number of
both producers and consumers in the economy. Thus the eﬀect of one agent is negligible on
the equilibrium outcome. In contrast, if an agent notices that he can inﬂuence the equilibrium
price by his production or consumption decisions, it will steer the equilibrium away from the
competitive outcome and the equilibrium price will not reveal the true costs of (marginal)
production or the true value of (marginal) consumption. The equilibrium allocation is not
eﬃcient and there are gains from trade that are not realized in the economy.
This thesis is a collection of three independent essays and an introduction. The ﬁrst two
essays, in Chapters 2 and 3, study pollution regulation under incomplete and asymmetric
information. The third essay, in Chapter 4, examines market power and, in particular, the
collusive behavior of ﬁrms in emission permit auctions.
This chapter is an introduction. It is organized as follows. In the next two sections, I shortly
review the literature on pollution regulation (Section 1.2) and auction mechanisms (Section
1.3), in the light of the above market failures. In Section 1.4, I introduce the aﬃne linear
model, which is used in the two ﬁrst essays. I also explain how this information structure
reﬂects the problem of climate change. In the last section, I summarize the essays and explain
how they contribute to the literature on pollution regulation.
3
1.2 Regulating pollution
Pigou (1920) was the ﬁrst to address how the pollution externality could be internalized
into the economic system. Levying, for instance, a uniform emission tax on polluting ﬁrms,
equaling the marginal damage of pollution, would provide the right incentives for ﬁrms to
reduce emissions. Each ﬁrm would ﬁnd it proﬁtable to reduce its emissions to a level where
the marginal abatement cost is equal to the Pigouvian tax. Coase (1960) challenged Pigou's
view. Coase states that when transaction costs are zero and property rights are well deﬁned,
the Pigouvian solutions are unnecessary and government actions are not needed. Economic
agents will ﬁnd the most eﬃcient solution by bargaining and the original distribution of
property rights between economic agents will not disturb this eﬃcient solution. This idea
is known as the so-called Coase Theorem, formulated by Stigler (1966). However, as Coase
himself said, this was not the actual message of the original paper:
I tend to regard the Coase Theorem as a stepping stone on the way to an
analysis of an economy with positive transaction costs. [...] My conclusion; let us
study the world of positive transaction costs. (Coase 1992.)1
Nevertheless, the basic idea of another and nowadays relatively popular environmental reg-
ulatory instrument is based on the Coase Theorem. Namely, the ﬁrst ideas of emissions
trading were formulated by Crocker (1966) and Dales (1968) to regulate air and water pollu-
tion, respectively. Brieﬂy, in a cap-and-trade emissions trading program, the regulator ﬁrst
announces the total amount of emissions permitted for regulated ﬁrms. This is the emis-
sions cap. Second, the regulator allocates pollution permits to ﬁrms up to the announced
emissions cap by using some initial allocation mechanism.2 Third, ﬁrms are not allowed
to pollute more emissions than they have permits in aggregate, but they are free to trade
permits among themselves in the markets. Thus the emissions of a particular ﬁrm may
exceed its initial allocation, but not its ﬁnal permit holding. The emissions trading pro-
gram provides a cost-eﬃcient solution to pollution control if the marginal abatement costs
are equal among regulated ﬁrms in equilibrium. In the spirit of the Coase Theorem, Mont-
gomery (1972) proved that tradeable permits would indeed provide a cost-eﬃcient solution
under competitive market conditions without any transaction costs. In addition, the solu-
1This is the lecture by Ronald Coase in memory of Alfred Nobel, December 9, 1991.
2The initial allocation of permits can be free using some grandfathering or benchmarking rules, or it can
be conducted by an auction. In the literature, tradeable permits are also called allowances, licenses, quotas
or rights. I use the term permit in Chapters 2 and 3 and the term allowance in Chapter 4. Note that in
the European Union Emissions Trading System (EU ETS) permits stand for administrative permissions for
given installations emitting greenhouse gases, whereas allowances stand for tradeable pollution rights.
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tion is independent of the initial allocation of permits. Hahn and Stavins (2011) call this the
independence property.
If the externality problem was the only market failure, the regulator could guarantee an
eﬃcient solution either by levying a Pigouvian tax or a system of tradeable permits or some
other regulatory instrument, such as non-tradeable permits or emission reduction subsidies.
In this thesis I consider only the ﬁrst two: an emission tax and tradeable permits. The
reason is two-fold. First, there is an ongoing policy debate as to whether taxes or tradeable
permits are preferable in environmental policy and in particular in climate policy. Second,
since Pigou (1920) and Coase (1960), the academic discussion about the relative merits of
price regulation (e.g. taxes) and quantity regulation (e.g. tradeable permits) has broadened
in many respects. However, contrary to the advice of Ronald Coase, the academic discussion
about prices versus quantities was not initially extended to questions of transaction costs.
Instead, incomplete information was shown to have an impact on the relative merits of prices
and quantities.
1.2.1 Incomplete information
Weitzman (1974) derives a rule for the choice between price and quantity controls, when
abatement costs and the damage caused by pollution are uncertain.3 Weitzman uses ﬁrst-
order linear approximations of the marginal abatement costs and a marginal damage function
and assumes that the uncertainty is captured entirely by the constant terms of these linear
functions.4 If the abatement costs and the pollution damage are not correlated, the rule is
simple. The regulator should control the quantity of pollution and use quantity instruments
if the marginal beneﬁts of pollution reduction increase more rapidly than the marginal costs
of reduction. On the other hand, the price instrument provides a lower expected welfare
loss if the slope of the marginal abatement costs is steeper than the slope of the marginal
damage function. The reason for this is intuitive. If the aggregate marginal abatement costs
are greater than expected, the equilibrium emissions will exceed the optimal level under a
uniform tax and will be below the optimal level under quantity control and vice versa, if
the marginal abatement costs are lower than expected. Hence, if the slope of the aggregate
marginal abatement costs is steeper (ﬂatter) than the slope of the marginal damage, the closer
(further) the resulting emissions will be from the optimal level under a tax as compared to
quantity control.
3Weitzman (1974) formulates the model as a general planning problem. However, he uses the problem of
air pollution as a possible example of the formulation.
4See Malcomson (1978) for a critique of the linear approximations.
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However, emission reduction costs and beneﬁts may have a statistical dependence on each
other (see Stavins 1996). Under these circumstances, a positive correlation between emission
reduction costs and beneﬁts will favor quantity control and a negative correlation will favor
price regulation as compared to a regime of statistical independence between emission reduc-
tion beneﬁts and costs. If the marginal abatement costs are not as expected, the positive
correlation will move the optimal emission level towards the expected level and thus towards
the emissions cap of the quantity control.
It is important to emphasize some relevant points related to Weitzman's (1974) model. First,
Weitzman assumes that as much information as it is feasible to gather has already been
obtained by the regulator when designing and implementing the policy instruments. However,
regulation policy will have been set before the uncertainty about abatement costs or pollution
damage has been resolved. After implementation, ﬁrms will acquire more information about
their true abatement costs and react to the new knowledge. Second, two policy alternatives
are constant: the pollution tax is uniform and set at the level of the expected ﬁrst-best price,
and the total allowable pollution in the quantity control is set at the expected ﬁrst-best level.
These two will not adjust to any changes in abatement costs or pollution damage. Third,
even though Weitzman does not consider emissions trading in his original paper, quantity
control can easily be extended to the case of tradeable permits. Since Weitzman's original
contribution, the literature on prices versus quantities has extended to compare tax and
tradeable permits e.g. in cases of stock pollution (e.g. Hoel and Karp 2001, 2002, Newell and
Pizer 2003, Karp and Zhang 2012), incomplete enforcement (e.g. Montero 2002), banking of
permits (e.g. Fell et al. 2012), technology choice (e.g. Krysiak 2008) or multiple pollutants
(e.g. Ambec and Coria 2013). In these papers, ﬁrms are assumed to be price-takers in the
emissions permit market if the trading of permits is allowed.5
The price or quantity control scenarios in Weitzman (1974) can be improved by making the
regulatory schemes non-constant. Weitzman (1978) himself proposes a tax regulation, where
the marginal tax rate is a linear function of ﬁrms' emissions. Roberts and Spence (1976), on
the other hand, introduce a hybrid scheme. In their hybrid regulation, the aggregate supply
of pollution permits is not constant. In the simplest case, supply is represented by a step
function where the equilibrium price of the market (with a ﬁxed supply of pollution permits)
is constrained by two additional price instruments: a price ﬂoor and a price cap. If the price
of pollution permits falls to the price ﬂoor due to lower than expected abatement costs, the
regulator will buy back permits from the ﬁrms at the ﬂoor price. If the abatement costs
are higher than expected and thus the equilibrium price becomes too high, the regulator
5Firms are also assumed to be risk-neutral. See Ben-David et al. (2000) or Baldursson and von der Fehr
(2004) for an analysis of risk-aversive ﬁrms under a tradeable permit regulatory regime.
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will set a fee for pollution, i.e. it sells permits to ﬁrms at the price cap. Furthermore,
adding subsequent steps into the supply function and increasing the number of steps to the
limit results in a continuous permit supply function (Roberts and Spence 1976, Appendix).
The optimal aggregate permit supply function is equal to the expected pollution damage
function. Moreover, if the pollution is uniformly mixed and the permit market is perfect,
tradeable permits with a non-constant permit supply will perform better than non-constant
taxes (Kennedy et al. 2010, Yates 2012).
1.2.2 Asymmetric information
It is realistic to assume that, at the implementation stage of pollution regulation, ﬁrms'
knowledge about their abatement costs is better than the social planner's information. Even
if regulated ﬁrms are uncertain about their future costs of emission reductions, they have
more accurate information about their production technologies, possibilities to reduce emis-
sions, knowledge of the price formation of essential inputs and outputs and so forth. In
addition, ﬁrms conduct R&D activities and they have strong incentives not to reveal infor-
mation about their own innovation processes outside the company. At the same time, such
information is valuable to the regulator if it improves the eﬃciency of regulations. Firms
are, however, not willing to reveal such information sincerely. Depending on the planned reg-
ulatory scheme, ﬁrms may have incentives either to overestimate or to underestimate their
uncertain abatement costs. Lewis (1996) provides a review of this topic. She points out
that in most instances pure forms of marketable permits or emission taxes are insuﬃcient
regulatory instruments when economic agents are asymmetrically informed.
Kwerel (1977) was one of the ﬁrst to introduce an incentive mechanism for the disclosure
of ﬁrms' information in pollution regulation. The incentive mechanism of Kwerel has two
building blocks. The regulator 1) issues a ﬁxed amount of tradeable pollution permits6
denoted by L, and 2) sets a subsidy e per permits in excess of emissions produced by ﬁrms.
Hence the regulator commits to buy back those permits which are not used at price e. In
addition, before the implementation of the regulation, there is one round of communication
between regulated ﬁrms and the regulator. Firms are asked to report their clean-up costs
to the regulator. Prior to reporting, the regulator announces that it will set the parameters
L and e as follows. The expected marginal damage equals the reported aggregate marginal
clean-up costs at pollution level L. Moreover, subsidy e equals the level of these marginal
functions evaluated at L. Kwerel argues that in a competitive permit market, reporting
6Kwerel uses the term transferable licenses.
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sincerely to the regulator is a Nash equilibrium of this game. That is, if every other ﬁrm is
reporting sincerely, it is also the best response for each ﬁrm to report sincerely.
Kwerel, however, says nothing about how the regulator initially distributes permits to ﬁrms.
Montero (2008) argues that, depending on the initial allocation method, ﬁrms may ﬁnd
more proﬁtable strategies compared to the sincere reporting strategies in Kwerel's scheme.
If permits are allocated for free and if ﬁrms are able to coordinate their reporting strategies,
regulation becomes ineﬃcient. Also, if permits are allocated in a uniform price auction and
ﬁrms use low-price equilibrium strategies in the auction, the allocation will not be eﬃcient.
Vickrey (1961), Clarke (1971) and Groves (1973) provide an eﬃcient (VCG) mechanism for
the provision of public goods, where agents are privately informed about the costs of their
actions. The VCG mechanism implements eﬃcient allocation in dominant strategies.7 That
is, whatever other ﬁrms report to the regulator about their emission reduction costs, it is a
dominant strategy for each ﬁrm to report its costs sincerely to the regulator. The intuition
of the mechanism is explained in later sections. Dasgupta, Hammond and Maskin (1980) use
the VCG mechanism to implement a tax regulation for privately informed ﬁrms (DHM tax
mechanism). Montero (2008) describes a simple auction mechanism where a discriminatory
Vickrey pricing rule is used to induce ﬁrms to bid sincerely. Both mechanisms, the DHM tax
mechanism and Montero's auction mechanism, allocate emission permits eﬃciently among
regulated ﬁrms, given the increasing expected marginal damage of pollution. Montero (2008)
argues, however, that these mechanisms diﬀer in two important ways. First, the DHM tax
mechanism fails to allocate permits eﬃciently when the supply of permits is ﬁxed. Second,
collusive actions may distort the ﬁrst-best property of the DHM tax mechanism. Montero, in
contrast, shows that the eﬃcient allocation of the VCG auction mechanism is not distorted
by the inelastic supply of permits or the collusive actions of ﬁrms. Thus, even if ﬁrms are able
to coordinate their bidding strategies prior to the auction, the mechanism assigns an eﬃcient
amount of permits to colluding ﬁrms. If a coalition agrees on the eﬃcient distribution of
permits within the coalition, then the allocation is eﬃcient. Finally, it is important to note
that in Kwerel (1977), Dasgupta et al. (1980) and Montero (2008), agents' values are private
and polluting ﬁrms know their abatement costs exactly.
In addition to the problem of asymmetric information between the social planner and ﬁrms,
Coasian bargaining may not work as intended if the information is asymmetric between ﬁrms.
Then the otherwise perfect market may fail to assign objects eﬃciently. To give an intuition
of this, consider the following simple example.8 Suppose that two ﬁrms are trading a single
7The VCG mechanism is a multi-unit extension of a single-unit Vickrey auction (i.e. a single-unit second-
price auction). However, the term Vickrey auction is used occasionally in a multi-unit context.
8Chatterjee and Samuelson (1983) provide a more general analysis of this example.
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pollution permit bilaterally. Suppose also that the marginal value of the permit is vS for the
seller and vB for the buyer, where vB > vS. Hence, there are gains from trade, because any
price between vS and vB would not make the ﬁrms worse oﬀ and at least one of the ﬁrms
better oﬀ. With complete information, the ﬁrms would bargain about the price and it would
be in both ﬁrms' interest to get the trade done. If the seller has all the bargaining power, it
can reap all the gains from the trade and the resulting equilibrium price, for instance, in a
take-it-or-leave-it game9 would be p = vB. The trading is eﬃcient, because the object goes to
the agent who values it most. However, if the ﬁrms do not have exact information about the
value of the trading partner, the trade may not occur. For instance, in the take-it-or-leave-it
game, suppose that f (vB) is the density of the buyer's valuation with a support vB ∈ [a, b],
where vS < b. Hence, vB is a random draw from the distribution F (vB). Suppose also
that the true value vB is known by the buyer, whereas the seller knows only the distribution
F (vB). The seller maximizes its expected gains from trade US (p) =
´ b
p
(p− vS) f (vB) dvB
with respect to the oﬀer price p ≥ vS. Then the optimal oﬀer price by the seller satisﬁes
p = vS +
1−F (p)
f(p)
. If the buyer's true value is less than the oﬀered price, i.e. p > vB, no trade
is done even if vB > vS.
In fact, Myerson and Satterthwaite (1983) show that generally there is no Bayesian incentive
compatible and individually rational allocation mechanism that can guarantee eﬃcient allo-
cation in bilateral trading. This is an important result. Moreover, the Vickrey-Clarke-Groves
mechanism would provide eﬃcient allocation (with private values), but one relevant problem
of the VCGmechanism is that it is not budget-balanced. Hence, in order to guarantee eﬃcient
allocation under asymmetric information between traders, there should be a coordinator or
broker to provide extra funding. This is one of the central reasons why auction mechanisms
are needed. In auctions, where all the agents are on the demand side, eﬃcient allocation can
be achieved by collecting money from the bidders and thus the budget is unbalanced to the
regulator's beneﬁt. Moreover, revenues from the auction can be used in other sectors of the
economy.10
1.2.3 Transaction costs
Following the so-called Coase Theorem, Stavins (1995) was the ﬁrst to show how the costs of
trading may inﬂuence the equilibrium of the emissions permit market. Transaction costs may
aﬀect the cost-eﬃciency of the market and the independence property of the initial allocation
of permits. Transaction costs may be borne from various sources. Stavins (1995) identiﬁes
9The take-it-or-leave-it game is also called the ultimatum game.
10See also Lewis (1996).
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three potential sources in the permit markets: 1) search and information, 2) bargaining and
decision, and 3) monitoring and enforcement. Furthermore, whether the marginal transaction
costs are increasing, constant or decreasing has diﬀerent implications for the independence
property (see Stavins 1995 for a discussion of the sources of diﬀerent types of transaction
costs). Stavins shows that if the marginal transaction costs are constant, the ﬁnal allocation
of allowances is independent of the pre-trade allocation. The cost-eﬃciency, however, is not
achieved unless the pre-trade allocation is already Pareto optimal. The gains from trade are
decreased due to the transaction costs and not all, otherwise beneﬁcial, trades are conducted.
With increasing marginal transaction costs, the closer the pre-trade allocation is to the Pareto
optimal allocation, the closer the equilibrium allocation is to the eﬃcient solution. Hence
the independence property fails to hold. With decreasing marginal transaction costs, there
are scale economies from trading and the shift in the pre-trade allocation away from eﬃcient
allocation results in an equilibrium outcome which is closer to the eﬃcient solution than the
post-trading outcome without the shift. An intuitively similar result with decreasing marginal
transaction costs is provided by Liski (2001), who examines a case where transaction costs are
a function of market size. In thick markets, transaction costs are presumably lower than in
thin markets and transaction costs vanish if the pre-trade allocation of permits is signiﬁcantly
diﬀerent from the eﬃcient allocation.11
1.2.4 Market power
Traditionally, oligopolistic competition, i.e. competition between strategic agents, is modeled
by quantity competition à la Cournot or by price competition à la Bertrand. In both models,
the equilibrium is close to the competitive equilibrium when the number of agents increases.
The ﬁrst contribution concerning market power in emissions trading markets was made by
Hahn (1984), who considers one dominant ﬁrm in the permit market. If the initial allocation
of permits is not at the eﬃcient level, the dominant ﬁrm manipulates the permit market price
and the equilibrium is not eﬃcient. If the dominant ﬁrm is on the supply side of the market,
it drives the price up by reducing sales of permits and if it is on the demand side, it steers the
price downwards by reducing purchases of permits. However, this market power vanishes if
the allocation of the dominant ﬁrm is at the competitive equilibrium at the outset. Misiolek
and Elder (1989) extend the dominant ﬁrm model to cover output markets. Furthermore,
models of market power in emission permit markets are extended to a dynamic set-up by
Liski and Montero (e.g. 2006, 2011) and to an oligopolistic setting by e.g. von der Fehr
11See also Montero (1998), who examines the combined eﬀect of transaction costs and uncertainty on trade
approval.
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(1993) and recently by Malueg and Yates (2009) and Lappi (2012). Contrary to previous
studies of Cournot competition, in the model of Malueg and Yates ﬁrms compete using linear
trading schedules and all the players act strategically in the permit market.12
I, however, consider oligopolistic competition in multi-unit auctions. In auction models,
oligopolistic agents compete with price-quantity pairs, i.e. with supply13 or demand schedules
as in Malueg and Yates (2009). In these models, strategic bidding does not always result in
a competitive outcome even if the number of bidders increases to the limit (see Wilson 1979,
Back and Zender 1993). Another and related aspect of strategic bidding is collusion, which
is a central concept of the oligopoly theory (Vives 1999). I consider collusive behavior in
auctions, where ﬁrms coordinate their bidding strategies. Collusion may aﬀect the eﬃciency
and revenues of the auction. These issues are discussed in more detail in the next section.
1.3 Auction mechanisms
In auctions of emission permits, the seller has multiple homogenous units to sell and bid-
ders want multiple units. Most of the theoretical literature on auctions concerns single-unit
auctions. The theory of multi-unit auctions is much less developed than single-unit auc-
tion theory. Next, I shortly review some central results of single-unit auction theory and
then introduce and discuss the properties of some of the most popular multi-unit auction
mechanisms.
1.3.1 Single-unit auctions
The benchmark model of auction theory is the independent private values (IPV) model of
a single unit. The risk-neutral seller has a single object to sell to a number of n risk-
neutral bidders. Bidders have values for the object, v1, . . . , vn, identically and independently
distributed with a cumulative distribution function F (v).
There are four traditional single-unit auction designs. In a ﬁrst-price sealed bid auction,
bidders submit their bids simultaneously to the auctioneer. The bidder with the highest bid
wins the object and pays her bid. In a second-price sealed bid auction (or Vickrey auction)
she pays the second-highest bid. Two most common open (or dynamic) auction designs are
the ascending-bid auction (English auction) and the descending-bid auction (Dutch auction).
For instance, in a typical English auction, the auctioneer ﬁrst announces a starting or reserve
12E.g. Montero (2009) reviews the literature on market power in pollution permit markets.
13Firms compete with supply schedules in a procurement setting.
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price, and bidders start to bid with increasing bids. The auction continues until only one
bidder remains. The bidder with the highest bid wins and pays her bid for the object. In
a descending auction, the auctioneer starts at a high price and lowers the price until one of
the bidders calls that she is willing to buy the object at the current price.
In the IPV model, the second-price auction and the ascending auction are (almost) strategi-
cally equivalent. In the second-price auction it is a dominant strategy for each bidder to bid
her true value of the object. Hence, the payment is the value for the object of the highest
loser, and the winner's bid does not aﬀect this payment. Expected proﬁts are maximized
when bidding is truthfull. In the ascending auction, bidders remain until the price exceeds
their values. Hence the auction stops when the price (incrementally) exceeds the second-
highest value. The ﬁrst-price auction and the Dutch auction are strategically equivalent in
the IPV model. In the ﬁrst-price auction, for example, bidders shade their bids, in order to
maximize their expected revenues, conditional on their information about their own value.
One of the most famous results in auction theory is the revenue equivalence theorem (Vickrey
1961, Myerson 1981, Riley and Samuelson 1981). The revenue equivalence theorem states that
given the IPV model, any auction design in which i) the bidder with the highest value wins,
and ii) the bidder with the lowest value gets zero pay-oﬀ yields the same expected revenue
for the seller. All the aforementioned standard auctions are thus revenue-equivalent. There
is voluminous literature on auction theory examining various aspects of single-unit auctions,
whilst relaxing the assumptions of the benchmark model (e.g. Milgrom 2004 provides an
excellent survey of the literature).
When bidders' values are not private or values are aﬃliated, the revenue equivalence breaks
down. When bidders have private but aﬃliated values, the high value of one bidder makes
high values of other bidders more likely. Bidders' valuations may also be uncertain, and
expected valuations may depend not only on each bidder's own information but also on
other bidders' information. Suppose that each bidder receives a private signal of the object's
value to her. Bidders' values are interdependent if signals of other bidders also aﬀect this
valuation. Bidders' values are common if they all have the same (but uncertain) valuation of
the object. Moreover, signals are aﬃliated if a high signal of one bidder makes high values
of other bidders' signals more likely. Milgrom and Weber (1982) show that, with aﬃliated
(and either private, interdependent or common) values, the English auction is better than
the second-price auction in terms of expected revenues. In addition, the Dutch auction and
the ﬁrst-price auction are strategically equivalent and they generate lower expected revenues
than the second-price auction and the English auction.14 This result is related to the winner's
14Milgrom and Weber (1982) also derive many other important results concerning e.g. seller's information,
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curse. Winning the object is bad news, because it reveals that other bidders value the object
less, which implies that the object is of low value for the winner too. Information of the
other bidders is (partly) revealed in the ascending auction, which alleviates the winner's
curse. However, in the ﬁrst-price auction bidders shade their bids more due to the winner's
curse, when values are aﬃliated.
In many auctions the main objective of the seller is to maximize revenues. An auction design
is said to be optimal if it represents the revenue-maximizing mechanism. According to the
optimal auctions literature, the revenue-maximizing assignment rule is based on virtual
valuations and not on true valuations of bidders (Myerson 1981). Suppose that bidder i's
valuation for the object is vi and this is drawn from the distribution Fi (v) with a density
fi (v). Then the virtual valuation (or marginal revenue) of bidder i is
MRi = vi − 1− Fi (v)
fi (v)
. (1.1)
The revenue-maximizing rule may assign the good to a bidder who does not value it most.
Values are said to be regular if the virtual value is monotonically increasing in vi. Then the
revenue-maximizing mechanism is also eﬃcient. Besides, the seller may increase the expected
revenue by setting a reserve price such that MRi = vs, where vs is the value of the object for
the seller. The revenue-maximizing seller does not assign the object at all if bids are below
the reserve price, even if vi > vs for some i. Thus, the gains from trade will not necessarily
be realized.
Maskin and Riley (2000) relax the assumption of the identical distribution of bidder values
and examine a model of asymmetric bidders. Suppose that there are two bidders: strong
(s) and weak (w). The supports of their value distributions are vi ∈ [βi, αi]. Moreover, the
distribution of the strong bidder's valuation ﬁrst-order stochastically dominates that of the
weak bidder's distribution: Fs (v) > Fw (v) for all v ∈ [βw, αs]. Maskin and Riley show that
in a ﬁrst-price auction, the weak bidder bids more aggressively than the strong bidder with
the same value v. Thus the strong bidder may lose the auction even if she had a greater
valuation. This will not happen in a second-price auction. Furthermore, strong bidders favor
second-price auctions whereas weak bidders favor ﬁrst-price auctions. Which auction design
guarantees greater expected revenues depends on the shapes and supports of the distribution
functions. However, the ﬁrst-price auction may often be more proﬁtable, while it favors
weak bidders. This is related to the result of revenue-maximizing auctions, which favor weak
bidders with greater marginal revenues (Milgrom 2004, 153).
reserve pricing and entry fees.
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The revenue and eﬃciency results may also break down if bidders are able to coordinate
their bids prior to the auction. McAfee and McMillan (1992) is a seminal contribution on
collusion and bidding rings in single-unit auctions. Bidding rings, or cartels, may agree that
no bidder bids more than the reserve price in the auction. After the auction the object is
allocated between the members using some cartel mechanism. However, cartels face several
problems. First, what is the mechanism to divide the spoils of the cartel agreement? Second,
while cartels are illegal, and side payments are in most cases impossible, the cartel agreement
must be self-enforcing. Third, collusion and thus low prices may induce other ﬁrms to enter
the market. Fourth, the regulator has strong incentives to destroy cartels, which makes
cartel agreements harder to sustain. Thus McAfee and McMillan show that weak cartels, i.e.
cartels whose members are unable to make side payments among themselves, cannot do any
better in ﬁrst-price auctions than to randomize the allocation among their members. Any
other allocation method is ex ante weakly dominated for all bidders by random allocation.
However, if side payments are possible, it is possible to attain the optimal cartel agreement:
the member with the highest valuation is assigned the object and new entrants are excluded.
1.3.2 Multi-unit auctions
The two most common multi-unit auction mechanisms are the discriminatory price auction,
also known as the pay-as-bid auction, and the uniform price auction.15 In an auction with
ﬁxed supply, bidders submit non-increasing bid functions. The auctioneer aggregates the
bid functions and clears the auction. The clearing price is the price at which the aggregate
demand intersects the supply. All bids above or equal to the clearing price are accepted as
winning bids.16 In a uniform price auction, each bidder pays the market clearing price for
every unit she wins. In a discriminatory price auction, bidders pay their bids for all the
units they have won in the auction. In both uniform price and discriminatory price auctions,
strategic bidders tend to reduce their demand in order to decrease the price and raise the
proﬁts from the auction. This might result in an ineﬃcient allocation of auctioned goods and
the allocation may diﬀer between the two auction formats. Hence the weak form of revenue
equivalence does not hold (see Ausubel et al. 2013). In addition, bid-shading aﬀects the
revenues collected by the auctioneer.
With private values, the Vickrey-Clarke-Groves mechanism (or the Vickrey auction) pro-
15The discriminatory price auction is often incorrectly thought of as a multi-unit extension of the single-
unit ﬁrst-price auction and the uniform price auction as a multi-unit extension of the single-unit second-price
auction (Ausubel et al. 2013).
16If the clearing price is the ﬁrst rejected bid, then all bids above the clearing price are winning bids. If
there is excess demand at the clearing price, then some rationing rules are needed.
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vides eﬃcient allocation in multi-unit auctions. Instead of the clearing price, bidders pay
the opportunity cost of each unit they win in a Vickrey auction. Despite its many useful
theoretical properties, the VCG mechanism is rarely used in practice. The reasons why it
is used so rarely include, for instance, possibility of complex bidding strategies, low seller
revenues, non-monotonic payment functions, and vulnerability to collusion or to the use of
multiple bidding identities by a single bidder. Ausubel and Milgrom (2006) and Milgrom
(2004) discuss the reasons in more detail.
The literature on multi-unit auctions generally focuses on a comparison of uniform price
and discriminatory price mechanisms in terms of eﬃciency and revenues. The challenge in
theoretical models of these two mechanisms is that analytical equilibrium characterizations
are diﬃcult or impossible even in the case of symmetric independent private values (e.g.
Hortaçsu 2011, Ausubel et al. 2013). This can be seen from the ﬁrst-order conditions of the
bidder's maximization problem under the Vickrey auction (VA), the uniform price auction
(UPA) and the discriminatory price auction (DPA) (e.g. Hortaçsu 2011, Wilson 1979):
V A : vi (Di (p)) = p, (1.2)
UPA : vi (Di (p)) = p−Di (p) Hq
Hp
, (1.3)
DPA : vi (Di (p)) = p+
H
Hp
, (1.4)
where vi (qi) is bidder i's marginal value function, Di (p) is the bid function and H (p,Di (p))
is the probability distribution of the market clearing price, i.e. the probability that the
market clearing price p is not higher than the bid for unit Di (p).
In Vickrey auctions bidders are price-takers, whereas in uniform price and discriminatory
price auctions the last terms in the right-hand sides of the ﬁrst order conditions are the
bid-shading factors. In many cases, it is very diﬃcult to evaluate analytically the probability
distribution H (see Hortaçsu 2011). What is more, there are typically multiple equilibria
in these models (e.g. Klemperer and Meyer 1989, Wang and Zender 2002).17 Hence any
comparison between the uniform and discriminatory price auction formats is more an em-
pirical question (Ausubel et al. 2013). Indeed, there is a growing empirical literature on
multi-unit auctions where diﬀerent mechanisms are used for selling, for instance, treasury
bills and bonds (e.g. Hortaçsu and McAdams 2010, Kastl 2011) or electricity (e.g. Hortaçsu
17Ollikka and Tukiainen (2013) derive approximations of equilibrium strategies in the uniform price, dis-
criminatory price and Vickrey auction formats. Their model is applied in the setting of central bank liquidity
auctions. To my knowledge, there are no other theoretical models of these auction mechanisms, where bidders'
values are asymmetric and interdependent.
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and Puller 2008, Wolak 2003).
Nowadays, auction mechanisms are used in many emissions trading programs to allocate
emission permits to regulated ﬁrms. The uniform price format is used, for instance, in
the European Union Emissions Trading System (EU ETS), in California's Cap-and-Trade
Program and in the U.S.'s Regional Greenhouse Gas Initiative (RGGI). Thus far, however,
the literature on multi-unit emission permit auctions is relatively scarce (see Cramton and
Kerr 2002, Lopomo et al. 2011).
In this thesis I examine two multi-unit auction designs. I study the Vickrey auction because
of its eﬃciency properties. In addition, equilibrium characterizations are possible in the
Vickrey auction even if bidders' values are interdependent. The uniform price auction is
studied because it is the most widely used format in emission permit auctions.
Vickrey auction
Ausubel and Milgrom (2006) provide a good introduction to the Vickrey-Clarke-Groves mech-
anisms. In a private values setting, bidders pay the opportunity cost of their participation
in the mechanism. This is clearly seen in the single-unit second price auction (the Vickrey
auction), where bidders bid their values and the winning bidder pays the second-highest bid.
In pollution permit auctions, as in Montero (2008), the direct VCG mechanism can be inter-
preted as follows. Suppose that Ui (qi) is ﬁrm i's gross value for its pollution qi, i.e. the value
of the avoided abatement costs from zero emissions, and DF (Q) is the damage function of
total pollution Q =
∑n
i=1 qi, where n is the number of polluting ﬁrms. It is assumed that
these functions are non-decreasing in pollution, i.e. U ′i (qi) ≥ 0 and DF ′ (Q) ≥ 0. Each ﬁrm
knows its own value of pollution, but the pollution damage function is common knowledge.
In the direct VCG mechanism, each bidder submits a report of its value function Uˆi (qi) to the
regulator. (In the equilibrium bidders are truthful and hence Uˆi (qi) = Ui (qi).) Given these
reports, the regulator computes the welfare-maximizing allocation of emissions (permits):
q? ∈ arg max
q
{
n∑
i=1
Uˆi (qi)−DF
(
n∑
i=1
qi
)}
.
Next, suppose that
q¯−i ∈ arg max
q−i
{
n∑
j 6=i
Uˆj (qj)−DF
(
n∑
j 6=i
qj
)}
is the welfare-maximizing allocation of emissions without ﬁrm i's participation. Suppose, for
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simplicity, that there are unique interior solutions to these problems, i.e. q? = (q?1, . . . , q
?
n)
and q¯−i = (q¯1, . . . , q¯i−1, q¯i+1, . . . , q¯n), where q?i > 0 and q¯j > 0 for all i, j. The VCG payment
of ﬁrm i is
Ri =
[
n∑
j 6=i
Uˆj (q¯j)−DF
(
n∑
j 6=i
q¯j
)]
−
[
n∑
j 6=i
Uˆj
(
q?j
)−DF ( n∑
i=1
q?i
)]
(1.5)
=
n∑
j 6=i
Uˆj (q¯j)−
n∑
j 6=i
Uˆj
(
q?j
)
︸ ︷︷ ︸
PE
+DF
(
n∑
i=1
q?i
)
−DF
(
n∑
j 6=i
q¯j
)
︸ ︷︷ ︸
PO
.
The VCG payment includes two parts: the pollution externality and the pecuniary external-
ity. The pecuniary externality is deﬁned as PE ≡ ∑nj 6=i Uˆj (q¯j) −∑nj 6=i Uˆj (q?j ). This is the
value of those units to other ﬁrms, which are not assigned them due to ﬁrm i's participation.
The pollution externality is the extra damage of increased pollution due to ﬁrm i's partic-
ipation: PO ≡ DF (∑ni=1 q?i ) − DF (∑nj 6=i q¯j). These externalities are both non-negative,
while q¯j ≥ q?j for all j, but
∑n
i=1 q
?
i ≥
∑n
j 6=i q¯j. The reported function Uˆi (qi) does not aﬀect
the payment schedule Ri otherwise than determining the allocation q?. Only the reports
submitted by the other ﬁrms directly aﬀect the payment schedule of ﬁrm i.
Montero (2008) provides an indirect interpretation of the same mechanism, where ﬁrms
submit bid functions to the regulator. After the auction is cleared, the ﬁrms ﬁrst pay the
clearing price for all the units they have won. In addition, the ﬁrms receive paybacks from
the regulator, which are determined by the bid functions of the other ﬁrms. Due to the
paybacks, the ﬁnal payment of ﬁrm i is equal to (1.5). The VCG payment rule induces ﬁrms
to bid sincerely in the auction in dominant strategies and the allocation is eﬃcient. Hence the
private values paradigm provides some convenient properties for the VCG mechanism. Due
to the dominant strategy property, ﬁrms do not have to know anything about other ﬁrms'
values. In addition, under some continuity assumptions, the VCG mechanism is the only
mechanism that can implement eﬃcient outcomes in dominant strategies (Green and Laﬀont
1979, Holmström 1979). Besides, of the set of eﬃcient mechanisms, the VCG mechanism is
also the revenue-maximizing mechanism (e.g. Krishna and Perry 2000, Ausubel and Cramton
1999).
When agents' values have common value components, things get more complicated. Jehiel
and Moldovanu (2001) show that with interdependent or common values generally no mech-
anism is able to implement eﬃcient allocation. However, Dasgupta and Maskin (2000) and
Ausubel and Cramton (2004) show that ex-post eﬃcient implementation can be achieved if
agents' valuations satisfy certain conditions. Suppose that both the abatement costs and
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pollution damage are uncertain, but prior to the auction ﬁrms receive signals deﬁned by a
vector s = (s1, . . . , sn). The signals reﬂect the ﬁrms' true valuations Ui (qi). The values
are interdependent if ﬁrm i's expected marginal valuation vi (qi; s) ≡ E
[
dUi(qi)
dqi
∣∣∣ s] depends
on the amount of emissions (or permits) qi and its own signal si, but also on other ﬁrms'
signals s−i = (s1, . . . , si−1, si+1, . . . , sn). Now, the signals should be one-dimensional and the
expected marginal value functions should satisfy the following three assumptions:
1. Continuity: vi (qi; s) is jointly continuous in (s, qi).
2. Value monotonicity: vi (qi; s) is non-negative, and
∂vi(qi;s)
∂si
> 0 and ∂vi(qi;s)
∂qi
≤ 0.
3. Single-crossing: Let s′ denote a signal vector s′ = (s′i, s−i) and s = (si, s−i). Then
vi (qi; s) has a single-crossing property if for all i, j 6= i, qi, qj, s−i and s′i > si:
vi (qi; s) > vj (qj; s)⇒ vi (qi; s′) > vj (qj; s′)
and
vi (qi; s
′) < vj (qj; s′)⇒ vi (qi; s) < vj (qj; s) .
Ausubel and Cramton (2004) prove that truthful bidding is the ex-post equilibrium in the
Vickrey auction with reserve pricing. This holds for any monotonic aggregate quantity rule
Q¯ (s) and associated monotonic eﬃcient assignment rule qei (s), and for any value function
satisfying continuity, value monotonicity and the single-crossing property. In addition, a
permit resale market does not distort the equilibrium of the Vickrey auction if all the gains
from trade are realized in the resale market.
The generalized Vickrey auction is deﬁned as follows (see Ausubel and Cramton 2004). First,
the monotonic eﬃcient assignment rule qei (s) is deﬁned by
vi (q
e
i (s) ; s)

≤ v−i
(
qe−i (s) ; s
)
, if qei (s) = 0
= v−i
(
qe−i (s) ; s
)
, if 0 < qei (s) < Q¯ (s)
≥ v−i
(
qe−i (s) ; s
)
, if qei (s) = Q¯ (s) .
(1.6)
Second, the aggregate quantity rule Q¯ (s) is determined by
Q¯ (s) =
y−1
(
v−i
(
qe−i (s) ; s
)
; s
)
, if qei (s) = 0
y−1 (vi (qei (s) ; s) ; s) , if q
e
i (s) > 0,
(1.7)
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where y (Q; s) ≡ E
[
dDF (Q)
dQ
∣∣∣ s] is the conditional expected marginal damage of total pollution
Q =
∑n
i=1 qi.
Third, the Vickrey payment rule is
Ri (s) =
ˆ qei (s)
0
vi (x; sˆi (s−i, x) , s−i) dx., (1.8)
where signal sˆi is the lowest possible signal for which ﬁrm i would have won unit x given
other bidders' (true) signals s−i:
sˆi (x, s−i) = inf
si
{si| qei (si, s−i) ≥ x} . (1.9)
Thus, the marginal payment for unit x is the expected marginal valuation of ﬁrm i evaluated
at x, if ﬁrm i had received and reported the lowest possible signal sˆi such that x = qˆei (sˆi, s−i).
Note that by the eﬃcient assignment rule vi (qˆei (sˆi, s−i) ; sˆi, s−i) = v−i (qˆ
e
i (sˆi, s−i) ; sˆi, s−i),
where qˆei (sˆi, s−i) is the eﬃcient allocation given the signal vector sˆ = (sˆi, s−i). The marginal
payment is thus based on valuations conditional on sˆ and not on true signals s. Hence, with
interdependent values the payment is not the full externality cost, in contrast to the pure
private values case. The payment does not include the informational externality of signal si
to other bidders' values and to the damage of pollution.
Ausubel and Cramton (2004) also show that in the case of independent signals and when the
seller has no value for the objects on sale, the Vickrey auction with reserve pricing attains
the upper bound for revenues in a resale-constrained auction program. Thus, when agents
are able to trade units freely after the auction mechanism, the best the auctioneer can do
with respect to eﬃciency and revenues is to conduct a Vickrey auction with a reserve price.18
Uniform price auction
In the uniform price auction with the ﬁxed supply and private values19, the ﬁrst-order con-
dition from (1.3) is written as (e.g. Holmberg 2009)
vi (Di (p)) = p− Di (p)
D′−i (p)
, (1.10)
where D′−i (p) ≤ 0 is a price derivative of the aggregate demand of every other bidder at p.
Because the total supply is ﬁxed, D′−i (p) is thus equal to the (negative) price derivative of
18In the ﬁrst two essays of the thesis, bidders' values are interdependent. However, the signals are not
independent and I am not able to derive any results using the revenue equivalence theorem (see Section 1.4).
19This is the setting in the third essay of this thesis.
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the residual supply. There are a number of notable points to be made from the ﬁrst-order
condition (1.10). First, compared to the competitive equilibrium, where bidders act as price-
takers, bid-shading results in a lower clearing price. Second, bidders do not shade their bids
for the ﬁrst units. If the clearing price is so high that Di (p) tends to zero, bidders act as
price-takers, i.e. Di (p) = v
−1
i (p). Third, bidders shade their bids more, the relatively larger
they are. Large bidders have larger Di (p) and they face a more elastic residual supply, i.e. a
smaller
∣∣D′−i (p)∣∣, than small bidders. This makes the shading factor higher for large bidders.
Fourth, due to the diﬀering shading characteristics, large (small) bidders tend to receive
less (more) units than in the eﬃcient outcome. Fifth, the number of possible equilibria is
inﬁnite and even very low price equilibria are possible, as shown by Wilson (1979). However,
underpricing can be reduced by adjusting the inelastic supply after the submission of bids
(Back and Zender 2001, McAdams 2007), making the supply elastic (LiCalzi and Pavan 2005)
or forcing the bid functions to be discrete (Kremer and Nyborg 2004).
Equation (1.10) constitutes a system of n diﬀerential equations. Solving it analytically is
a very demanding task. Holmberg (2008) derives a unique solution to this problem with a
procurement auction model for when ﬁrms compete with supply functions. However, the
solution requires a set of assumptions: the perfectly inelastic demand is uncertain, there
is a price cap, ﬁrms are symmetric, ﬁrms' production capacities are constrained, and the
capacity constraints bind with positive probability (see also Rudkevich et al. 1998, Anderson
and Philpott 2002, Keloharju et al. 2005). Holmberg (2009), on the other hand, derives
a numerical solution to an otherwise similar model but in the case of asymmetric ﬁrms.
Moreover, assuming a linear model and linear bid schedules simpliﬁes the model and oﬀers
tractable solutions (e.g. Green 1996, Baldick et al. 2004, Ausubel et al. 2013).
The Vickrey auction is shown to be vulnerable to collusion. In a uniform pricing format,
collusion has been studied in laboratory experiments by e.g. Goswami et al. (1996) and
Burtraw et al. (2009). In inﬁnitely repeated uniform price auctions, Fabra (2003) and
Dechenaux and Kovenock (2007), for instance, examine how perfect collusion can be sustained
among the capacity-constrained ﬁrms.20
1.4 Information
Information plays a key role in pollution regulation in many respects, as we saw in previous
sections. One of the most signiﬁcant, and perhaps the greatest, current environmental prob-
lem is climate change. Climate change is an extremely complex, multi-level and dynamic
20Fabra (2003) also studies discriminatory price auctions.
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problem associated with great uncertainty. Auction mechanisms are one possible tool to
overcome some of the issues related to the incomplete and asymmetric information in pollu-
tion regulation. However, auction mechanisms with multiple units are relatively complicated
to model, even in the simplest possible setting. In this thesis, I try to simplify the complex
information structure with a simple static representation similar to Vives (2010, 2011)21 In
the following, I explain how the static aﬃne linear model reﬂects the dynamic problem and
preserves the main informational characteristics of climate change.22 Note, however, that
these models are relatively general and can be applied in numerous types of environmental
and other problems.
The recent report by the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change (IPCC)23 aﬃrms, once
again, that the climate is warming and that global warming is due to increased concentrations
of anthropogenic greenhouse gases in the atmosphere. To what extent high greenhouse gas
concentrations increase global temperatures is very uncertain. The resulting damage caused
by a rise in global temperatures is even more uncertain, whether this is due to rising sea
levels, ocean acidiﬁcation, extreme weather events, ﬂoods, droughts, changes in ecosystems
or any other possible impact. Tol (2009) surveys the literature on the economic eﬀects of
climate change. Estimates of the total eﬀects vary from a 2.3% increase in global GDP due to
a 1.0◦C increase in global temperature (Tol 2005) to a 4.8% reduction in global GDP due to
a 3.0◦C temperature increase (Nordhaus 1994). However, the estimated impacts of climate
change vary heavily between regions or economic sectors. In particular, low-income countries
are the most vulnerable to climate change, such as countries in Africa and Asia. If the global
temperature rise is only modest (such as 1.0◦C), the positive eﬀects for high-income countries
may oﬀset the damage for more vulnerable regions. However, it seems more probable that
the temperature rise will be more severe and that we will face notable reductions in global
GDP due to global warming.
The climate change impacts can also be expressed as the net present value of incremental
damage due to a small increase in greenhouse gas emissions. This is the social cost of carbon,
or the marginal damage of pollution. In the studies analyzed by Tol (2009), the average
estimate of the social cost of carbon is approximately US$29 per tonne of CO2 (i.e. $105
per tonne of carbon), but the range of the estimates is very large. Including uncertainty
in the models tends to increase and equity weighting tends to reduce the estimates. Most
importantly, the appropriate discount rate is the major open issue concerning the social cost
21The aﬃne linear model is applied in the ﬁrst two essays. This gives a simple interdependent values model.
In the third essay, the ﬁrms' marginal valuations are private.
22The climate change problem is a dynamic stock pollution problem. This is studied e.g. by Hoel and
Karp (2001, 2002), Newell and Pizer (2003), Karp and Zhang (2005, 2012).
23The Working Group I contribution to the IPCC's Fifth Assessment Report (AR5).
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of carbon. (Nordhaus 2011.) In a recent paper, Anthoﬀ and Tol (2013) discuss these issues
in more detail.
Nevertheless, I model the marginal (net present) damage of pollution as a linear function:24
MDF (Q; γ) = γ + δQ, (1.11)
where Q can be interpreted as the total greenhouse gas pollution of the next 50 years.
Pollution is uniformly mixed. Thus pollution levels depend only on the total emissions levels;
the locations of emission sources are not relevant. Following Weitzman (1974), the damage
function is linearized around the ﬁrst-best pollution level Q?. This gives the parameters
of the linear function: γ ≡ MDF (Q?) − δQ? and δ ≡ dMDF (Q)
dQ
∣∣∣
Q?
. For simplicity and in
order to guarantee tractable solutions, the slope parameter δ ≥ 0 is assumed to be common
knowledge. Thus the uncertainty of pollution damage is captured by the damage parameter
γ. It is normally distributed with a mean and a variance given by γ ∼ N(γ¯, σ2γ).
In order to mitigate the damage of global warming, greenhouse gas emissions should be
reduced substantially in coming decades. Depending on the ambition of climate policy, this
requires a considerable technological shift in electricity generation from fossil fuels to carbon-
free technologies such as wind and solar power. Currently, these technologies are more costly
than e.g. coal or gas plants. With appropriate climate policies new carbon-free technologies
will be competitive with conventional technologies. This, however, is a very uncertain process.
The implementation costs and the learning rates for the new technologies, i.e. the reductions
in costs as a function of installed capacity, vary widely inside and between diﬀerent sets of
renewable energy technologies, among others (see Fischedick et al. 2011).
The ﬁrms I model in the essays can be interpreted as electricity companies. A typical elec-
tricity company has diﬀerent plants in its generation portfolio. The generating mix contains
diﬀerent shares of e.g. gas, oil, coal and nuclear power, and renewable energy. In order to
reduce emissions, the company must invest in more eﬃcient fossil fuel plants or carbon-free
technologies. However, the investment costs and the future maintenance costs for diﬀerent
technologies are uncertain. This cost uncertainty arises from several factors, such as the de-
velopment and learning eﬀects of new technologies, the relative costs of primary fuels, local
weather conditions, economic growth, the demand for electricity or future climate policies.
Nevertheless, the more ﬁrms have to reduce emissions the more they have to pay and the
more valuable emission permits become.
As is well known, technological change is a complex dynamic problem. To avoid complex
24See e.g. Weitzman (2010) for discussion of the speciﬁcation of the damage function.
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details, I simplify the technological description considerably by making it static. Suppose that
the emission reduction activities and investment decisions of a single ﬁrm are independent of
each other. In that case the net present value of the future emission reduction path is simple
to calculate and the problem can be solved as a static problem. This is, of course, a very
signiﬁcant simpliﬁcation.
Hence, in the models, the linearized marginal (net present) value of pollution for ﬁrm i is
written as
ui (qi; θi) = θi − βqi, (1.12)
where the cost parameter θi ≡ ui (q?i )− βq?i and the slope parameter β ≡ −dui(qi)dqi
∣∣∣
q?i
≥ 0 are
deﬁned by the ﬁrst-best level of pollution q?i . The slope parameter β is constant and common
knowledge to all the ﬁrms and to the regulator. The uncertainty is, again, captured by the
cost parameter θi. In the models, the private cost parameter θi is initially uncertain to ﬁrm i
(and to other ﬁrms and the regulator). I assume ex-ante symmetry between ﬁrms, and hence
the cost parameters share the same prior distribution, θi ∼ N
(
θ¯, σ2θ
)
. However, the ﬁrms
are not identical and they have some private information about their reduction costs. The
ﬁrms have diﬀerent generation portfolios and each ﬁrm thus has a noisy signal of its own cost
parameter, si = θi + εi. The noise terms are identically and independently distributed with
a normal distribution around zero, i.e. εi ∼ N (0, σ2ε).
The aﬃne linear model is assumed to entail two important correlations associated with func-
tions (1.11) and (1.12). First, due to the similar set of units in their generation portfolios
and similar investment possibilities, it is reasonable to assume that emission reduction costs
are correlated between ﬁrms. I assume symmetric correlation between ﬁrms, hence the cost
parameters θi and θi (i 6= j) have a covariance cov [θi, θj] = ρσ2θ .
Second, the correlation between the emission reduction costs and beneﬁts, i.e. the avoided
damage of pollution, has an important role in the models. This statistical dependence is
discussed by Stavins (1996). He states that with uniformly mixed pollution, correlation
between the beneﬁts and costs of emission reductions is not likely. However, climate change
is a problem with a very long time horizon. Global warming impacts economic growth as well
as local weather conditions, among other things. The nature of the statistical dependence
between pollution damage and emission reduction costs is not clear. On the one hand, the
relative costs of wind or wave energy, for example, can be reduced locally due to higher wind
speeds. On the other hand, decreased economic growth may aﬀect the ﬁnancing costs or
availability and costs of other resources. This may increase the costs of emission reductions
in the long run. In the models, I assume that the possible dependence between environmental
damage and the cost of emissions reductions is the same for all regulated companies. The
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correlation between the damage parameter γ and the average cost parameter θm =
∑n
i=1 θi
is given by cov [γ, θm] = σγθ.
With linear functions and normal random parameters, the conditional expectations of un-
certain variables are aﬃne functions. Thus it is easy to calculate the expected value of θi
conditional on si and sm:
E [θi| si, sm] = Aθ¯ +Bsi + Cnsm, (1.13)
where A ≡ A (ξ), B ≡ B (ξ) and C ≡ C (ξ) are functions of the information structure,
ξ ≡ (n, σ2ε , σ2θ , ρ). Respectively, the conditional expectation of the damage parameter is
written as
E [γ| si, sm] = γ¯ + Z
(
nsm − nθ¯
)
, (1.14)
where Z ≡ Z (n, σ2ε , σ2θ , ρ, σγθ). This property is very useful in the analysis. With this
construction, the signals are one-dimensional and the expected marginal value functions
vi (qi; s) = E [θi| si, sm] − βqi satisfy the continuity, value monotonicity and single-crossing
properties. In addition, the aggregate quantity rule deﬁned in (1.7) may derive from (1.11)
and (1.14). Thus the aﬃne linear model provides a convenient and simple set-up for extending
the analysis of optimal pollution regulation, where regulated ﬁrms have private, yet uncertain,
information about their emission reduction costs.
1.5 Summaries of the essays
1.5.1 Prices vs. quantities when information is incomplete and
asymmetric
I examine the Weitzman (1974) prices versus quantities model by comparing a uniform Piqou-
vian tax and a program of tradeable permits where the permit market is assumed to perform
perfectly. I extend the information structure of Weitzman by allowing ﬁrms to have private
information about their uncertain abatement costs. Moreover, the abatement costs are sym-
metrically correlated between ﬁrms. I also allow the emission reduction beneﬁts and costs to
be correlated. The model is linear and the information structure is aﬃne. Hence, ﬁrms' values
for pollution are interdependent, but the marginal value functions, i.e. the marginal values of
avoided abatement activities, satisfy the continuity, value monotonicity and single-crossing
properties.
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In the absence of regulation, ﬁrms will not initiate emission reduction activities. Once reg-
ulation is implemented, ﬁrms update their production processes, install new and cleaner
technologies and gradually learn their costs of abatement. Hence, at the outset there are un-
certainties related both to the level of abatement costs and when the true costs are revealed.
However, ﬁrms are better informed than the regulator, which is an important modiﬁcation
to the Weitzman model. Moreover, the regulator's strategies are constrained in two impor-
tant ways in this paper. First, the regulator can only choose between a uniform tax and
tradeable permits with a ﬁxed total quantity. Second, the initial allocation is the only stage
at which it can inﬂuence the rules of the regulation. Moreover, there is only one round of
communication between ﬁrms and the regulator and it is also conducted during the process
of the initial allocation.
I propose the following two-stage regulation. The second stage is the standard prices versus
quantities setting, where the regulator implements either a uniform tax or a program of
tradeable permits. However, the information on which the policy parameters, i.e. the level of
tax or the total amount of permits, are based, is gathered in the ﬁrst stage of the regulation.
In the ﬁrst stage, the regulator conducts a generalized Vickrey auction. The main task of
the auction is to collect private information from regulated ﬁrms. In addition, the ﬁrst-stage
auction mechanism serves as an initial allocation method for pollution permits. Permits are
also allocated in the case of the price regulation. Under the tax (or subsidy) regulation, ﬁrms
may buy more permits from the regulator or sell permits back to the regulator at a given
price in the second stage. In the quantity regulation, on the other hand, the emissions cap
is ﬁxed, but ﬁrms may trade permits among themselves.
The main contribution of the paper is to investigate whether the Vickrey pricing rule induces
ﬁrms to bid sincerely in an auction and reveal their information to the regulator when the
auction is followed by either a price or quantity regulation. I show that the Vickrey auction is
incentive compatible when followed by a constant quantity regulation, whenever the positive
correlation between emissions reduction beneﬁts and costs is not too high. However, if
constant price regulation is used in the second stage, ﬁrms do not have incentives to bid
sincerely in the Vickrey auction, unless the correlation between emissions reduction beneﬁts
and costs is relatively high and negative. This, however, is not expected in most pollution
problem cases, as discussed by Stavins (1996). Hence, if the information is valuable to the
regulator and if the regulator is able to implement an incentive mechanism to collect the
private information of ﬁrms, tradeable permits are a more preferable instrument relative to
taxes when compared with the Weitzman model.
In addition, the solution concept of the generalized Vickrey auction is a Bayes Nash equilib-
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rium. It is thus not possible to implement the eﬃcient mechanism in dominant strategies,
when bidders' values are interdependent. However, even if the dominant strategy implemen-
tation is not possible, I show that collusion does not distort the outcomes of the ex-post
eﬃcient allocation and incentive compatibility of the Vickrey auction and thus the results
are in line with Montero (2008).
1.5.2 Learning through one round of communication in regulating
the commons when markets are imperfect
I apply the same information and regulation structure as in the ﬁrst essay. Polluting ﬁrms
are privately better informed than the regulator and ﬁrms' abatement costs are uncertain
but correlated. In addition, the pollution damage is uncertain and can be correlated with
the abatement costs. The regulator implements a two-stage regulation using the generalized
Vickrey auction in the ﬁrst stage.
The essay provides two important extensions. Firstly, for the second-stage regulation, the
regulator implements a quantity regulation, but now the emissions cap is not ﬁxed. Instead,
the supply of pollution permits is dictated by the non-constant permit supply schedules for
each ﬁrm. Secondly, I relax the assumption of a perfect permit market. However, I do not
specify the sources of market imperfections. Imperfections can arise from transaction costs,
asymmetric information between bidders or any other market friction. Taking these frictions
seriously would make the modeling extremely diﬃcult. Hence I make a rough simpliﬁcation
and assume that the marginal cost of trading for each ﬁrm is a linear function of the amount
the ﬁrm trades in the permit market with other ﬁrms. This simpliﬁcation provides a tractable
solution, but it does not change the intuition of the results.
Even if trading between ﬁrms is costly, ﬁrms are able to trade permits with the regulator
without any extra costs in the model. Furthermore, the non-constant permit supply schedules
take into account the frictions of the permit market. If the frictions are modest, the regulation
in the second stage is close to the non-constant permit regulation of Roberts and Spence
(1976) and if the frictions are very great, the optimal second stage regulation is Weitzman's
(1978) non-constant tax regulation.
The main contributions of the essay are two-fold. First, I study the incentive compatibility
conditions of the ﬁrst-stage auction mechanism followed by the permit resale market in the
regulation stage. I show that given the aﬃne linear structure of the model, the best strategy
is to bid sincerely in the Vickrey auction if every other ﬁrm bids sincerely, unless the (negative
or positive) correlation between the aggregate abatement costs and damage of pollution is
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relatively high.
Second, I address the role of ﬁrms' private information when the permit market suﬀers from
frictions. Given a perfectly competitive permit market, the regulator would be able to obtain
a solution that maximizes the expected social welfare even without the knowledge of ﬁrms'
private information. This is Roberts and Spence's (1976) non-constant permit regulation,
where the regulator is concerned about the aggregate pollution level and thus the aggregate
supply schedule of permits needs to be set equal to the expected marginal damage function.
The permit market solves the asymmetries between ﬁrms. With an imperfect permit market,
the regulator needs to take into account both the aggregate pollution and the distribution
and the initial allocation of permits among regulated ﬁrms. The private information of ﬁrms
is then valuable to the regulator.
1.5.3 Collusion in emission allowance auctions
Assuming that ﬁrms' values are private and their knowledge about their own abatement
costs is complete, I compare two auction designs for allocating the emission allowances: the
Vickrey auction and the uniform price auction. Even though the Vickrey auction is an eﬃcient
mechanism, it is vulnerable to collusion, as shown by Montero (2008). Collusion reduces the
auction revenues. In contrast, uniform price auctions are not necessarily eﬃcient. This gives
an interesting set-up for revenue and eﬃciency comparisons.
In the model, there are no secondary markets and the market consists of two parts: a
competitive fringe and a number of strategic ﬁrms. The fringe ﬁrms behave as price-takers in
the auction and thus the fringe balances the market. Hence I do not have to consider the low
price equilibria of Wilson (1979). To analyze these two auction designs, I postulate a linear-
quadratic demand function equilibrium with a ﬁxed supply of emission allowances. Moreover,
strategic ﬁrms may collude prior to an auction. Hence I link the auction model to a coalition-
formation game. I apply a partition function approach (e.g. Yi 2003), where the coalition
formation is conducted in two stages. In the ﬁrst stage, strategic ﬁrms decide whether to
participate in coalitions and in the second stage the coalitions play a non-cooperative auction
game against each other. This is the main contribution of the essay.
Montero (2008) shows that Vickrey auctions provide an eﬃcient allocation of allowances
even if ﬁrms collude. However, all the strategic ﬁrms have strong incentives to form one
big coalition in Vickrey auctions. Thus the revenue loss increases when the market share of
strategic ﬁrms increases.
In contrast, uniform price auctions create a coalition game with positive externalities. The
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more concentrated the coalition structure is, the better oﬀ the coalition outsiders are. In such
games, large coalitions are hard to sustain, because ﬁrms have strong incentives to deviate. I
examine three examples of the coalition formation game in a uniform price auction: a cartel
game with either myopic or farsighted ﬁrms and an open membership game with multiple
coalitions. The stable coalition structure and hence the eﬃciency and revenues of uniform
price auctions depend heavily on the coalition game and the structure of the market.
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Chapter 2
Prices vs. quantities when information is
incomplete and asymmetric
Abstract
I extend the Weitzman (1974) model by allowing ﬁrms to have private information about their
uncertain abatement costs. The abatement costs are correlated between ﬁrms. I propose a two-
stage regulation. In the ﬁrst stage, the regulator conducts a generalized Vickrey-Clarke-Groves
(VCG) mechanism. The ﬁrst-stage auction mechanism serves as an initial allocation method of
pollution permits and also collects private information from regulated ﬁrms. In the second stage,
the regulator implements either a constant price or a constant quantity regulation. In the constant
price regulation, a uniform tax rate is set at the level of the expected ﬁrst-best price. The constant
quantity regulation is implemented through a tradeable permit program, where the supply of permits
is ﬁxed at the level of the expected ﬁrst-best aggregate pollution. I show, using an aﬃne linear model,
that the VCG mechanism is incentive compatible when followed by the constant quantity regulation,
whenever the positive correlation between emissions reduction beneﬁts and costs is not too high.
However, if the constant price regulation is used in the second stage, the information mechanism is
incentive compatible only if the negative correlation between emissions reduction beneﬁts and costs
is relatively high.
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2.1 Introduction
When regulating harmful pollution, the relevant information about emission reduction costs
is often in the hands of regulated ﬁrms. Thus, in order to implement eﬃcient regulation,
the regulatory authority often communicates with regulated ﬁrms to get them to reveal
their private information. However, it is not in the ﬁrms' interest to tell the regulator
their information truthfully, if this is expected to increase their costs. Instead, ﬁrms might
overestimate or underestimate their costs of abatement activities depending on their beliefs
about the type of the future regulation. For instance, if the authority is planning to implement
a uniform tax on pollution, it is in the ﬁrms' interest to underestimate their costs, and thus
have the tax as low as possible. If, on the other hand, the regulator is planning to put up
a program of tradeable emission permits with a ﬁxed supply of permits, ﬁrms may ﬁnd it
proﬁtable to overestimate their expected costs in order to get the regulator to issue more
permits to the market. Signs of this kind of behavior have been seen, for example, in the ﬁrst
phases of the US Acid Rain Program and the EU Emissions Trading System. In both of these
programs the initial allocation of permits was generous and the resulting equilibrium prices
fell much lower than was initially expected (e.g. McAllister 2009). Hence, if the information
provided by the regulated ﬁrms is biased or incomplete, the regulation is not as eﬃcient as
it could be.
This paper extends, at least to my knowledge, the previous literature on regulating pollution
in two respects. First, I address the role of ﬁrms' private information in more detail. I
assume that regulated ﬁrms do not have accurate information about their own abatement
costs. Nevertheless, their information is more accurate than that of the regulator. In addition,
the ﬁrms' private information is correlated. Second, I combine the traditional prices versus
quantities regulation model of Weitzman (1974) with the information mechanism. It is of
great interest to ﬁnd a mechanism that gives incentives to regulated ﬁrms to reveal their
private information truthfully to the regulator. Hence, I present the following two-stage
regulation. In the ﬁrst stage, the regulator conducts a generalized Vickrey-Clarke-Groves
(VCG) mechanism, which allocates emission permits initially to regulated ﬁrms. The main
goal of the auction mechanism, however, is to collect the ﬁrms' private information. In
the second stage, the regulator implements either a constant price or a constant quantity
regulation. In the constant price regulation, a uniform tax/subsidy rate is set at the level of
the expected ﬁrst-best price. During the regulation period, ﬁrms are able to trade permits
with the regulator at this price. The constant quantity regulation is implemented through a
tradeable permit program, where the supply of permits is ﬁxed to the level of the expected
ﬁrst-best aggregate pollution. In the quantity regulation, ﬁrms are free to trade permits with
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each other. Even if the ﬁrst-stage information mechanism is ex-post eﬃcient without any
secondary market, regulated ﬁrms may not be willing to reveal their information truthfully
when the VCG mechanism is followed by the regulation stage. Hence, the main contribution
of this paper is to derive conditions for an incentive compatible VCG mechanism, when it is
followed by either a constant price or a constant quantity regulation. In addition, I show when
ﬁrms' private information is most valuable to the regulator and, thus, when the information
mechanism improves the outcomes of the regulation.
Weitzman (1974) derives a rule for choosing between a constant price and quantity regulation,
when a social planner is at the decision node where as much information as is feasible to
gather has already been obtained by one means or another and an operational plan must be
decided on the basis of the available current knowledge. Given that the permit market is
perfect, Weitzman shows that the choice between a price or quantity regulation depends on
the relationship between the slope of the aggregate marginal abatement costs and the slope
of the marginal pollution damage. For example, if the slope of aggregate marginal abatement
costs is greater than the slope of the marginal damage, then the constant price regulation
should be used. In addition, if the marginal abatement costs are correlated with the marginal
pollution damage, then the positive correlation increases the comparative advantage of the
quantity regulation. In this paper, I study the two constant regulations because these are
the two most recommended instruments that are also used in practice.1 For instance, there
is a wide and ongoing debate as to whether to use a tax or an emissions trading system in
climate policy (e.g. Newell and Pizer 2003, Karp and Zhang 2005, Metcalf 2007, Stavins
2007).2
If regulated ﬁrms have more accurate information about the costs of emission reductions
than the regulator has, then the regulator is eager to communicate with the ﬁrms before
1Roberts and Spence (1976), Weitzman (1978), Kennedy et al. (2010) and Yates (2012), for instance,
provide models with non-constant regulatory schemes. In a non-constant tax regulation, the tax rate varies
with the quantity of emissions and in a non-constant quantity regulation the permit supply is deﬁned as a
function of price. With a similar information structure to this chapter, I examine in Chapter 3 a two-stage
regulation with a non-constant quantity regulation in the second stage. In addition, in Chapter 3, I relax the
assumption of a perfect permit market.
2The climate change problem is a dynamic stock pollution problem. In a problem of stock pollution,
Newell and Pizer (2003) and Karp and Zhang (2005), for instance, build dynamic models with autocorre-
lated abatement costs. Using estimates of marginal abatement costs, marginal damage and other relevant
parameters in their models, they argue that taxes dominate quota regulation in the climate change problem.
Moreover, in Karp and Zhang (2005), the regulator learns from ﬁrms' reactions in diﬀerent periods and
adjusts regulation based on the new information (feed-back policy). However, in this paper the model is
static. During one period the regulation is ﬁxed by assumption and the regulation period of this paper can
be interpreted as a single period of a dynamic model. Also the timing of information is diﬀerent. In the
model of this paper, the regulator is eager to learn the private information of ﬁrms at the beginning of the
regulation period in order to improve the regulation for the same period, whereas in Karp and Zhang (2005)
the new information is used for adjusting the regulation in subsequent periods.
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implementing any regulation. Kwerel (1977) gives an example of a regulatory scheme with
one round of communication between the regulator and the regulated ﬁrms. In Kwerel's
model ﬁrms know their own abatement costs exactly. Kwerel proposes a simple subsidy and
license (permit) scheme, where polluting ﬁrms ﬁrst submit reports on their abatement costs
to the regulator. Based on the ﬁrms' reports, the regulator then allocates pollution licenses
to the ﬁrms and sets the price of a subsidy at which it will buy pack any licenses that are in
excess of the ﬁrms' emissions. Kwerel's scheme implements the ﬁrst-best in Nash equilibrium.
In other words, given that other ﬁrms report their private information truthfully to the
regulator, it is also the best response for each ﬁrm to report truthfully. However, Kwerel's
scheme works only if all licenses are auctioned oﬀ with an uniform-price design and if the
uniform-price auction is competitive (Montero 2008). If licenses are allocated for free, there
are more proﬁtable equilibrium strategies than those proposed by Kwerel. When using these
proﬁtable deviation strategies, ﬁrms over-report their demand for licenses to the maximum
extent. Also, if licenses are allocated using a uniform-price auction, bid-shading and the
resulting low-price auction equilibrium provide incentives for over-reporting and make the
regulation a money-making machine for ﬁrms.
Montero (2008) provides an eﬃcient mechanism for the commons problem by applying the
Vickrey-Clarke-Groves (VCG) pricing rule (Vickrey 1961, Clarke 1971, Groves 1973).3 Mon-
tero examines an indirect implementation of the VCG mechanism by proposing a simple
sealed-bid auction mechanism for emissions permits with endogenous (non-constant) sup-
ply.4 In Montero, each ﬁrm is certain about its abatement costs. In other words, ﬁrms have
pure private values of the emission permits. In a pure private values case, the VCG mech-
anism implements eﬃcient allocation in dominant strategies. Montero also shows that the
Vickrey auction implements the ﬁrst-best outcome, even if ﬁrms collude and coordinate their
bids in the auction.
I follow the previous literature (e.g. Weitzman 1974, 1978) and linearize the unknown func-
tions around the ﬁrst-best. In addition, I apply the aﬃne information structure from Vives
(2010, 2011). The model is thus the symmetric case of Weitzman (1974, 1978). Moreover,
I assume that prior distributions, the number of regulated ﬁrms and the functional forms of
the costs and beneﬁts of emission reductions are common knowledge. With the quantity reg-
ulation, I further assume that the second-stage market is perfect. Hence, trading is eﬃcient,
ﬁrms do not have market power and the market does not suﬀer from any kind of frictions.
Pollution is assumed to be uniformly mixed.
3The VCG mechanism is a multi-unit extension of a single-unit Vickrey auction. In this paper these are
used as synonyms.
4Dasgupta et al. (1980) propose a tax scheme applying a direct VCG mechanism.
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However, it is important to recognize the two important extensions that I make to the
Weitzman (1974) model. First, I take one step backwards and assume that regulated ﬁrms
have some private information about their own abatement costs. Reducing emissions is
costly for ﬁrms. They have to install new and cleaner technology, modify their production
processes, use more expensive inputs or perhaps even reduce production to some extent.
Above all, polluting ﬁrms have more accurate information about their expected abatement
costs than the regulator. This information is valuable but not available, a priori, to the
regulator.
Second, regulated ﬁrms do not have complete information about their true abatement costs.
Without any regulation, ﬁrms are not willing to reduce their emissions from the business-
as-usual level, and they have only limited understanding of the future costs of emissions
reductions. Once the regulation is implemented and ﬁrms start to invest in new technologies,
ﬁrms gradually learn their true abatement costs. However, the exact timing of the learning
process is not known beforehand. Moreover, if all regulated ﬁrms choose their abatement
technologies from a similar technology set, uncertain costs are correlated between ﬁrms.
Hence, the values that ﬁrms place on emission permits are interdependent. This complicates
the auction mechanism implemented in the ﬁrst stage of the regulation. In Montero (2008),
values are private and the Vickrey auction provides the ﬁrst-best solution. Unfortunately,
with common or interdependent values, the eﬃciency property of VCG mechanisms (or any
other mechanism) is not generally sustained (Jehiel and Moldovanu 2001). However, with
suitable conditions, such as when bidders' uncertainty is one-dimensional and marginal values
have single-crossing properties, a generalized Vickrey auction is ex-post eﬃcient (Dasgupta
and Maskin 2000, Ausubel and Cramton 2004). This holds at least in the absence of a
secondary market for permits.
Furthermore, I allow the uncertain beneﬁts and costs of emissions reductions to be correlated
(see also Stavins 1996). The relative magnitude of this correlation determines whether the
Vickrey auction is incentive compatible, when it is followed by one of the two constant
regulations. I show that it is optimal to bid sincerely in a Vickrey auction if every other
bidder is bidding sincerely and if the auction is followed by a constant quantity regulation,
whenever the positive correlation between emissions reduction beneﬁts and costs is not too
high. However, using the constant price regulation in the second stage, the Vickrey auction is
incentive compatible only if the negative correlation between aggregate abatement costs and
pollution damage is relatively high. Moreover, if there is no statistical dependence between
the marginal beneﬁts and marginal costs of environmental protection, I derive a modiﬁed rule
for choosing between the one-stage price regulation (uniform tax without any information
mechanism) and the two-stage quantity regulation (a tradeable emission permit program
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with the Vickrey auction as an initial allocation mechanism). The comparative advantage of
the two-stage quantity regulation increases if the private information of ﬁrms becomes more
accurate, if the correlation between ﬁrms' abatement costs increases and if the regulated
ﬁrms are more heterogeneous. In addition, I show that when the incentive compatibility
conditions are satisﬁed, collusive actions do not distort the ex-post eﬃciency of the Vickrey
auction.
In Section 2.2, I introduce the two-stage regulation and the aﬃne linear model. I solve the
problem backwards. Hence in Section 2.3, I ﬁrst derive the expected deadweight losses of
the constant price regulation and the constant quantity regulation and compare them given
the information of the regulator at the time of implementing the second-stage regulation. I
derive the value of information in diﬀerent information structures. In Section 2.4, I describe
the Vickrey payment rule of the information stage, and derive the incentive compatibility
conditions of the Vickrey auction. A modiﬁed Weitzman rule is introduced in Section 2.5
and Section 2.6 provides a robustness check for collusion. Section 2.7 concludes.
2.2 Model
Consider n ≥ 2 risk-neutral ﬁrms indexed with i = 1, ..., n.5 As a by-product of the
normal production of goods and services, ﬁrms pollute. Pollution is denoted by a vector
q = (q1, . . . , qn) and Q =
∑n
i=1 qi denotes the aggregate pollution. Without any regulation,
the pollution of ﬁrm i is at the business-as-usual level, qbaui . Reducing emissions below the
business-as-usual level is costly for ﬁrms.
Let ACi (zi; θi) denote the abatement costs of ﬁrm i, where zi (qi) = qbaui − qi ≥ 0 is the
amount of abatement and θi is a ﬁrm-speciﬁc cost parameter. Put the other way round,
the gross value of the avoided abatement costs of ﬁrm i, that is the gross value of pollution,
writes Ui (qi; θi) = ACi
(
qbaui ; θi
) − ACi (zi (qi) ; θi). Hence the marginal abatement costs, or
the marginal value of the avoided abatement costs, is denoted by U ′i =
dUi
dqi
= ui (qi; θi).
The cost parameter θi deﬁnes the level of the marginal abatement costs of ﬁrm i such that
ui (qi; θi) ≥ ui (qi; θ′i) if θi ≥ θ′i for all 0 ≤ qi ≤ qbaui and i. Moreover, it is reasonable to
assume that with closely related industrial ﬁrms, emission reduction technologies are related
and costs are thus correlated. In particular, I assume that cost parameters are correlated
between ﬁrms.
5I relax this assumption later and let there be one cartel with all ﬁrms as members or only one big ﬁrm,
and thus n = 1.
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Furthermore, pollution causes damage to the environment and the damage function is denoted
by DF (Q; γ). The marginal damage function is denoted by DF ′ = dDF
dQ
= MDF (Q; γ)
and γ is a damage parameter such that MDF (Q; γ) ≥ MDF (Q; γ′) if γ ≥ γ′ for all
0 ≤ Q ≤∑ni=1 qbaui . Pollution is assumed to be uniformly mixed. The standard assumptions
hold, U ′i > 0, U
′′
i ≤ 0, and DF ′ > 0, DF ′′ ≥ 0.
The ﬁrst-best solution maximizes the social welfare with respect to the pollution vector q:
max
q
W (q) =
n∑
i=1
Ui (qi; θi)−DF
(
n∑
i=1
qi; γ
)
. (2.1)
Let us assume that this problem has an interior solution denoted by a vector q? = (q?1, . . . , q
?
n)
where 0 < q?i < q
bau
i for all i and Q
? =
∑n
i=1 q
?
i . In the ﬁrst-best, the pollution of each ﬁrm is
at the level where the marginal value of pollution equals the ﬁrst-best price and, in addition,
the ﬁrst-best price equals the value of the marginal damage function:
ui (q
?
i ; θi) = p
? = MDF (Q?; γ) .
Unfortunately, the ﬁrst-best solution is unknown due to the uncertain information about
the true damage function and the true emission reduction costs. The cost parameters θ =
(θ1, . . . , θn) are unknown to all at the outset, but each ﬁrm receives a private signal of its own
cost parameter and ﬁrms learn their true abatement costs during the regulation period. In
order to maximize the expected welfare, the regulator implements regulation r. Firms react
to this regulation. Let pii,r (·) denote the proﬁt function of ﬁrm i. The proﬁt-maximizing
solution of ﬁrm i, after the revelation of θi, is thus denoted by qi,r = arg max pii,r (qi; θi).
Hence, qr = (q1,r, . . . , qn,r) denotes the vector of proﬁt maximizing pollution levels and
Qr =
∑n
i=1 qi,r is the total level of pollution. The problem of the regulator is then to
choose a regulation r which maximizes the expected welfare given the reactions of ﬁrms to
the regulation:
max
r
E [W (qr)] = E
[
n∑
i=1
Ui (qi,r; θi)−DF (Qr; γ)
]
(2.2)
s.t.
qi,r = arg max pii,r (qi; θi) .
In the next two sections I ﬁrst describe the two-stage regulation model where the regulator
can communicate with regulated ﬁrms before implementing the actual regulation. This com-
munication is conducted by an information mechanism. Furthermore, I assume that every
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ﬁrm and the regulator know the primitives of the model: the prior distributions of uncertain
variables, the number of regulated ﬁrms and the functional forms of the costs and beneﬁts
of emission reductions. In particular, I apply an aﬃne linear model, which is also introduced
below.
2.2.1 Two-stage regulation
With the possibility of communication, the model has two stages. In the ﬁrst stage the regu-
lator implements an information mechanism, which aims to reveal ﬁrms' private information
to the regulator. In addition, the ﬁrst-stage mechanism serves as an initial allocation method
for permits. This is done utilizing a generalized Vickrey auction and I denote this stage the
information stage. Before conducting the auction mechanism, the regulator informs all ﬁrms
about the rules of the auction and the regulation period. Then, according to the auction
mechanism, ﬁrms submit reports (bidding schedules) to the regulator. The regulator's ob-
jective is to get ﬁrms bid sincerely in the auction. Thus, the following deﬁnition is the core
concept in this paper.
Deﬁnition 2.1. The Vickrey auction in the information stage is said to be incentive com-
patible (IC) if bidding sincerely in the auction is the best response to other bidders' strategies
when they too bid sincerely.
After the auction, the regulator allocates pollution permits to ﬁrms and collects the auction
payments from them. The payments and the allocation rule are determined by the ﬁrms'
reports. The auction mechanism is a time-consuming procedure. The regulator is not able
to conduct an auction at any point of time. I thus assume that after an auction there is
a relatively long time period when ﬁrms take diﬀerent actions: trade inputs and outputs
of production, make decisions about reducing emissions and, most importantly, learn. This
period is the second stage of the model and it is called the regulation period.
Using the information from the ﬁrst stage, the regulator sets up a regulation in the beginning
of the regulation period. If the price regulation is chosen, then the regulator establishes a
uniform tax/subsidy for ﬁrms. The tax (subsidy) speciﬁes the price at which ﬁrms are able
to buy (sell) emission permits from (to) the regulator during the regulation stage. Hence,
permit transactions are conducted on two occasions. First, ﬁrms have to buy pollution
permits based on their reports after the information stage. Second, ﬁrms may update their
holdings of emissions permits during the regulation period.
Instead, if a quantity regulation is applied in the regulation period, ﬁrms may trade pollution
rights with each other. Firms may need this opportunity when they learn their true abatement
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costs. However, the total amount of permits is ﬁxed after the information mechanism. With
the quantity regulation, I assume that the second-stage market is perfect. The assumption
of perfect competition is a natural ﬁrst step for the resale market. Suppose that the initial
allocation is ex-post eﬃcient. Then the initial allocation after the information stage is fairly
close to the ﬁrst-best and ﬁrms' ability to use market power is limited. Nevertheless, the
results would change if there were trade frictions in the secondary market. However, I ignore
all market imperfections in the resale market.6
At the end of the regulation period, each ﬁrm is obligated to hold an amount of permits
equalling the emissions it had in the regulation period. I assume that the penalty for being
non-compliant is very high and ﬁrms do not violate the compliance rule on purpose. To
recap, the timing of the regulation is the following.
• t0: All agents (regulated ﬁrms and the regulator) learn the distribution functions of the
uncertain parameters and the functional forms of ﬁrms' abatement costs and pollution
damage. Each ﬁrm receives a noisy signal about its own abatement costs.
• t1: The ﬁrst stage - the information stage. The regulator conducts an auction, in which
emission permits are initially allocated to ﬁrms. The regulator announces both the
rules of the auction mechanism and the rules of the regulation during the regulation
period. In the auction, each ﬁrm i simultaneously submits a demand schedule to the
regulator. The regulator sets the clearing price and the total quantity of permits to
be allocated. Then it distributes permits to ﬁrms and collects auction payments from
ﬁrms. The regulation period starts after the auction.
• t1−t2: The second stage - the regulation stage. In the quantity regulation, the aggregate
supply of permits is ﬁxed at the level of the initial allocation. Firms are, however,
allowed to trade permits with each other. In contrast, if the price regulation is used,
ﬁrms may purchase more permits from the regulator or sell permits back to the regulator
at the announced uniform price, which is set at the level of the ﬁrst-stage auction
clearing price. Firms learn their cost parameters during the regulation period.
• t2: All ﬁrms have learned their cost parameters. The time point t2 is not known to any
ﬁrm or to the regulator at the outset. The true damage of pollution is not revealed.
6In Appendix 2.E, I derive the results of the model when the permit market suﬀers from market frictions
and run some numerical simulations. See Chapter 3 for a more general analysis when the permit market is
not perfect.
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2.2.2 Aﬃne linear model
In the following, I introduce the aﬃne linear model and derive the linearized version of the
regulator's problem (2.2). In particular, all the unknown marginal functions are linearized
around the ﬁrst-best (see Weitzman 1974, 1978). In addition, all the random variables are
normally distributed (see Vives 2010, 2011).7 To put it more formally, the aﬃne linear model
is deﬁned as follows.
Deﬁnition 2.2. The aﬃne linear model is deﬁned by equations (2.4) - (2.16), where the
distribution functions of the uncertain variables and the functional forms of the abatement
costs and pollution damage are common knowledge and the permit market is perfect.
Each ﬁrm has the following quadratic approximation of its abatement cost function evaluated
around the ﬁrst-best:
Ui (qi; θi) = Ui (q
?
i ; θi) + U
′
i (q
?
i ; θi) (qi − q?i ) +
1
2
U ′′i (q
?
i ; θi) (qi − q?i )2 . (2.3)
The linearized marginal value function of ﬁrm i is thus written as
ui (qi; θi) = θi − βqi, (2.4)
where the intercept, i.e. the cost parameter, is θi ≡ U ′i (q?i ; θi) − U ′′i (q?i ; θi) q?i > 0 and the
slope β ≡ −U ′′i (q?i ; θi) ≥ 0. The slope parameter β is constant and common knowledge
to all ﬁrms and to the regulator.8 However, the cost parameter θi is initially uncertain to
ﬁrm i (and to other ﬁrms and the regulator). The cost parameters share the same prior
distribution, θi ∼ N
(
θ¯, σ2θ
)
and these cost parameters are symmetrically correlated between
ﬁrms with a covariance, cov [θi, θj] = ρσ2θ . The average cost parameter θm =
1
n
n∑
i=1
θi has an
expected value E [θm] = θ¯ and a variance var [θm] = 1n (1 + (n− 1) ρ)σ2θ .
At the outset, each ﬁrm receives a noisy signal of its own cost parameter, si = θi + εi.
The noise terms are i.i.d., with a normal distribution around zero, εi ∼ N (0, σ2ε). Let
s = (s1, . . . , sn) denote the signal vector and s−i = (s1, . . . , si−1, si+1, . . . , sn) is the signal
vector of every other ﬁrm but ﬁrm i. The average signal is denoted by sm = 1n
n∑
i=1
si and it
7Using normally distributed random variables is convenient for modeling purposes but lacks reality. The
support of the normal random variable is [−∞,∞]. Thus, given the assumptions of the model, there is a
positive probability that a ﬁrm's marginal value of pollution permits is highly negative and decreasing in the
ﬁrm's pollution. This is not realistic, nor is it realistic that the marginal damage function of pollution is
negative. Hence I assume throughout the paper that all the parameter values of the model are such that all
unrealistic events are highly unprobable, and thus can be ignored.
8The assumption of a constant slope makes the model a bit more easy to solve. The common knowledge
assumption is, however, more restrictive. Without this assumption, the model would not be tractable.
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has an expected value E [sm] = θ¯ and a variance var [sm] = 1n (σ
2
ε + (1 + (n− 1) ρ)σ2θ).9 I
assume that the expected values are interdependent and hence σ2ε > 0 and 0 < ρ < 1. I do
not consider negative correlation between marginal values.10
Firms update their beliefs about cost parameters given the information they have. In addition
to the ﬁrm's own signal, the clearing price of the ﬁrst-stage auction reveals information
about the signals of other ﬁrms. Indeed, given that the auction mechanism is incentive
compatible (Deﬁnition 2.1) and thus all ﬁrms bid sincerely, then under the aﬃne linear model
(Deﬁnition 2.2) the clearing price p is suﬃcient statistics for sm. This entails that E [θi| sm]
is informationally equivalent to E [θi| p]. Furthermore, due to the symmetric correlation
between ﬁrms' cost parameters, E [θi| s] is informationally equivalent to E [θi| sm], and thus
E [θi| s] = E [θi| sm] = E [θi| p]. I explain this mechanism later. Now, given that ﬁrm i knows
both its own signal si and the average signal sm (or the whole signal vector s, or the clearing
price of the incentive compatible Vickrey auction), then the conditional expected value of θi
writes as (see Appendix 2.A and e.g. DeGroot 1970, Vives 2011)
E [θi| s] = Aθ¯ +Bsi + Cnsm, (2.5)
where11
A =
σ2ε
σ2ε + (1 + (n− 1) ρ)σ2θ
B =
(1− ρ)σ2θ
σ2ε + (1− ρ)σ2θ
C =
ρσ2θσ
2
ε
(σ2ε + (1− ρ)σ2θ) (σ2ε + (1 + (n− 1) ρ)σ2θ)
.
The variance of θi conditional on s is, respectively,
var [θi| s] = (B + C)σ2ε . (2.6)
Furthermore, the conditional expected value and the variance of the average cost parameter
writes as
E [θm| s] = θ¯ + (1− A)
(
sm − θ¯
)
, (2.7)
9Note also that var [sm] = cov [si, sm].
10The model would have independent private values if ρ = 0. The pure common values case is when the
value parameters are perfectly correlated and thus ρ = 1.
11The expected value of θi conditional only on signal si is E [θi| si] = σ
2
ε
σ2ε+σ
2
θ
θ¯ +
σ2θ
σ2ε+σ
2
θ
si. Note also that
A+B + nC = 1 and thus 1−A = B + nC.
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var [θm| s] = A · var [θm] =
(
B
n
+ C
)
σ2ε . (2.8)
Note that after the revelation of the average signal sm, there would still be some uncertainty
before ﬁrm i learns its true cost parameter θi. The remaining uncertainty of ﬁrm i is εsi =
θi − E [θi| s]. This is a normally distributed random variable with the parameters εsi ∼
N (0, (B + C)σ2ε) and a covariance, cov
[
εsi , ε
s
j
]
= Cσ2ε . The distribution of the remaining
aggregate uncertainty, nεsm =
∑n
i=1 ε
s
i , has the parameters nε
s
m ∼ N (0, (B + nC)nσ2ε).
Hence (2.4) and (2.5) yield the expected marginal value function conditional on s:
vi (qi; s) = E [ui (qi)| s] = Aθ¯ +Bsi + Cnsm − βqi. (2.9)
Respectively, the second-order approximation of the damage function writes as
DF (Q; γ) = DF (Q?; γ) +DF ′ (Q?; γ) (Q−Q?) + 1
2
DF ′′ (Q?; γ) (Q−Q?)2 . (2.10)
This gives the marginal damage function:
MDF (Q; γ) = γ + δQ, (2.11)
where γ ≡ DF ′ (Q?; γ) − DF ′′ (Q?; γ)Q? and δ ≡ DF ′′ (Q?; γ) ≥ 0. Again, the slope pa-
rameter δ is assumed to be common knowledge. The uncertainty of the damage function is
captured by the damage parameter γ. This is assumed to be a normally distributed random
variable, γ ∼ N(γ¯, σ2γ). Furthermore, γ is correlated with θm and I denote the covariance by
cov [γ, θm] = σγθ.12 Hence, the expected marginal damage function conditional on the sum
of all signals nsm =
n∑
i=1
si is written as
y (Q; s) = E [MDF (Q)| s] (2.12)
= E [γ| s] + δQ,
where
E [γ| s] = γ¯ + Z (nsm − nθ¯) , (2.13)
and
Z =
cov [γ, nsm]
var [nsm]
=
σγθ
σ2ε + (1 + (n− 1) ρ)σ2θ
. (2.14)
I assume that the true damage parameter is not revealed during the regulation period. The
12The correlation between γ and θm is ργθ =
σγθ√
var[θm]
√
var[γ]
and thus σγθ =
√
1
n (1− ρ+ nρ)σθσγργθ.
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remaining uncertainty related to the damage parameter, after the revelation of signals, is
εsγ = γ − γ¯ − Z
(
nsm − nθ¯
)
and the conditional variance of γ and εsγ is
var [γ| s] = var [εsγ] = σ2γ − nZσγθ. (2.15)
Note also that the covariance between the average cost and damage parameters conditional
on signal vector s is simply
cov [γ, θm| s] = Aσγθ. (2.16)
The covariance between abatement costs and pollution damage plays an important role in
this paper. In particular, it deﬁnes the conditions under which sincere bidding in the infor-
mation stage of the two-stage regulation is incentive compatible. I show later in Proposition
2.1 that given the aﬃne linear model, the information mechanism is incentive compatible
when followed by a constant quantity regulation, whenever the positive correlation between
emissions reduction beneﬁts and costs is not too high:
σγθ
var [θm]
≤ 1. (2.17)
In particular, (2.17) ensures that the aggregate quantity rule of the ﬁrst-stage auction is
weakly increasing in each bidder's signal. Note that 1 − A − nZ = var[θm]−σγθ
var[sm]
and thus
(2.17) is equivalent to nZ ≤ 1 − A. Furthermore, in Proposition 2.2, I show that, when a
constant price regulation is used in the second stage, the information mechanism is incentive
compatible only if the negative correlation between emissions reduction beneﬁts and costs is
relatively high:
σγθ
var [θm]
≤ −nδ
β
. (2.18)
This is equivalent to nZ ≤ −nδ
β
(1− A).
Finally, given the aﬃne linear model, the pollution of ﬁrm i in the ﬁrst-best is q?i =
1
β
(θi − p?)
where p? is the ﬁrst-best price:
p? =
nδθm + βγ
β + nδ
. (2.19)
Furthermore, the welfare-maximizing aggregate pollution level may write
Q? =
n (θm − γ)
β + nδ
. (2.20)
Hence the second-best regulation minimizes the following approximation of the expected
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deadweight loss equation:
min
r
E [DWLr] = E [W (q
?)−W (qr)] (2.21)
≈ E
[
n∑
i
θi (q
?
i − qi,r)−
β
2
n∑
i
(
q?2i − q2i,r
)− γ (Q? −Qr)− δ
2
(
Q?2 −Q2r
)]
.
This problem is equivalent to (2.2). In this paper I consider two alternative constant regula-
tions. The subscript r = p denotes that the regulator implements a uniform tax/subsidy and
thus uses a constant price regulation. On the other hand, if r = q then the constant quantity
regulation through tradeable emission permits is chosen for the regulation period.
2.3 Regulation stage
In this section, I examine Weitzman's (1974) prices vs. quantities comparison under the aﬃne
linear model. I compare the constant price and quantity regulations, given the regulator's
information. In particular, let the information parameter I = 0 denote that the regulator
knows only the prior information and thus the regulation is implemented in the absence of
the information mechanism. In contrast, I = s denotes that the regulator has complete
information about the private information of ﬁrms. The problem of the regulator is to
choose r = p, q that minimizes the expected deadweight loss from (2.21) given the responses
of regulated ﬁrms.
2.3.1 Prices
With the price instrument, the regulator sets a tax/subsidy at the level of the expected
ﬁrst-best price. When the regulator knows only the prior information (I = 0), the expected
ﬁrst-best price is
p¯ (0) =
nδθ¯ + βγ¯
β + nδ
. (2.22)
Respectively, if the regulator has complete information about the signal vector (I = s), the
expected ﬁrst-best price writes as
p¯ (s) =
nδθ¯m (s) + βγ¯ (s)
β + nδ
(2.23)
= p¯ (0) +
nδ (1− A) + βnZ
β + nδ
(
sm − θ¯
)
,
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where the last line comes from inserting θ¯m (s) = E [θm| s] from (2.7) and γ¯ (s) = E [γ| s]
from (2.13).
In the beginning of the regulation period, the regulator allocates permits to ﬁrms according
to the expected ﬁrst-best emissions conditional on the regulator's information I. For ﬁrm i
this gives q¯i (I) = 1β
(
θ¯i (I)− p¯ (I)
)
, where p¯ (I) is the expected ﬁrst-best price from (2.22) or
(2.23), and θ¯i (I) = E [θi| I]. With the aﬃne information structure, θ¯i (0) = θ¯ for all ﬁrms,
and θ¯i (s) = E [θi| s] from (2.5). For the average ﬁrm, indexed with m and receiving signal
sm, q¯m (I) = 1nQ¯ (I), where Q¯ (I) =
∑n
i=1 q¯i (I) is the total emissions cap in the beginning
of the regulation period. If the regulator has no information about ﬁrms' signals, all ﬁrms
receive an equal amount of permits:
q¯i (0) = q¯ (2.24)
=
θ¯ − γ¯
β + nδ
.
On the other hand, when the regulator knows the signal vector s, it can implement the
ex-post eﬃcient allocation denoted by qe (s) = (qe1 (s) , . . . , q
e
n (s)) ≡ E [q?| I]:
q¯i (s) = q
e
i (s) (2.25)
= q¯ +
(
1− A− nZ
β + nδ
)(
sm − θ¯
)
︸ ︷︷ ︸
q¯m(s)
+
B
β
(si − sm) .
Firms maximize their proﬁts given the announced tax (or subsidy):
max
qi
pii,p (qi; θi) =
ˆ qi
q¯i(I)
{ui (x; θi)− p¯ (I)} dx. (2.26)
In equilibrium, ﬁrms equate their marginal abatement costs with the tax (or subsidy). In
Appendix 2.B, I derive the outcomes of the price and quantity regulation (see also Weitzman
1974, and Stavins 1996). The proﬁt-maximizing solution of ﬁrm i for equilibrium pollution
yields:
qi,p = q¯i (I) +
1
β
(
θi − θ¯i (I)
)
. (2.27)
However, while the price is ﬁxed, the realized aggregate emissions may be over or under the
ﬁrst-best emissions after the revelation of the true abatement costs. The expected deadweight
loss of the price regulation is thus
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E [DWLp (I)] =
1
2
(
1
β
n
+ δ
){(
nδ
β
)2
var [θm| I] + 2
(
nδ
β
)
cov [θm, γ| I] + var [γ| I]
}
.
(2.28)
2.3.2 Quantities
The initial allocation of the quantity regulation is given by the expected ﬁrst-best quantities
from (2.24) or (2.25). During the regulation stage, ﬁrms trade permits with each other. Thus,
when the market is competitive, the maximization problem of ﬁrm i writes as
max
qi
pii,q (qi; θi) =
ˆ qi
q¯i(I)
{ui (x; θi)− pq} dx. (2.29)
In the competitive equilibrium, ﬁrms equate their marginal abatement costs with the permit
market price pq. The equilibrium price is deﬁned by the market-clearing rule (see again
Appendix 2.B):
pq = p¯ (I) + θm − θ¯m (I) . (2.30)
However, the total allocation of permits does not adjust to any changes in abatement costs.
The equilibrium pollution of ﬁrm i is
qi,q = q¯i (I) +
1
β
{(
θi − θ¯i (I)
)− (θm − θ¯m (I))} . (2.31)
The expected deadweight loss, due to the non-adjustable total supply of permits, is written
as
E [DWLq (I)] =
1
2
(
1
β
n
+ δ
)
{var [θm| I]− 2cov [θm, γ| I] + var [γ| I]} . (2.32)
2.3.3 Prices vs. quantities
Equations (2.28) and (2.32) give Weitzman's (1974) prices vs. quantities comparison. The
comparative advantage of the constant price regulation over the quantity regulation has an
expected value
∆pq (I) = E [DWLq (I)−DWLp (I)] (2.33)
=
n
2β
var [θm| I]
{
1− nδ
β
− 2 σγθ
var[θm]
}
.
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Equation (2.33) deﬁnes the Weitzman rule. The constant price regulation should be chosen
if ∆pq (I) > 0 and the constant quantity regulation if ∆pq (I) < 0.
Lemma 2.1. (Weitzman rule) Consider the aﬃne linear model with constant price and
quantity regulations. In expected terms, when the abatement costs and pollution damage are
not correlated (σγθ = 0), the constant price regulation is more favorable if the slope of the
aggregate marginal abatement cost function is steeper (less price-elastic) than the marginal
damage function, that is if β
n
> δ. Conversely, if the slope of the marginal damage is steeper,
i.e. if δ > β
n
, then the regulator should use the constant quantity regulation. Furthermore, if
the marginal abatement costs are correlated with the marginal damage of pollution, then the
positive correlation (σγθ > 0) increases the comparative advantage of the constant quantity
regulation (see also Stavins, 1996).
Proof. See (2.33).
The critical value of the ratio between the slopes at which both instruments have equal
expected welfare, i.e. κ ≡
(
nδ
β
: ∆pq = 0
)
, is given by
κ = 1− 2 σγθ
var[θm]
.
It is also easy to see from (2.33) that the regulator should always use quantities if the positive
covariance between abatement costs and emission reduction beneﬁts, in relative terms, is
high enough. In particular, this is the case whenever σγθ
var[θm]
> 1
2
and thus ∆pq (I) is then
always non-positive, while nδ
β
≥ 0. Respectively, the constant price regulation should be used
whenever σγθ
var[θm]
< 1
2
(
1− nδ
β
)
. I examine next the role of the regulator's information. The
results are collected in the following lemmas.
Lemma 2.2. Given the aﬃne linear model, the choice between constant price and quantity
regulations is independent of the regulator's knowledge of ﬁrms' private information.
Proof. The choice between constant price and quantity regulations depends on the sign of
∆pq (I). Furthermore, sign [∆pq (I)] = sign
[
1− nδ
β
− 2 σγθ
var[θm]
]
. This is independent of the
regulator's information I.
Lemma 2.3. Given the aﬃne linear model, the diﬀerence between the expected deadweight
losses of constant price and quantity regulations is decreasing in the regulator's information
I if σ2θ > 0.
Proof. Note that var [θm| s] = A · var [θm]. From (2.33) it is then clear that |∆pq (s)| <
|∆pq (0)| if A < 1. This, on the other hand, is true whenever σ2θ > 0.
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Lemma 2.4. Given the aﬃne linear model, the private information of ﬁrms is valueless to
the regulator if
σγθ
var[θm]
= 1.
Proof. According to the Weitzman rule (2.33), the regulator should use constant quantity
regulation, whenever σγθ
var[θm]
> 1
2
. Furthermore, from (2.32) we may derive the value of ﬁrms'
private information to the regulator when using a constant quantity regulation:
∆q,I = E [DWLq (0)−DWLq (s)]
=
1
2
(
1
β
n
+ δ
)
(var [θm])
2
var [sm]
(
1− σγθ
var [θm]
)2
.
This is zero when σγθ
var[θm]
= 1 > 1
2
.
Lemma 2.5. Given the aﬃne linear model, the private information of ﬁrms is valueless to
the regulator if
σγθ
var[θm]
= −nδ
β
.
Proof. According to the Weitzman rule (2.33) the regulator should use constant price regu-
lation, whenever σγθ
var[θm]
< 1
2
(
1− nδ
β
)
. From (2.28) we may derive the value of ﬁrms' private
information to the regulator when using a constant price regulation:
∆p,I = E [DWLp (0)−DWLp (s)]
=
1
2
(
1
β
n
+ δ
)
(var [θm])
2
var [sm]
(
nδ
β
+
σγθ
var [θm]
)2
.
This is zero when σγθ
var[θm]
= −nδ
β
< 1
2
(
1− nδ
β
)
.
Lemmas 2.4 and 2.5 imply that the aggregate initial allocation Q¯ (I) is independent of infor-
mation I when σγθ = var [θm] and, respectively, the level of uniform tax p¯ (I) is independent
of I when σγθ = −nδβ var [θm]. These are also easily derived from (2.23) and (2.25). In
other cases the private information of ﬁrms is valuable to the regulator. However, given the
regulations being considered, the natural next question is: Are there mechanisms that give
incentives for ﬁrms to reveal their private information to the regulator? This is examined in
the next section.
2.4 Information stage
In this section, I examine a mechanism which aims to reveal the private information of ﬁrms
to the regulator. The regulator is then able to implement ex-post eﬃcient allocation of
emissions permits in the beginning of the regulation stage and thus improve the outcome
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of the chosen regulation. Due to the correlated cost parameters, ﬁrm j's signal aﬀects ﬁrm
i's expected marginal value function. Firms' expected values are thus interdependent. In
general, this poses a problem of ﬁnding a mechanism that is able to implement eﬃcient
allocation (Jehiel and Moldovanu 2001). Hence, in order to achieve ex-post eﬃciency in the
auction in the information stage, some additional assumptions about expected marginal value
functions are needed (Dasgupta and Maskin 2000, Ausubel and Cramton 2004). Following
Ausubel and Cramton, the expected marginal value functions should satisfy the following
three assumptions:
1. Continuity: vi (qi; s) is jointly continuous in (s, qi).
2. Value monotonicity: vi (qi; s) is non-negative, and
∂vi(qi;s)
∂si
> 0 and ∂vi(qi;s)
∂qi
≤ 0.
3. Single-crossing: Let s′ denote a signal vector s′ = (s′i, s−i) and s = (si, s−i). Then
vi (qi; s) has a single-crossing property, if for all i, j 6= i, qi, qj, s−i and s′i > si,
vi (qi; s) > vj (qj; s)⇒ vi (qi; s′) > vj (qj; s′)
and
vi (qi; s
′) < vj (qj; s′)⇒ vi (qi; s) < vj (qj; s) .
It is easy to see that (2.9) satisﬁes all these conditions. Continuity is just a regular assumption
that guarantees an unambiguous solution to the ﬁrst stage auction. Value monotonicity
implies that ﬁrms are naturally ordered with respect to their signals, and that ﬁrms' demand
curves in the Vickrey auction are weakly downward-sloping. Single-crossing means that an
increase in signal si increases ﬁrm i's expected marginal value more than any other ﬁrm's
marginal value for a given quantity. Furthermore, if a ﬁxed quantity is assigned eﬃciently
among the ﬁrms in the auction, then ﬁrm i's quantity qi is weakly increasing in signal si.
(Ausubel and Cramton 2004.)
Single-crossing also implies that signal si does not aﬀect the natural order of ﬁrms other than
i. This means that if ﬁrms other than i are ordered by a vector
O−i (x; s) ≡ (v1 (x; s) , . . . , vi−1 (x; s) , vi+1 (x; s) , . . . , vn (x; s))
such that vj (x; s) ≥ vk (x; s) for every x and j < k, then signal si does not aﬀect the order
of vector O−i (x; s).
Next I ﬁrst describe the generalized VCG mechanism and then I study the incentive compat-
ibility conditions of the VCG mechanism conducted in the information stage, when followed
by the two possible constant regulations.
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2.4.1 Vickrey auction
According to the revelation principle, for each indirect Bayesian mechanism there is a payoﬀ-
equivalent direct revelation mechanism (e.g. Myerson 1981). I ﬁrst describe the direct and
then the indirect interpretation of the same VCG mechanism using the aﬃne linear model.
In the direct mechanism, the regulator requests reports from ﬁrms on their payoﬀ-relevant
parameters unknown to the regulator. In our model the reports include signals. The reg-
ulator also informs ﬁrms about the allocation and payment rules, which are determined by
the reports and are the basis of the regulation in the second stage. In their Theorem 1,
Ausubel and Cramton (2004) prove that for any value function satisfying continuity, value
monotonicity and the single-crossing property, the Vickrey auction with reserve pricing has
truthful bidding as an ex-post equilibrium for any monotonic aggregate quantity rule Q¯ (s)
and associated monotonic eﬃcient assignment rule qei (s).
Firstly, following Ausubel and Cramton (2004), the monotonic eﬃcient assignment rule qei (s)
is deﬁned by
vi (q
e
i (s) ; s)

≤ v−i
(
qe−i (s) ; s
)
, if qei (s) = 0
= v−i
(
qe−i (s) ; s
)
, if 0 < qei (s) < Q¯ (s)
≥ v−i
(
qe−i (s) ; s
)
, if qei (s) = Q¯ (s) .
(2.34)
Secondly, the Vickrey auction is deﬁned as a mechanism with the payment rule
Ri (s) =
ˆ qei (s)
0
vi (x; sˆi (s−i, x) , s−i) dx. (2.35)
In (2.35), signal sˆi is the lowest possible signal for which ﬁrm i would have won the unit x
given other bidders' signals s−i:
sˆi (s−i, x) = inf
si
{si| qei (si, s−i) ≥ x} . (2.36)
Thus the marginal payment of unit x is the expected marginal value of ﬁrm i evaluated at x, if
ﬁrm i would have received and reported the lowest possible signal sˆi such that x = qei (sˆi, s−i).
Finally, reserve pricing is deﬁned by a monotonic aggregate quantity rule Q¯ (s) which is weakly
increasing in each bidder's signal. Due to this and the single-crossing property, it is possible
to distribute the total quantity eﬃciently and each ﬁrm's allocation is weakly increasing in its
signal. Ausubel and Cramton (2004) also assume independent types, which is a requirement
for their general revenue equivalence theorem. With the aﬃne information structure, signals
are not independent. However, this is not an issue, while revenue extraction is not a central
question in this model. The primary objective of the regulator is to maximize the expected
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social welfare and not to extract the maximum amount of revenue.13 The analysis of this
paper is based on ex-post arguments which do not require any assumptions about the
distribution of signals, as noted also by Ausubel and Cramton (2004). The aggregate quantity
rule Q¯ (s) is determined by
Q¯ (s) =
y−1
(
v−i
(
qe−i (s) ; s
)
; s
)
, if qei (s) = 0
y−1 (vi (qei (s) ; s) ; s) , if q
e
i (s) > 0.
(2.37)
In addition, Ausubel and Cramton (2004) show that even if an equilibrium in an auction
without a resale is typically not an equilibrium in an auction followed by a resale market,
a resale market does not distort the equilibrium of the Vickrey auction. In Theorem 2,
they state that if the Vickrey auction with reserve pricing is followed by any resale process
that is coalitionally-rational against individual bidders, truthful bidding remains the ex-post
equilibrium. Hence, given that other bidders give truthful reports, the sum of i) the expected
payoﬀ in the Vickrey auction when misreporting and, ii) all the gains from trade in the
resale market due to misreporting is lower than the payoﬀ when reporting truthfully in the
ﬁrst place. In this section I examine whether these incentive compatibility conditions of the
information mechanism are satisﬁed in the regulation model under consideration.
To give more intuition on the information mechanism I next describe the indirect interpre-
tation of the VCG mechanism introduced in equations (2.34) - (2.37). Moreover, I apply the
aﬃne linear model and derive the equilibrium of the auction game. The following auction
mechanism is similar to the indirect VCG mechanism of Montero (2008), who provides more
detailed analysis in a pure private values environment.
In the auction mechanism, instead of signals, ﬁrms report bid functions to the regulator.
The regulator collects all bid schedules, determines the clearing price at which the total
demand equals supply and allocates units to ﬁrms that have submitted winning bids, i.e.
bids above the clearing price. Let Di (p; s′i, si) be the bid function of ﬁrm i, when it bids
according to signal s′i when its true signal is si, and where p is the price. Suppose, for a
moment, that every ﬁrm bids sincerely and I thus write Di (p; si, si) ≡ Di (p; si). Later I
13When bidders are not symmetric, the revenue-optimizing seller may either misassign or withhold goods.
According to the optimal auctions literature, the revenue-maximizing assignment rule is based on the virtual
values and not on the marginal values of bidders and the rule may assign goods in hands that do not value
them most. Besides, the seller may also increase the expected revenues by setting a reserve price and not
assigning units at all if bids are below the reserve price. Ausubel and Cramton (2004) show that in the case
of independent types and when the seller places no value on the objects on sale, the Vickrey auction with
reserve pricing attains the upper bound for revenues in the resale-constrained auction program. Thus, when
agents are able to trade units freely after the auction mechanism, the best the auctioneer can do with respect
to eﬃciency and revenues is to conduct a Vickrey auction with a reserve price.
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will relax this assumption and derive conditions under which it is proﬁtable for a ﬁrm to
bid sincerely when other ﬁrms are bidding sincerely in a Vickrey auction. This constitutes
an ex-post eﬃcient Bayes Nash equilibrium. To simplify the analysis, I assume perfectly
divisible units and hence no rationing rules are needed. Total demand in the auction is
D (p; s) = Di (p; si) +D−i (p; s−i) where D−i (p; s−i) is the demand of every other bidder but
bidder i.
The price-elastic supply of pollution permits is simply
QS (p; s) = y
−1 (p; s) (2.38)
=
1
δ
(
p− γ¯ − nZ (sm − θ¯)) .
Let pv (s) denote the clearing price in the Vickrey auction. Given that the Vickrey auction
is ex-post eﬃcient, it must hold from (2.23) that pv (s) = p¯ (s). Then the aggregate quantity
rule Q¯ (s) is weakly increasing in each bidder's signal if
dQ¯ (s)
dsi
=
1
δ
(
δ (1− A) + βZ
β + nδ
− Z
)
≥ 0 ⇔ var [θm] ≥ σγθ.
Note that this gives condition (2.17). Furthermore, the residual supply for bidder i is
RSi (p; s−i) = QS (p; s)−D−i (p; s−i) and the inverse demand function is written Pi (qi; si) ≡
D−1i (qi; si). In the Vickrey auction, in addition to the clearing price and the allocation of
permits, the regulator determines paybacks for each ﬁrm. Hence, the ﬁnal payment that
ﬁrms have to pay for the units received is not the clearing price. Instead, the share of the
paybacks is deﬁned by
αi = 1−
´ qi
0
RS−1i (x; s−i) dx
RS−1i (qi; s−i) qi
. (2.39)
While p = RS−1i (qi; s−i) in the equilibrium, the payment of bidder i in the auction writes as
Ri,v = (1− αi) pqi (2.40)
=
ˆ qi
0
RS−1i (x; s−i) dx.
Each ﬁrm faces a payment schedule where the marginal payment is given by the inverse
residual supply function. Note that Ri,v depends on signal si only through the end point qi.
Hence the payback mechanism makes bidders bid their expected marginal value functions,
conditional on the aggregate information. That information is incorporated in the clearing
price of the auction. The payback function is determined by the strategies of all other bidders
but bidder i. With sincere bidding, (2.40) is equivalent to (2.35).
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Given that bidders act sincerely and the expected marginal value function is linear in signals
and in quantity qi, ﬁrms utilize linear strategies deﬁned by
Di (p; si) = a+ bsi − cp, (2.41)
where a, b and c are some positive constants. The total demand for pollution rights in the
auction may then write
D (p; s) = na+ nbsm − ncp. (2.42)
Knowing the form of the bidding strategies of other agents, ﬁrm i observes the clearing price
p = pv (s) after the auction but before the auction conditions its bidding strategy on nsm.
Furthermore, using (2.38) and (2.42) yields
nsm =
(
1
b+ Z
δ
)(
1
δ
(
p− γ¯ + Znθ¯)− na+ ncp) . (2.43)
With linear strategies and normal random variables the clearing price is suﬃcient statistics
for nsm and hence E [θi|s] is informationally equivalent to E [θi|si, p] (Vives 2011). The
conditional expectation of θi, derived in equation (2.5), can then plug into the ﬁrst-order
condition of the considered maximization problem. Note that the expected eﬃciency makes
the proﬁts of the second stage random such that the expected value is E [pii,τ (qi, hi; θi)] = 0.
Consider for a moment that this holds. The ﬁrst-order condition when bidding sincerely and
thus in the price-taking equilibrium of the auction is
E [θi|si, p]− βqi − p = 0. (2.44)
Furthermore, plugging equation (2.5) and (2.43) into the ﬁrst-order equation (2.44) gives
qi =
1
β
{
Aθ¯ +Bsi + C
(
1
b+ Z
δ
)(
1
δ
(
p− γ¯ + Znθ¯)− na+ ncp)− p} . (2.45)
Equating this with the strategy Di(p; si) = a + bsi − cp and solving the system, we get the
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linear Bayesian demand function equilibrium strategy, where
a =
1
β
(
1
B + nC + β
δ
Z
){(
AB +
β
δ
(A+ nC)Z
)
θ¯ − β
δ
Cγ¯
}
(2.46)
b =
1
β
B (2.47)
c =
1
β
(
B − β
δ
C + β
δ
Z
B + nC + β
δ
Z
)
. (2.48)
From (2.38) and (2.42), the equilibrium price is then given by
pv (s) =
nδa+ γ¯ + nδbθ¯ + n (δb+ Z)
(
sm − θ¯
)
nδc+ 1
. (2.49)
I show in Appendix 2.C that plugging (2.46) - (2.48) into (2.49) yields pv (s) = p¯ (s) and
Di(pv (s) ; si) = q¯i (s) = q
e
i (s), where p¯ (s) and q
e
i (s) are given by (2.23) and (2.25).
The equilibrium of the Vickrey auction is described in Figure 2.1. It is updated from Figure
2 in Montero (2008). The curves on the left side of Figure 2.1 describe the maximiza-
tion problem of ﬁrm i, whereas the curves on the right side of the ﬁgure the market as a
whole. The curve yˆ (Q; s′i, s−i) plots the equilibrium values of the marginal damage function
y
(
Q¯ (s′i, s−i) ; s
′
i, s−i
)
for diﬀerent signal values s′i, where s
′
i is the report of ﬁrm i's signal, i.e.
the signal on which its bid function is based, when its true signal is si. I have assumed that
σγθ > 0 and thus yˆ (Q; s′i, s−i) has a greater slope than y (Q; s).
The Vickrey auction without a resale process is incentive compatible if RS−1i (qi; s−i) <
vi (qi; s) when qi < q¯i(s) and RS
−1
i (qi; s−i) > vi (qi; s) when qi > q¯i(s). This requires that
the slope of the inverse residual supply function denoted by τv is greater than the slope of
the expected marginal value function, i.e. τv > −β, which holds when var [θm] > σγθ (see
equations (2.53) and (2.54) below). The total payment Ri,v (s) is deﬁned by the area under
the RS−1i (qi; s−i) curve. Respectively, ﬁrm i's proﬁt in the Vickrey auction given the signal
vector s, denoted by pii,v (s), is the area between the vi (qi; s) and RS
−1
i (qi; s−i) curves from
zero to the allocated quantity q¯i(s). The report s′i aﬀects the bid function Pi (qi; si) and
the quantity allocated to ﬁrm i, but not the vi (qi; s) or RS
−1
i (qi; s−i) functions. If ﬁrm i
submitted a bid function according to the signal s′i < si with Pi (qi; s
′
i) thus lying below the
sincere bid function Pi (qi; si), the clearing price of the auction would be lower than pv (s) and
ﬁrm i would receive less quantity q¯i (s′) < q¯i (s). Hence, ﬁrm i would lose some of its expected
proﬁts, while vi (qi; s) ≥ RS−1i (qi; s−i) when qi ∈ [q¯i (s′) , q¯i (s)]. A similar argument applies
when s′i > si. Then q¯i (s
′) > q¯i (s) but vi (qi; s) ≤ RS−1i (qi; s−i) when qi ∈ [q¯i (s) , q¯i (s′)].
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Figure 2.1: Equilibrium of the Vickrey auction.
Thus it is optimal to act sincerely in an auction without a resale market if every other ﬁrm
bid sincerely.
With pure private values, the marginal payment at each quantity in the Vickrey auction
is equal to the opportunity cost of that particular unit. When ﬁrm i participates in the
auction, it increases the total amount of pollution permits and decreases the amount of
pollution rights assigned to other ﬁrms (at least when −nδ
β
≤ σγθ
var[θm]
≤ 1). With pure
private values it is a dominant strategy to bid truthfully in the Vickrey auction and hence
Pi (qi; si) = vi (qi; si) = ui (qi; θi). The total payment Ri,v is then the sum of the pecuniary
externality to other ﬁrms (the area PE) and the pollution externality of increased pollution
(PO). The pecuniary externality is deﬁned as the value of those units to other bidders, and
which are not assigned to them due to ﬁrm i's participation. However, with interdependent
values the payment is not the full externality cost, in contrast to the pure private values
case with a similar payment rule (see Montero 2008). The payment does not include the
informational externality (IE) of signal si to other bidders' values and to the damage of
pollution.
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2.4.2 Incentive compatibility
In this section I examine whether sincere bidding in the Vickrey auction is incentive compat-
ible if it is followed by one of the constant regulations. Given that every other ﬁrm is bidding
sincerely in the Vickrey auction, it is in ﬁrm i's interest to bid truthfully if the expected loss
in the Vickrey auction when deviating from a sincere bidding strategy is greater than the
expected beneﬁt in the regulation stage from a deviation strategy.
Recall that the auction payment Ri,v (s) =
´ q¯i(s)
0
RS−1i (x; s−i) dx depends only on signal si
through its end point q¯i (s). Let s˜−i = 1n−1
∑
j 6=i sj denote the average signal of every other
ﬁrm but ﬁrm i, and suppose that other ﬁrms bid sincerely in the auction. Consider for a
moment that ﬁrm i receives a signal sˆi. Then it is easy to derive the clearing price pv as a
function of sˆ = (sˆi, s−i) from (2.49):
pv (sˆ) =
nδa+ γ¯ − nZθ¯ + (n− 1) (δb+ Z) s˜−i
nδc+ 1
+
δb+ Z
nδc+ 1
sˆi, (2.50)
where δb+Z
nδc+1
= δ(1−A)+βZ
β+nδ
. Using this and the equilibrium condition
q¯i (sˆi, s−i) = QS (pv (sˆ) ; sˆi, s−i)−D−i (pv (sˆ) ; s−i) ,
it is easy to see that given sincere bidding:
sˆi (s−i, qi) =
(
ncδ + 1
(ncδ + 1) b− c (bδ + Z)
)
(2.51)
×
{−a+ cγ¯ − ncZθ¯ + c (n− 1) (bδ + Z) s˜−i
ncδ + 1
+ qi
}
.
Plugging (2.51) into (2.50), the inverse residual supply may write RS−1i (qi; s−i) = Ωi (s−i) +
τvqi, which is independent of si. However, again using the fact that the inverse residual
supply function goes through the equilibrium point (pv (s) , qei (s)), yields
RS−1i (qi; s−i) = pv (s) + τv (qi − qei (s)) , (2.52)
where the slope is given by
τv =
δb+ Z
(ncδ + 1) b− c (δb+ Z) (2.53)
=
βσγθ + nδ · var [θm](
1 + nδ
β
)
(n− 1)B · var [sm] + var [θm]− σγθ
.
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Firstly, note that in the absence of the second stage, sincere bidding in the Vickrey auction
would be incentive compatible ifRS−1i (qi; s−i) < vi (qi; s) when qi < q¯i (s) andRS
−1
i (qi; s−i) >
vi (qi; s) when qi > q¯i (s). This holds while at the auction equilibrium RS
−1
i (q¯i (s) ; s−i) =
vi (q¯i (s) ; s) and from (2.53) we get τv ≥ −β, whenever(
1 +
nδ
β
)
(n− 1)B · var [sm] + var [θm]− σγθ ≥ 0. (2.54)
This, on the other hand, is fulﬁlled whenever the aggregate quantity rule Q¯ (s) is weakly
increasing in each bidder's signal and thus if var [θm] ≥ σγθ, which gives (2.17). Note,
however, that (2.17) is too restrictive and Q¯ (s) needs not to be increasing in si in order for
the Vickrey auction without a resale market to be incentive compatible. For the Vickrey
auction without a second stage to be incentive compatible only requires that the equilibrium
allocation q¯i (s) is increasing in si, which is guaranteed by (2.54). I show in Corollary 2.1
that (2.17) may be relaxed even with the second-stage constant quantity regulation, unless
n = 1.
Furthermore, suppose next that ﬁrm i bids according to signal s′i when its true signal is si, and
I thus denote s′ = (s′i, s−i). Hence, ﬁrm i uses a deviation strategyDi (p; s
′
i, si) = a+bs
′
i−cp.14
Given ﬁxed s−i, the initial allocation of permits to ﬁrm i reduces to
q¯i (s
′) = a+ bs′i − cpv (s′)
= qei (s)−
1
β
(
(n− 1)B + 1− A− nZ
1 + nδ
β
)
1
n
(si − s′i)
= qei (s)−

(
1 + nδ
β
)
(n− 1)B · var [sm] + var [θm]− σγθ
(β + nδ) var [sm]
 1
n
(si − s′i) .
From this it is easy to see that dq¯i(s
′)
ds′i
> 0 if (2.54) holds. The proﬁt in the auction with the
deviation strategy writes pii,v (s′i; si, s−i) and the loss in the Vickrey auction is thus
Li,v (s
′
i; si, s−i) = pii,v (si; si, s−i)− pii,v (s′i; si, s−i) (2.55)
=
ˆ qei (s)
q¯i(s′)
{
vi (x; s)−RS−1i (x; s−i)
}
dx.
Respectively, the expected proﬁt in the secondary market due to the deviation strategy writes
14Alternatively, ﬁrm i may use any bid function that goes through the point (pv (s
′) , q¯i (s′)).
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as
pii,r (s
′
i; si, s−i) =

´ qi,p(s′)
q¯i(s′)
{vi (x; s)− p¯ (s′)} dx, if r = p´ qi,q(s′)
q¯i(s′)
{vi (x; s)− pq (s′)} dx, if r = q
, (2.56)
where p¯ (s′) is the tax/subsidy under the price regulation, pq (s′) the expected equilibrium
price of the secondary market under the quantity regulation, and qi,p (s′) and qi,q (s′) are
the corresponding expected equilibrium quantities given the initial allocation according to
s′. Due to the ex-post eﬃciency of the Vickrey auction, the expected proﬁts of ﬁrm i in the
second stage when bidding sincerely in the auction are zero, pii,r (si; si, s−i) = 0. Hence the
auction mechanism of the ﬁrst stage is incentive compatible if
∆IC = pii,v (si; si, s−i) + pii,r (si; si, s−i)− pii,v (s′i; si, s−i)− pii,r (s′i; si, s−i) (2.57)
= Li,v (s
′
i; si, s−i)− pii,r (s′i; si, s−i)
≥ 0.
The main results of this paper are provided in the following propositions. Proofs can be
found in Appendix 2.D.
Proposition 2.1. Given the aﬃne linear model, the information mechanism of the two-stage
regulation with the constant quantity regulation in the second stage is incentive compatible
whenever
σγθ
var[θm]
≤ 1, if the resale market is coalitionally-rational against individual bidders.
Proof. See Appendix 2.D.
Corollary 2.1. Given the aﬃne linear model, the information mechanism without the second
stage, and thus without any resale market, is incentive compatible if
σγθ
var [θm]
≤ 1 +
(
1 +
nδ
β
)
(n− 1)
(
B
B + nC
)
.
Moreover, the information mechanism of the two-stage regulation with the constant quantity
regulation in the second stage and when the resale market is coalitionally-rational against
individual bidders is incentive compatible if
σγθ
var [θm]
≤ 1 +
(
1 +
nδ
β
)
(n− 1)
(
B
B + nC
)(
C
B + C
)
.
Proof. See Appendix 2.D.
Corollary 2.2. Given the aﬃne linear model, the information mechanism of the two-stage
regulation with the constant quantity regulation in the second stage is incentive compatible
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if ﬁrms pay (receive) the equilibrium price for all permits they buy (sell) in the second-stage
resale market, and if
σγθ
var[θm]
≤ 1.
Proof. See Appendix 2.D.
Proposition 2.2. Given the aﬃne linear model, the information mechanism of the two-stage
regulation with the constant price regulation in the second stage is incentive compatible only
if
σγθ
var[θm]
< −nδ
β
.
Proof. See Appendix 2.D.
2.5 Prices vs. quantities revisited
In this section I combine the results from Sections 2.3 and 2.4. In particular, I compare
four diﬀerent regulatory instruments: constant price and constant quantity regulations with
and without the Vickrey auction. For simplicity, I denote by the one-stage price regulation
(abbreviated P1) the regulation where a uniform tax is set using only the prior information
and thus without any information mechanism. The two-stage price regulation (P2) denotes
a regulation with a Vickrey auction in the ﬁrst stage and a constant price regulation in
the second stage. One-stage and two-stage quantity regulations (Q1 and Q2) are deﬁned
respectively. Hence in the following I discuss which of these four regulations should be used
in diﬀerent settings. The results are described in Table 2.1 and Figure 2.2.
Table 2.1: Prices vs. quantities with and without a Vickrey auction
Information structure Regulation Details
σγθ
var[θm]
< −nδ
β P2
Equation (2.33),
Proposition 2.2
−nδ
β
<
σγθ
var[θm]
< 1
2
(
1− nδ
β
)
P1 / Q2
Equation (2.58),
Proposition 2.1,
Proposition 2.2
1
2
(
1− nδ
β
)
<
σγθ
var[θm]
< 1 Q2
Equation(2.33),
Proposition 2.1
1 <
σγθ
var[θm]
< 1 +
(
1 + nδ
β
)
(n− 1) ( B
B+nC
) (
C
B+C
)
Q2 / Q1
Equation (2.33),
Corollary 2.1,
Lemma 2.4
σγθ
var[θm]
> 1 +
(
1 + nδ
β
)
(n− 1) ( B
B+nC
) (
C
B+C
)
Q1
Equation (2.33),
Corollary 2.1
In Figure 2.2, Q2 marks the area where the inverse residual supply function of the Vickrey
auction for ﬁrm i should lie when the two-stage quantity regulation maximizes the expected
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Figure 2.2: Inverse residual supply function of the Vickrey auction.
welfare from the set of four regulatory alternatives. Moreover, Figure 2.2 shows the following
threshold curves:
L1 ≡
(
RS−1i (qi; s−i)
∣∣ σγθ
var [θm]
= −nδ
β
)
,
L2 ≡
(
RS−1i (qi; s−i)
∣∣ σγθ
var [θm]
=
1
2
(
1− nδ
β
))
,
L3 ≡
(
RS−1i (qi; s−i)
∣∣ σγθ
var [θm]
= 1
)
,
L4 ≡
(
RS−1i (qi; s−i)
∣∣ σγθ
var [θm]
= 1 +
(
1 +
nδ
β
)
(n− 1)
(
B
B + nC
)(
C
B + C
))
,
L5 ≡
(
RS−1i (qi; s−i)
∣∣ σγθ
var [θm]
= 1 +
(
1 +
nδ
β
)
(n− 1)
(
B
B + nC
))
.
First, according to theWeitzman rule (2.33) and Proposition 2.1, when 1
2
(
1− nδ
β
)
≤ σγθ
var[θm]
<
1 the regulator should use the two-stage quantity regulation (Q2). This is the case in Figure
2.2 where RS−1i (qi; s−i) is between curves L2 and L3.
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Second, according to the Weitzman rule (2.33) and Proposition 2.2, the regulator should use
the two-stage price regulation (P2), whenever σγθ
var[θm]
< −nδ
β
. In Figure 2.2, RS−1i (qi; s−i)
would then lie below the vi (qi; s) and above L1 curves for qi ≤ qei (s). Note also that when
σγθ
var[θm]
= −nδ
β
the private information of ﬁrms is of no value to the regulator (Lemma 2.5).
Third, when σγθ
var[θm]
≥ 1, according to the Weitzman rule (2.33), the regulator should use the
constant quantity regulation. Then RS−1i (qi; s−i) would have a steeper slope than curve L3 in
Figure 2.2. Even if σγθ
var[θm]
≥ 1, there are some parameter values which yield ∆q,IC > 0 and the
Vickrey auction followed by the constant quantity regulation would be incentive compatible.
These are examined in Corollary 2.1. In Figure 2.2, RS−1i (qi; s−i) would then lie between
curves L3 and L4. However, then
σγθ
var[θm]
≈ 1 and, according to Lemma 2.4, the value of
ﬁrms' private information to the regulator is relatively low. Furthermore, when RS−1i (qi; s−i)
is between curves L4 and L5, the Vickrey auction is incentive compatible without the second
stage but it is not incentive compatible when followed by the second-stage regulation. Hence,
to conclude, and using a simple rule, whenever σγθ
var[θm]
≥ 1, the regulator should use the one-
stage quantity regulation (Q1).
Fourth, what should the choice be when −nδ
β
≤ σγθ
var[θm]
< 1
2
(
1− nδ
β
)
and when RS−1i (qi; s−i)
is between L1 and L2. In those cases the Weitzman rule says that the constant price regulation
performs better. On the other hand, the regulator is not able to get ﬁrms to reveal their
private information in the ﬁrst stage if the price regulation is used in the regulation period.
Instead, using the quantity regulation in the second stage provides ex-post eﬃcient allocation
of permits after the information stage. Thus, the choice between the two-stage quantity
regulation and the one-stage price regulation depends on the modiﬁed Weitzman rule:
∆Modpq = E [DWLq (s)−DWLp (0)] (2.58)
=
1
2
(
1
β
n
+ δ
)
var [θm]
{
A−
(
nδ
β
)2
−
[
2A+ nZ + 2
(
nδ
β
)]
σγθ
var [θm]
}
.
For example, consider the most likely case where the abatement costs and pollution damage
are not correlated (σγθ = 0). Then the one-stage price regulation is better if ∆Modpq > 0 and
thus if
nδ
β
<
√
σ2ε
σ2ε + (1 + (n− 1) ρ)σ2θ
.
Hence, the less noisy the signals are (low σ2ε), the more correlated abatement costs are between
ﬁrms (high ρ) and the more heterogeneous ﬁrms are (high σ2θ), the more is gained from the
information stage and the steeper the slope of the aggregate marginal abatement cost function
should be relative to the slope of the marginal damage function, in order for the regulator
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to consider the one-stage constant price regulation. If σ2ε = 0, ﬁrms have private values and
the Vickrey auction provides the second-best solution. However, if the signals are extremely
noisy (σ2ε →∞), ﬁrms do not have any better information about their abatement costs than
the regulator has and the model reduces to the original prices vs. quantities comparison,
where the information mechanism provides no additional value to the regulator.
Finally, the role of correlation between the costs and beneﬁts of emission reductions does
not change from (2.33) when −nδ
β
≤ σγθ
var[θm]
. The positive correlation (σγθ > 0 ) increases
the comparative advantage of the two-stage quantity regulation. The last term of (2.58),
i.e.
[
2A+ nZ + 2
(
nδ
β
)]
σγθ
var[θm]
, is positive when σγθ > 0, and negative when −nδβ var [θm] ≤
σγθ < 0.15
2.6 Collusion
Montero (2008) shows that, with pure private values, the auction mechanism implements the
ﬁrst-best even if ﬁrms collude and thus coordinate their bids in the Vickrey auction. With
pure private values, the VCG mechanism implements the ﬁrst-best in dominant strategies.
With interdependent values, a dominant strategy implementation is not possible. The equi-
librium concept is Bayes Nash equilibrium. However, ex-post eﬃciency is attained even if
ﬁrms collude. This is a characteristic which is not supported by the scheme of Kwerel (1977),
for example.
Suppose that all ﬁrms meet before the auction and decide to coordinate their bidding sched-
ules in the auction and their actions in the regulation stage. In addition, they agree on the
procedure for sharing the cartel proﬁts after the auction. Hence the cartel faces both an
external coordination problem of submitting bids in the Vickrey auction but also an internal
mechanism design problem. Montero (2008) explains how the incentive compatible cartel
mechanism induces ﬁrms to reveal their individual demand curves truthfully to the cartel
organization. Moreover, Montero shows that the optimal collusive agreement for a cartel of
m ≤ n ﬁrms is to submit only one serious bid in the Vickrey auction with the true aggregate
demand curve of the cartel. This bid is submitted by one cartel member while all the other
members submit empty demand schedules.
I ﬁrst consider the external coordination problem with interdependent values and assume that
the cartel members can agree on the eﬃcient cartel mechanism after the auction. Hence, if
there is only one cartel with all ﬁrms as members, with the aﬃne linear model this means
15This is clear while
[
2A+ nZ + 2
(
nδ
β
)]
σγθ
var[θm]
∣∣∣
σγθ=−nδβ var[θm]
= −
[
2A+ nδβ (1 +A)
]
nδ
β < 0.
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that the serious bid is based on the average signal. Next I show, using the equations of
the direct VCG mechanism (2.34) - (2.37), why a bid function based on the sincere report
s′m = sm is optimal for the cartel.
After all ﬁrms have shared their private information sincerely inside the cartel, the aggregate
expected marginal value function, and thus the expected marginal value function of the cartel
writes as
vc (Q; sm) = θ¯ + (1− A)
(
sm − θ¯
)− β
n
Q. (2.59)
Consider ﬁrst the information mechanism without any second-stage regulation. Suppose that
the bid function the cartel submits in the Vickrey auction is based on signal s′m when the true
average signal is sm. Hence, without any other ﬁrm, the inverse bid function of the cartel is
Pc (Q; s
′
m, sm) = θ¯ + (1− A)
(
s′m − θ¯
)− β
n
Q. (2.60)
The regulator assumes that this is the sincere bid. Hence from (2.37), the aggregate quantity
rule writes as
Q¯ (s′m) = y
−1 (Pc (Q; s′m, sm) ; s
′
m) (2.61)
=
θ¯ − γ¯ + (1− A− nZ) (s′m − θ¯)
δ + β
n
.
Note that taking an inverse of the aggregate quantity rule yields the lowest possible signal
sˆm, which gives a quantity Q to the cartel:
sˆm (Q) = θ¯ +
(
γ¯ − θ¯
1− A− nZ
)
+
(
δ + β
n
1− A− nZ
)
Q. (2.62)
From (2.35) we may derive the Vickrey payment of the cartel with a report s′m:
Rc,v (s
′
m) =
ˆ Q¯(s′m)
0
vc (X; sˆm (X)) dX (2.63)
=
ˆ Q¯(s′m)
0
{
θ¯ + (1− A) (sˆm (X)− θ¯)− β
n
X
}
dX.
Hence the cartel payoﬀ in the Vickrey auction with a report s′m, when the true average signal
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is sm, writes as
pic,v (s
′
m; sm) =
ˆ Q¯(s′m)
0
vc (X; sm)− vc (X; sˆm (X)) dX (2.64)
= (1− A)
ˆ Q¯(s′m)
0
(sm − sˆm (X)) dX.
By deﬁnition sm = sˆm
(
Q¯ (sm)
)
. If 1−A−nZ > 0 and thus σγθ
var[θm]
< 1, the aggregate quantity
is increasing in report s′m. Then sm > sˆm
(
Q¯ (s′m)
)
for all s′m < sm and sm < sˆm
(
Q¯ (s′m)
)
for
all s′m > sm. It is then clear that the sincere report s
′
m = sm maximizes the cartel proﬁts
pic,v (s
′
m; sm).
From the regulator's perspective there is only one ﬁrm, and thus there is no need for the
second-stage permit market if the quantity regulation is chosen. If the cartel can agree on
the eﬃcient allocation, the Vickrey auction provides ex-post eﬃcient allocation, even if ﬁrms
collude.
Instead, with a constant price regulation, the regulator implements a tax/subsidy rate
p¯ (s′m) = Pc
(
Q¯ (s′m) ; s
′
m, sm
)
for the regulation period. Note that the inverse (residual)
supply for the cartel may write
RS−1c (Q) = y (Q; sˆm (Q)) = vc (Q; sˆm (Q)) (2.65)
=
(1− A) γ¯ − nZθ¯
1− A− nZ +
(
βnZ + nδ (1− A)
1− A− nZ
)
︸ ︷︷ ︸
≡τRS
1
n
Q,
where τRS is the optimal slope of the Roberts and Spence (1976) non-constant quantity
regulation with a perfect permit market (see Chapter 3). Thus, if −nδ
β
>
σγθ
var[θm]
> 1,
the inverse supply schedule is an increasing function and deviating from sincere bidding is
proﬁtable. Giving a report s′m < sm decreases the initial allocation of permits but also the
second-stage tax. After the auction the cartel can buy permits from the regulator at a lower
rate than in the Vickrey auction. Respectively, with a report s′m > sm the cartel receives
too many permits in the auction compared to the eﬃcient allocation, but it can sell permits
back to the regulator at a rate exceeding the Vickrey price. Hence a deviation strategy
Pc (Q; s
′
m, sm) is proﬁtable to the cartel. In the case of a second-stage price regulation,
sincere bidding is incentive compatible for the cartel only if σγθ
var[θm]
≤ −nδ
β
, and thus when
τRS ≤ 0 (Proposition 2.2).
Finally, there must be a optimal cartel mechanism if a quantity regulation is chosen for the
second stage and if τv > 0 and thus if −nδβ >
σγθ
var[θm]
> 1. The intuition is clear. Then the
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average price of permits in the Vickrey auction is decreasing in bidder size. If all ﬁrms join
one big cartel, i.e. a grand coalition, the total Vickrey payoﬀ of the cartel is greater than the
cumulative payoﬀs of individual ﬁrms when participating in the auction individually. The
diﬀerence between these two gives the cartel proﬁts. The cartel mechanism must be designed
such that each member receives (in expectation) an equal number of permits to what it would
have obtained individually after a Vickrey auction without a cartel agreement. In addition,
cartel members can agree on how to share the cartel proﬁts such that each member's cartel
payoﬀ in the auction is the sum of its share of the cartel proﬁts and the individual auction
proﬁts that it would have received if all ﬁrms had participated in the auction individually.
This makes each member better oﬀ when joining a cartel and reporting sincerely inside the
cartel (see Montero 2008). However, when σγθ
var[θm]
< −nδ
β
the inverse residual supply functions
are decreasing (τv < 0) and the average price of permits in the Vickrey auction is increasing
in bidder size. Thus collusive actions are then not proﬁtable to ﬁrms.
To conclude, when −nδ
β
>
σγθ
var[θm]
> 1, ﬁrms are able to agree on the cartel mechanism, given
that the second-stage regulation is based on quantities. Even if ﬁrms coordinate their bids
in the Vickrey auction, the aggregate allocation is at the ex-post optimal level. Furthermore,
if the cartel mechanism is eﬃcient, the outcome after the Vickrey auction is also ex-post
eﬃcient. On the other hand, when σγθ
var[θm]
< −nδ
β
, ﬁrms are better oﬀ when they participate
in the Vickrey auction individually. Thus possible collusive actions do not distort the ex-post
eﬃcient properties of the Vickrey auction.
2.7 Conclusions
This paper considers a two-stage regulation for regulating pollution. The analysis extends
the Weitzman (1974) prices vs. quantities model to an environment where ﬁrms are better
informed about their abatement costs than the regulator. Thus, the private information
of ﬁrms is valuable to the regulator when designing environmental policy. However, ﬁrms
themselves do not know the abatement costs exactly. Also, abatement costs are correlated
between ﬁrms, which makes the model one of interdependent values. In the ﬁrst stage the
regulator conducts an auction mechanism to allocate emission permits to regulated ﬁrms.
Applying the Vickrey pricing rule, the initial allocation is ex-post eﬃcient, conditional on
sincere bidding being incentive compatibile. During the actual regulation stage two constant
regulations are considered.
With a constant price regulation a uniform price is set at the level of the expected ﬁrst-best
price. During the regulation stage, ﬁrms are able to update their emissions permit assets by
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trading permits with the regulator at a predeﬁned price. At the end of the regulation period,
ﬁrms' permit accounts must contain a number of permits equal to their emissions in the
regulation period. Hence the marginal cost of abatement is ﬁxed after the information stage,
but emissions vary. With a constant quantity regulation, the aggregate supply of permits is
ﬁxed, but ﬁrms are able to trade permits with each other after the initial allocation. However,
the equilibrium price is uncertain when implementing the regulation.
Knowing these features, regulated ﬁrms have limited incentives to share their information
sincerely with the regulator. If ﬁrms may inﬂuence the price that they have to pay for permits,
they certainly will try to inﬂuence it, if this is expected to be proﬁtable for them. Hence
ﬁnding an incentive mechanism which induces ﬁrms to report their information sincerely to
the regulator is of great importance.
I have shown that with a constant quantity regulation the generalized Vickrey auction im-
plements the ex-post eﬃcient allocation of permits and thus incentivizes ﬁrms to report their
private signals sincerely to the regulator. This is not the case, only if the positive correlation
between pollution damage and abatement costs is high. Moreover, the mechanism remains
ex-post eﬃcient even if ﬁrms coordinate their bids in the auction. With the constant price
regulation, on the other hand, the truth-telling property of the Vickrey auction is not sus-
tained. Firms' ability to inﬂuence the second-stage tax is too attractive. Only if the expected
price is decreasing in the ﬁrms' reports, and thus when the pollution damage and abatement
costs are highly correlated with a negative sign, is the Vickrey auction incentive compatible.
Then lying and colluding in the Vickrey auction causes harm for an individual ﬁrm, if all
other ﬁrms are sincere.
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Appendices
2.A Conditional expectation of the value parameter θi
According to the information structure introduced in Section 2.2, consider the following
multivariate normal random variable Xi = (X1, X2.1, X2.2) = (θi, si, sm) with a mean vector
µ =
 µ1µ2.1
µ2.2
 =
 E [θi]E [si]
E [sm]
 =
 θ¯θ¯
θ¯
 ,
and a covariance matrix
Σ =
[
Σ11 Σ12
Σ21 Σ22
]
,
where
Σ11 = var [θi] = σ
2
θ
Σ12 = Σ
T
21 =
[
cov [θi, si]
cov [θi, sm]
]T
=
[
σ2θ
1
n
(σ2θ + (n− 1) ρσ2θ)
]T
≡
[
δ1
δ2
]T
Σ22 =
[
var [si] cov [si, sm]
cov [si, sm] var [sm]
]
=
[
σ2θ + σ
2
ε
1
n
(σ2θ + σ
2
ε + (n− 1) ρσ2θ)
1
n
(σ2θ + σ
2
ε + (n− 1) ρσ2θ) 1n (σ2θ + σ2ε + (n− 1) ρσ2θ)
]
≡
[
∆11 ∆12
∆21 ∆22
]
.
The inverse of Σ22 is
Σ−122 =
1
det (Σ22)
[
det (∆22) − det (∆21)
− det (∆12) det (∆11)
]
=
1
∆11∆22 −∆12∆21
[
∆22 −∆21
−∆12 ∆11
]
.
The conditional distribution of the random variable (θi|si, sm) has an expected value (DeG-
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root 1970)
E [θi|si, sm] = µ1 + Σ12Σ−122
[
si − µ2.1
sm − µ2.2
]
=
(
1− δ1∆22 − δ2∆12 + δ2∆11 − δ1∆21
∆11∆22 −∆12∆21
)
θ¯
+
δ1∆22 − δ2∆12
∆11∆22 −∆12∆21 si
+
δ2∆11 − δ1∆21
∆11∆22 −∆12∆21 sm,
where
∆11∆22 −∆12∆21 = (n− 1)
n2
(
σ2θ + σ
2
ε + (n− 1) ρσ2θ
) (
σ2θ + σ
2
ε − ρσ2θ
)
,
δ1∆22 − δ2∆12 = (n− 1)
n2
(1− ρ)σ2θ
(
σ2θ + σ
2
ε + (n− 1) ρσ2θ
)
,
δ2∆11 − δ1∆21 = (n− 1)
n2
nρσ2θσ
2
ε .
Using these, and after some calculations, the expected value of θi conditional on the signal
vector s can be written as
E [θi|si, sm] = Aθ¯ +Bsi + Cnsm,
where,
A =
σ2ε
σ2ε + (1− ρ+ nρ)σ2θ
B =
(1− ρ)σ2θ
σ2ε + (1− ρ)σ2θ
C =
ρσ2θσ
2
ε
(σ2ε + (1− ρ+ nρ)σ2θ) (σ2ε + (1− ρ)σ2θ)
.
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Moreover, the conditional variance is
var [θi|si, sm] = Σ11 − Σ12Σ−122 Σ21
= Σ11 − δ1 δ1∆22 − δ2∆21
∆11∆22 −∆12∆21 − δ2
δ2∆11 − δ1∆12
∆11∆22 −∆12∆21
= σ2θ − σ2θB − (1 + (n− 1) ρ)σ2θC
= σ2θ (1−B) (1− ρ+ ρA)
= σ2θ (1−B) (1− ρ) + σ2θ (1−B) ρA
= (B + C)σ2ε .
Furthermore, let the remaining uncertainty be denoted by εsi = θi − E [θi|si, sm]. It is a
normal random variable with zero expected value and a variance var [εsi ] = var [θi|si, sm].
Furthermore, the covariance between the remaining uncertainties may write
cov
[
εsi , ε
s
j
]
= E
[{(
θi − θ¯
)−B (si − θ¯)− Cn (sm − θ¯)}
× {(θj − θ¯)−B (sj − θ¯)− Cn (sm − θ¯)}]
= E
[(
θi − θ¯
) (
θj − θ¯
)
+B2
(
si − θ¯
) (
sj − θ¯
)
+ C2n2
(
sm − θ¯
)]
−2E [B (θi − θ¯) (sj − θ¯)+ Cn (θi − θ¯) (sm − θ¯)−BCn (si − θ¯) (sm − θ¯)]
= ρσ2θ +B
2ρσ2θ + C
2n2 · var [sm]− 2Bρσ2θ − 2C · var [θm] + 2BCn · var [sm]
= var [εsi ]− (1−B)2 σ2θ (1− ρ)−B2σ2ε
= var [εsi ]−Bσ2ε
= Cσ2ε .
The aggregate uncertainty is given by (note that B + nC = 1− A = var[θm]
var[sm]
)
nεsm =
n∑
i=1
εsi =
(
θm − θ¯
)− (1− A) (sm − θ¯) .
It has a normal distribution with zero expected value and a variance
var [nεsm] = E
[((
θm − θ¯
)− (1− A) (sm − θ¯))2]
= E
[(
θm − θ¯
)2
+ (1− A)2 (sm − θ¯)2 − 2 (1− A) (θm − θ¯) (sm − θ¯)]
= var [θm] + (1− A)2 var [sm]− 2 (1− A) cov [θm, sm]
= A2var [θm] + (1− A)2 var [εm]
= (1− A)nσ2ε .
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The damage parameter γ is assumed to be a normally distributed random variable, γ ∼
N(γ¯, σ2γ). Furthermore, the damage and abatement costs are correlated and the covariance
between γ and θm is denoted by cov [γ, θm] = σγθ. The expected damage parameter condi-
tional on the sum of all signals, nsm =
n∑
i=1
si, writes as
E [γ| sm] = γ¯ + Z
(
nsm − nθ¯
)
,
where
Z =
cov [γ, nsm]
var [nsm]
=
σγθ
σ2ε + (1 + (n− 1) ρ)σ2θ
.
The remaining uncertainty related to the damage parameter γ is thus εsγ = γ−γ¯−Z
(
nsm − nθ¯
)
and the conditional variance of γ is
var [γ| s] = E
[(
εsγ
)2]
= E
[
(γ − γ¯)2 + (nZ)2 (sm − θ¯)2 − 2nZ (γ − γ¯) (θm − θ¯ + εm)]
= σ2γ + (nZ)
2 var [sm]− 2nZσγθ
= σ2γ − nZσγθ.
The covariance between the average cost and beneﬁt parameters of emissions reductions,
conditional on the signal vector s, is simply
cov [γ, θm| s] = E
[(
A
(
θm − θ¯
)− (1− A) εm) ((γ − γ¯)− nZ (θm − θ¯)− nZεm)]
= E
[
A
(
θm − θ¯
)
(γ − γ¯)− AnZ (θm − θ¯)2 + (1− A)nZε2m]
+E
[− (1− A) (γ − γ¯) εm + (1− A)nZ (θm − θ¯) εm − AnZ (θm − θ¯) εm]︸ ︷︷ ︸
=0
= Aσγθ − nZA · var [θm] + (1− A)nZ · var [εm]
= Aσγθ.
2.B Regulation stage - prices vs. quantities
In order to derive the prices vs. quantities comparison (Weitzman 1974), I utilize a general
non-constant regulation model. Constant price and quantity regulations are the two extremes
of this general model (see also Weitzman 1978). With a non-constant regulation, the supply
of permits for each ﬁrm in the regulation stage is given by a linear permit schedule:
Ti (qi; I) = p¯ (I) + τ (qi − q¯i(I)) , (2.66)
78
where p¯ (I) = E [p?| I] and q¯i(I) = E [q?i | I] are the expected ﬁrst-best outcomes conditional
on information I and τ is the slope of the permit supply schedules. Due to the model being
symmetric, i.e. constant β and symmetric correlation of abatement costs ρ, the slope τ is the
same for each ﬁrm. Then, in the beginning of the regulation period, the regulator allocates
pollution permits to ﬁrms according to q¯ (I) = (q¯1 (I) , ...., q¯n (I)). However, each ﬁrm may
purchase (or sell back) permits from (to) the regulator according to the price schedule (2.66).
In addition, ﬁrms are free to trade permits with each other in the secondary market.
The two alternative constant regulations may derive from (2.66) in the following way. Using
τ = 0, the permit supply schedule reduces to the constant tax (or subsidy) Ti (qi; I) = p¯ (I).
Also, this deﬁnes the equilibrium price of the secondary market and ﬁrms have no incentives
to trade permits with each other. On the other hand, if τ →∞, the regulation is a constant
quantity regulation where the aggregate supply of permits is ﬁxed at Q¯ (I) =
∑n
i=1 q¯i (I).
Equation (2.66) then only deﬁnes the initial allocation of permits. I ﬁrst derive the solution
with a general model and then describe the solution with the two regulatory extremes: a
constant price regulation (τ = 0) and a constant quantity regulation (τ →∞).
With the non-constant regulation model, the net purchases of ﬁrm i from the regulator,
denoted by hi, is a sum of the initial allocation q¯i(I) and transactions with the regulator
in the regulation period. Then the amount of trading in the permit markets is simply
∆qi = |qi − hi| ≥ 0. Firm i buys permits in the resale market if qi > hi and sells permits if
hi > qi.
The problem of the regulator is to choose the τ that minimizes the expected deadweight loss
from (2.21) given the responses of regulated ﬁrms. Firm i maximizes its proﬁts with respect
to pollution qi and purchases from the regulator hi given the supply schedule Ti (qi; I):
max
qi,hi
pii,τ (qi, hi; θi) =
ˆ qi
q¯i(I)
ui (x; θi) dx−
ˆ hi
q¯i(I)
Ti (x; I) dx (2.67)
+pτ∆qi
{
1{hi>qi} − 1{qi>hi}
}
.
In (2.67), pτ is the equilibrium price of the secondary market and 1{·} is an indicator function
with the value 1, if its argument is true, and otherwise 0. The ﬁrst-order condition with
respect to pollution is given by
0 = ui (qi; θi) + pτ
d (hi − qi)
dqi
1{hi>qi} − pτ
d (qi − hi)
dqi
1{qi>hi} (2.68)
= ui (qi; θi)− pτ ,
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and with respect to permit purchases from the regulator by
0 = −Ti (hi; I) + pτ d (hi − qi)
dhi
1{hi>qi} − pτ
d (qi − hi)
dhi
1{qi>hi} (2.69)
= −Ti (hi; I) + pτ .
Let qi,τ and hi,τ denote the proﬁt-maximizing pollution level and purchases from the regulator
of ﬁrm i given τ . The ﬁrst-order conditions imply that ﬁrms equate their marginal value
functions with the marginal costs of purchasing and hence from (2.68) and (2.69):
τhi,τ + βqi,τ = (β + τ) q¯i (I) +
(
θi − θ¯i (I)
)
. (2.70)
Further, market clearing implies that
∑n
i=1 hi,τ =
∑n
i=1 qi,τ = Qτ and summing equations
(2.70) from 1 to n gives the total level of pollution
Qτ = Q¯ (I) +
n
(
θm − θ¯m (I)
)
β + τ
. (2.71)
For the average ﬁrm we get
qm,τ = hm,τ = q¯m (I) +
θm − θ¯m (I)
β + τ
. (2.72)
Plugging this into the ﬁrst-order condition gives the equilibrium price:
pτ = p¯ (I) +
(
τ
β + τ
)(
θm − θ¯m (I)
)
. (2.73)
Moreover, ﬁrm i's equilibrium outcomes may derive from (2.68), (2.69), (2.70) and (2.73):
qi,τ = q¯i (I) +
1
β
{(
θi − θ¯i (I)
)− ( τ
β + τ
)(
θm − θ¯m (I)
)}
, (2.74)
hi,τ = q¯i (I) +
(
1
β + τ
)(
θm − θ¯m (I)
)
. (2.75)
Plugging (2.74) into the deadweight loss equation (2.21) yields, after a few lines of simple
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calculations,
DWLτ (I) =
1
2
(
1
β
n
+ δ
){(
nδ − τ
β + τ
)2 (
θm − θ¯m (I)
)2
+ (γ − γ¯ (I))2
}
(2.76)
+
(
1
β
n
+ δ
)(
nδ − τ
β + τ
)(
θm − θ¯m (I)
)
(γ − γ¯ (I)) ,
and thus the expected value of (2.76) is
E [DWLτ (I)] =
1
2
(
1
β
n
+ δ
){(
nδ − τ
β + τ
)2
var [θm| I] + var [γ| I]
}
(2.77)
+
(
1
β
n
+ δ
)(
nδ − τ
β + τ
)
cov [θm, γ| I] .
Recall that the regulator chooses only between constant regulations.16 If the regulator uses a
constant pigovian tax/subsidy, i.e. τ = 0 and thus Ti (qi; I) = p¯ (I), the expected deadweight
loss writes as
E [DWLp (I)] = E [DWLτ (I)| τ = 0] (2.78)
=
1
2
(
1
β
n
+ δ
){(
nδ
β
)2
var [θm| I] + 2
(
nδ
β
)
cov [θm, γ| I] + var [γ| I]
}
.
Respectively, with a constant quantity regulation (τ →∞) the expected deadweight loss is
E [DWLq (I)] = E [DWLτ (I)| τ →∞] (2.79)
=
1
2
(
1
β
n
+ δ
)
{var [θm| I]− 2cov [θm, γ| I] + var [γ| I]} .
2.C Linear equilibrium strategy of the generalized VCG mechanism
From Appendix 2.A, the expected value of θi conditional on si and sm is E [θi|s] = Aθ¯ +
Bsi +Cnsm. If there is correlation between marginal abatement costs and pollution damage
(σγθ 6= 0), the total supply of pollution rights writes as QS = 1δ
(
p− γ¯ − nZ (sm − θ¯)). Thus,
16Note that the optimal slope of the general model is τ? =
βσγθ+nδ
1
n (1+(n−1)ρ)σ2θ
1
n (1+(n−1)ρ)σ2θ−σγθ
, which gives E [DWL?τ ] =
1
2
(
1
β
n+δ
)
var [γ| θm]. With the symmetric aﬃne linear model, τ? and E [DWL?τ ] are independent of infor-
mation I, when the permit market is perfect. For a more general analysis, see Chapter 3.
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in equilibrium we have
nsm =
1
b+ Z
δ
(
1
δ
(
p− γ¯ + Znθ¯)− na+ ncp) .
The ﬁrst-order condition of the Vickrey auction is written as
E [θi|si, sm]− βqi = p
βqi = Aθ¯ +Bsi + C
(
1
b+ 1
δ
Z
)(
1
δ
(
p− γ¯ + Znθ¯)− na+ ncp)− p
qi =
Abθ¯ − 1
δ
(
Cγ¯ − (A+ nC)Zθ¯)− Cna
β
(
b+ 1
δ
Z
) + B
β
si
−
(
b− Cnc− 1
δ
(C − Z))
β
(
b+ 1
δ
Z
) p.
Plugging in qi = Di (p; si) = a+ bsi − cp and solving for parameters a, b and c results in
a =
1
β
(
BAθ¯
B + nC + β
δ
Z
)
− 1
δ
(
Cγ¯ − (A+ nC)Zθ¯
B + nC + β
δ
Z
)
b =
1
β
B
c =
1
β
(
B
B + nC + β
δ
Z
)
− 1
δ
(
C − Z
B + nC + β
δ
Z
)
.
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The clearing price of the Vickrey auction in the information stage is thus
pv (s) =
nδa+ nδbsm + γ¯ + nZ
(
sm − θ¯
)
nδc+ 1
=
nδ
{
1
β
BAθ¯ − 1
δ
(
Cγ¯ − (A+ nC)Zθ¯)}
nδ
(
1
β
B − 1
δ
C + 1
δ
Z
)
+B + nC + β
δ
Z
+
(
B + nC + β
δ
Z
) (
nδ
β
Bsm + γ¯ + nZ
(
sm − θ¯
))
nδ
(
1
β
B − 1
δ
C + 1
δ
Z
)
+B + nC + β
δ
Z
=
(
B + β
δ
Z
) (
nδ
β
Aθ¯ + γ¯ + nZ
(
sm − θ¯
))
+ nC
(
nZθ¯ − γ¯)(
1 + nδ
β
) (
B + β
δ
Z
)
+
(
B + β
δ
Z
)
nδ
β
(B + nC) sm + nC
(
γ¯ − nZθ¯)(
1 + nδ
β
) (
B + β
δ
Z
)
=
nδ
β
Aθ¯ + γ¯ + nZ
(
sm − θ¯
)
+ nδ
β
(1− A) sm(
1 + nδ
β
)
=
nδθ¯ + βγ¯ + (nδ (1− A) + βnZ) (sm − θ¯)
β + nδ
.
This is equal to p¯ (s) in (2.23). Respectively, the total level of allocated permits is
Qv =
1
δ
(
pv − γ¯ − Z
(
nsm − nθ¯
))
=
θ¯ + β
nδ
γ¯ +
(
1− A+ β
nδ
nZ
) (
sm − θ¯
)− ( β
nδ
+ 1
)
γ¯ − ( β
nδ
+ 1
)
nZ
(
sm − θ¯
)
β
n
+ δ
=
θ¯ − γ¯ + (1− A− nZ) (sm − θ¯)
β
n
+ δ
= Q¯ (s) .
Furthermore, q¯m (s) = 1nQ¯ (s) and this gives for an individual ﬁrm q¯i (s) = q¯m (s)+b (si − sm) =
q¯m (s) +
B
β
(si − sm), which is equal to (2.25).
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2.D Proofs of Section 2.4
Proof of Proposition 2.1
Suppose that other ﬁrms bid sincerely in the information stage and ﬁrm i bids according to
signal s′i when its true signal is si. Suppose also that s
′
i < si. The expected equilibrium
outcome qi,q (s′) given strategies according to s′ = (s′i, s−i) in the information stage and the
constant quantity regulation in the second stage may derive from (2.31). Using θ¯i (s)−θ¯i (s′) =
(B + C) (si − s′i) and θ¯m (s)− θ¯m (s′) =
(
B
n
+ C
)
(si − s′i) yields
qi,q (s
′) = q¯i (s′) +
1
β
(
n− 1
n
)
B (si − s′i) ,
= qei (s)−
(
1− A− nZ
β + nδ
)
1
n
(si − s′i) .
Furthermore, the expected equilibrium price of the secondary market writes from (2.30):
pq (s
′) = pv (s)− δ (1− A) + βZ
β + nδ
(si − s′i)︸ ︷︷ ︸
pv(s′)
+
(
B
n
+ C
)
(si − s′i)
= pv (s) +
(
1− A− nZ
1 + nδ
β
)
1
n
(si − s′i) .
If the resale market is coalitionally-rational against individual bidders, ﬁrm i can reap all the
gains from trade in the second-stage resale market, but not more. If this is the case, instead
of the equilibrium price pq (s′), it pays for permits according to the expected inverse residual
supply function
RS
−1
i (qi, s
′
i; s) = pq (s
′) +
(
β
n− 1
)
(qi − qi,q (s′)) .
The proﬁt of the second stage for ﬁrm i due to the deviation strategy is then from (2.56):
pii,q (s
′
i; si, s−i) =
ˆ qi,q(s′)
q¯i(s′)
{
vi (x; s)−RS−1i (x, s′i; s)
}
dx.
Suppose that var [θm] ≥ σγθ holds and thus 1−A ≥ nZ. This implies that q¯i (s′) < qi,q (s′) <
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qei (s) and pq (s
′) > pv (s) when s′ = (s′i, s−i) with s
′
i < si. These give for the IC condition:
∆q,IC =
ˆ qi,q(s′)
q¯i(s′)
{
RS
−1
i (x, s
′
i; s)−RS−1i (x; s−i)
}
dx (2.80)
+
ˆ qei (s)
qi,q(s′)
{
vi (x; s)−RS−1i (x; s−i)
}
dx.
Given that (2.54) holds, vi (qi; s) ≥ RS−1i (qi; s−i) for all qi ≤ qei (s). Thus, the second integral
of (2.80) is positive. Furthermore, if RS
−1
i (qi, s
′
i; s) ≥ RS−1i (qi; s−i) at both extreme points
of the ﬁrst integral in (2.80), then ∆q,IC ≥ 0. At qi,q (s′), equilibrium conditions guarantee
that RS
−1
i (qi,q (s
′) , s′i; s) = vi (qi,q (s
′) ; s) ≥ RS−1i (qi,q (s′) ; s−i). At q¯i (s′), on the other hand,
RS−1i (q¯i (s
′) ; s−i) = pv (s′) and
RS
−1
i (q¯i (s
′) , s′i; s) = pq (s
′) +
(
β
n− 1
)
(q¯i (s
′)− qi,q (s′))
= pv (s
′) + C (si − s′i) .
Thus if s′i ≤ si then RS−1i (qi, s′i; s) ≥ RS−1i (qi; s−i) for an interval qi ∈ [q¯i (s′) , qi,q (s′)] and
∆q,IC ≥ 0. Similar arguments hold if s′i > si.
Proof of Corollary 2.1
According to Proposition 2.1, the information mechanism is incentive compatible if var [θm] ≥
σγθ and thus if 1− A ≥ nZ. Suppose instead that nZ > 1− A, which implies that Q¯ (s′) >
Q¯ (s) and hence with constant quantities in the second stage q¯i (s′) < qei (s) < qi,q (s
′) and
pq (s
′) < pv (s) when s′ = (s′i, s−i) with s
′
i < si. Thus it is easy to see that
vi (qi; s)−RS−1i (qi; s−i) = (β + τv) qei (s)− (β + τv) qi
and
vi (qi; s)−RS−1i (qi, s′i; s) =
(
n
n− 1
)
βqi,q (s
′)−
(
n
n− 1
)
βqi.
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Thus, with the second-stage quantity regulation and when the resale market is coalitionally-
rational against individual bidders, the IC condition may write
∆q,IC =
ˆ qei (s)
q¯i(s′)
{
vi (x; s)−RS−1i (x; s−i)
}
dx−
ˆ qi,q(s′)
q¯i(s′)
{
vi (x; s)−RS−1i (x, s′i; s)
}
dx
= (β + τv)
ˆ qei (s)
q¯i(s′)
{qei (s)− x} dx−
(
n
n− 1
)
β
ˆ qi,q(s′)
q¯i(s′)
{qi,q (s′)− x} dx
=
1
2
(β + τv) (q
e
i (s)− q¯i (s′))2 −
1
2
(
n
n− 1
)
β (qi,q (s
′)− q¯i (s′))2
=
1
2
(β + τv)
(
1
β
(
(n− 1)B + 1− A− nZ
1 + nδ
β
)
1
n
(si − s′i)
)2
−1
2
(
n
n− 1
)
β
(
1
β
(
n− 1
n
)
B (si − s′i)
)2
=
1
2β
(
n− 1
n
)
(si − s′i)2B2
×
(1 + τv
β
)(
n− 1
n
)1 + 1− A− nZ(
1 + nδ
β
)
(n− 1)B
2 − 1
 .
Using (2.53) we get
(
1 +
τv
β
)
=
(
1 +
nδ
β
) (n− 1)B · var [sm] + var [θm](
1 + nδ
β
)
(n− 1)B · var [sm] + var [θm]− σγθ
 .
Hence, while 1 − A − nZ = var[θm]−σγθ
var[sm]
, the Vickrey auction of the ﬁrst stage with constant
quantities in the second stage is incentive compatible and ∆q,IC ≥ 0 if
σγθ ≤ var [θm]
+
(
1 +
nδ
β
)
(n− 1)B · var [sm]
(
1−
(
n
n− 1
)
(n− 1)B · var [sm]
(n− 1)B · var [sm] + var [θm]
)
σγθ
var [θm]
≤ 1 +
(
1 +
nδ
β
)
(n− 1)
(
B
B + nC
)(
C
B + C
)
.
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Respectively, without any resale market,
∆q,IC =
ˆ qei (s)
q¯i(s′)
{
vi (x; s)−RS−1i (x; s)
}
dx
=
1
2β
(
1
n
(si − s′i)
)2(n− 1)B · var [sm] + var [θm](
1 + nδ
β
)
(var [sm])
2

×
((
1 +
nδ
β
)
(n− 1)B · var [sm] + var [θm]− σγθ
)
.
Thus, without the second-stage regulation, ∆q,IC ≥ 0 if
σγθ
var [θm]
≤ 1 +
(
1 +
nδ
β
)
(n− 1)
(
B
B + nC
)
.
Proof of Corollary 2.2
Suppose that other ﬁrms bid sincerely in the information stage and ﬁrm i bids according to
signal s′i when its true signal is si. Suppose also that s
′
i < si. Then RS
−1
i (qi, s
′
i; s) ≤ pq (s′)
and thus pq (s′) ≥ RS−1i (qi; s−i) for qi ∈ [q¯i (s′) , qi,q (s′)]. Hence ∆q,IC > 0 if RS
−1
i (qi, s
′
i; s)
is replaced by pq (s′) in (2.80). Similar arguments hold if s′i > si.
Proof of Proposition 2.2
Suppose that other ﬁrms bid sincerely in the information stage and ﬁrm i bids according to
signal s′i when its true signal is si. Suppose also that s
′
i < si. Then, given a signal vector
s′ = (s′i, s−i), the constant price regulation in the second stage is deﬁned by p¯ (s
′) = pv (s′).
Moreover, the expected proﬁt of the second stage for ﬁrm i reduces to
pii,p (s
′
i; si, s−i) =
ˆ qi,p(s′)
q¯i(s′)
{vi (x; s)− pv (s′)} dx.
This on the other hand yields for the IC condition
∆p,IC = −
ˆ qei (s)
q¯i(s′)
{
RS−1i (x; s−i)− pv (s′)
}
dx−
ˆ qi,p(s′)
qei (s)
{vi (x; s)− pv (s′)} dx. (2.81)
From the equilibrium conditions it is known thatRS−1i (q¯i (s
′) ; s−i) = pv (s′) and vi (qi,p (s′) ; s) =
pv (s
′). Suppose that δ (1− A) + βZ > 0 and thus σγθ
var[θm]
> −nδ
β
. Hence, pv (s′) ≤ pv (s)
when s′i < si. This also implies that q¯i (s
′) < qei (s) < qi,p (s
′). Also, RS−1i (qi; s−i) must then
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be a non-decreasing function and RS−1i (qi; s−i) ≥ pv (s′) for all q¯i (s′) ≤ qi ≤ qei (s). While
vi (qi; s) is a non-increasing function in qi, both integrals in (2.81) are non-negative and thus
∆p,IC < 0.
However, whenever pv (s′) ≥ pv (s) the opposite is true and ∆p,IC ≥ 0. If pv (s′) ≥ pv (s), it
must hold that qi,p (s′) < qei (s) due to non-increasing vi (qi; s) and (2.81) may write
∆p,IC =
ˆ qi,p(s′)
q¯i(s′)
{
pv (s
′)−RS−1i (x; s−i)
}
dx+
ˆ qei (s)
qi,p(s′)
{
vi (x; s)−RS−1i (x; s−i)
}
dx. (2.82)
Furthermore, RS−1i (qi; s−i) must now be a non-increasing function and pv (s
′) ≥ RS−1i (qi; s−i)
for all q¯i (s′) ≤ qi ≤ qei (s). Hence the ﬁrst integral must be non-negative. Furthermore,
vi (qi; s) ≥ RS−1i (qi; s−i) for all qi ≤ qei (s), given that var [θm] ≥ σγθ, and also the second
integral must be non-negative. Hence ∆p,IC ≥ 0 and the Vickrey auction followed by the
constant price regulation is incentive compatible only if var [θm] ≥ σγθ and dRS
−1
i (qi;s−i)
dqi
≤ 0.
Together these require that
σγθ
var [θm]
≤ −nδ
β
.
Similar arguments hold if s′i > si.
2.E Imperfect permit market
In this section I relax the assumption of a perfect permit market. However, I keep the
model relatively general and just assume that the market suﬀers from trade frictions which
make trading costly for ﬁrms. The trading cost function is denoted by TC (∆qi), where
∆qi = |qi − hi| ≥ 0 is the amount of trading in the permit market of ﬁrm i. Further, I
assume quadratic trading costs:
TC (∆qi) =
1
2
ω (∆qi)
2 , (2.83)
where ω > 0 denotes the coeﬃcient of market performance. For simplicity, I assume that ω
is common knowledge and exogenous to the other parameters of the model. Trading costs
do not change the results of the constant price regulation, but the maximization problem of
the constant quantity regulation turns into:
max
qi,hi
pii,q (qi, hi; θi) =
ˆ qi
q¯i(I)
ui (x; θi) dx (2.84)
+
ˆ ∆qi
0
{pq − ωx} dx1{hi>qi} −
ˆ ∆qi
0
{pq + ωx} dx1{qi>hi}.
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Taking the ﬁrst-order conditions and solving the system gives the equilibrium price from
(2.73)
pq = p¯ (I) + θm − θ¯m (I) . (2.85)
In the equilibrium, ﬁrm i's pollution is
qi,q = q¯i (I) +
(
1
β + ω
){(
θi − θ¯i (I)
)− (θm − θ¯m (I))} . (2.86)
Hence, with a constant quantity regulation, the expected deadweight loss writes as (see
Chapter 3 for derivation)
E [DWLq (I, ω)] =
1
2
(
1
β
n
+ δ
)
{var [θm| I]− 2cov [θm, γ| I] + var [γ| I]} (2.87)
+
n
2β
(
1
1 + β
ω
)2
{var [θi| I]− var [θm| I]}︸ ︷︷ ︸
EDWLω(I)
.
When the frictions in the permit market increase, the second term of (2.87) increases and
the quantity regulation becomes a less attractive regulatory instrument. Note also that
var [θi| 0]− var [θm| 0] ≥ var [θi| s]− var [θm| s](
n− 1
n
)
(1− ρ)σ2θ ≥ (1−B)
(
n− 1
n
)
(1− ρ)σ2θ
B ≥ 0.
Hence, the less noisy the signals are the more is gained from the information mechanism
even if the permit market is imperfect. This is clear while the allocation is then close to
the ﬁrst-best and the resale market is not needed. The modiﬁed Weitzman rule with linear
marginal trading costs in the permit market is written as
∆Modpq,ω =
1
2
(
1
β
n
+ δ
){[
A−
(
nδ
β
)2]
var [θm]−
[
2A+ nZ + 2
(
nδ
β
)]
σγθ
}
(2.88)
− 1
2β
(
1
1 + β
ω
)2
(1−B) (n− 1) (1− ρ)σ2θ .
Below I have run numerical simulations. In the simulations I vary the standard deviation
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of the signal noise (σε ) and the correlation coeﬃcient of the aggregate abatement costs and
pollution damage (ργθ). The other parameters of the aﬃne linear model are kept ﬁxed. The
ﬁxed parameter values are presented in Table 2.2 and the values of the two variating variables
in Table 2.3.
Table 2.2: Simulations - ﬁxed parameter values
Variable Value
n Number of ﬁrms 10
σθ Standard deviation of the abatement cost parameter 10
ρ Correlation coeﬃcient of the abatement costs 0.5
β/n Slope of the aggregate abatement costs 1
σγ Standard deviation of the damage parameter 10
δ Slope of the pollution damage 1
Table 2.3: Simulations - values of variating variables
Variable σε Standard deviation of the signal noise
Value 5 10 20
ργθ Correlation coeﬃcient -0.2 Simulation 1 Simulation 2 Simulation 3
of abatement costs 0 Simulation 4 Simulation 5 Simulation 6
and pollution damage 0.2 Simulation 7 Simulation 8 Simulation 9
Figure 2.3 presents the expected deadweight losses of the two constant regulations. The
dashed lines are constant price regulations and the solid lines constant quantity regulations
when the regulator knows the private information of ﬁrms (I = s, blue curves) and when
the regulation is implemented using only prior information (I = 0, red curves). Given
the structure of the model, the price regulation with I = s cannot be attained due to the
incentive compatibility conditions and the dashed blue curve p(s) denoting the two-stage
price regulation is thus thinner in Figure 2.3 than the other curves.
From the simulations, the two-stage quantity regulation (solid blue line) performs worse than
the one-stage price regulation (dashed red line) when the correlation between abatement costs
and pollution damage is negative (the upper panels), signal noise is high (panels on the right)
and when the permit market frictions increase. The two extremes are Simulations 3 and 7.
Moreover, the value of information increases in precision of signals. In all simulations −nδ
β
<
σγθ
var[θm]
< 1. Hence, according to Lemma 2.4, the diﬀerence between the welfares of quantity
regulations with and without private information of ﬁrms is decreasing in σγθ. Respectively,
the welfare diﬀerence of price regulations due to private information is increasing in σγθ
(Lemma 2.5).
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Figure 2.3: Expected deadweight losses of the constant price regulation (p (I)) and the con-
stant quantity regulation (q (I)) when the coeﬃcient of market performance ω increases. The
red curves describe the cases when the regulator knows only the prior information (I = 0)
and the blue curves the cases when the regulator knows the private information of ﬁrms
(I = s). The parameter values of the various simulations are presented in Tables 2.2 and 2.3.
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Chapter 3
Learning through one round of
communication in regulating the
commons when markets are imperfect
Abstract
When regulating pollution, regulation has often to be designed using only asymmetric and incomplete
information. Even if polluting ﬁrms are privately better informed than the regulator, they may not
have accurate information about their own emission abatement costs. If the regulator is planning
to implement a program of tradeable emissions permits and if the permit market is perfect, the
regulator is able to obtain a solution that maximizes the expected social welfare without the private
information of ﬁrms. However, this private information is valuable to the regulator if the permit
market is not perfect. This paper presents a two-stage regulation when the permit market suﬀers
from market imperfections. In the ﬁrst stage, the regulator conducts a generalized Vickrey-Clarke-
Groves (VCG) mechanism. The main goal of the ﬁrst-stage auction mechanism is to collect private
information from regulated ﬁrms. In addition, the ﬁrst stage serves as an initial permit allocation
method. The Vickrey payment rule rewards ﬁrms for revealing their information sincerely to the
regulator. In the second stage, given the information on the expected costs of reducing emissions,
the regulator implements a quantity regulation, where non-constant permit supply schedules take
into account the frictions of the permit market. I study the incentive compatibility conditions of
the ﬁrst stage auction mechanism followed by a resale market for permits in the regulation stage. I
show that given the aﬃne linear structure of the model, the best response is to bid sincerely in the
Vickrey auction if every other ﬁrm is bidding sincerely, unless the (negative or positive) correlation
between aggregate abatement costs and pollution damage is relatively high.
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3.1 Introduction
In many commons problems, regulation has to be designed using asymmetric and incom-
plete information. Polluting ﬁrms, for instance, are normally privately better informed than
the regulator with regard to the costs of reducing emissions. When a new regulation is be-
ing implemented, even regulated ﬁrms may not have accurate information about their own
abatement costs. To comply with the new regulation the production processes need to be
revised or new, and perhaps still immature, technologies implemented. Moreover, if all the
regulated ﬁrms have similar sets of possible abatement technologies, uncertain costs may be
correlated between ﬁrms. Once the regulation is implemented and ﬁrms start to invest in
new technologies, the uncertainty about the costs will gradually vanish. From the regula-
tor's point of view, however, it may not be possible to wait for the revelation of uncertain
reduction costs. Without any regulation, ﬁrms are not willing to install new technologies
and they do not learn the true costs of emission reductions. The choice of the regulatory
instrument has to be made under incomplete information. Suppose, for instance, that the
regulator is planning to implement a program of tradeable emissions permits. When the
market for emission permits is new, the market may not perform perfectly. Trading may be
costly due to searching or other transaction costs, trading may not be eﬃcient due to asym-
metric information between trading partners, some of the traders may have market power,
or there may be policy failure due to overlapping environmental regulation. If the permit
market was perfectly competitive without any trading frictions, the regulator would be able
to obtain a solution that maximizes the expected social welfare without the private infor-
mation of ﬁrms. Then the regulator would have to care only about the aggregate pollution
level and thus the aggregate supply schedule of permits needs to be set equal to the expected
marginal damage function. However, when the permit market is not perfect, it is not only
the aggregate pollution but also the distribution and the initial allocation of permits among
regulated ﬁrms which is important in terms of the expected welfare. Most importantly, the
private information of ﬁrms is then valuable to the regulator.
For concreteness, consider electricity companies emitting greenhouse gases. In recent years,
these companies have been regulated, or are expected to be regulated, by new climate policy
instruments, such as the EU Emissions Trading System (EU ETS). The generation mix of a
typical company contains varying shares of gas, oil, coal and nuclear power, and renewable
energy. Depending on the production portfolio and investment cycles, companies have dif-
ferent investment plans for the future. If the regulatory requirement changes the investment
plan of a company, the company faces additional costs.1 Uncertainty about these abate-
1This is of course a dynamic problem, whereas the model I consider is a static one. However, consider
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ment costs arises from several factors, such as the development and learning eﬀects of new
technologies, the relative costs of primary fuels, local weather conditions, economic growth
or future climate policies. However, due to similar sets of generating units in production
portfolios and possible new technologies, the eﬀects of these factors are fairly similar for all
companies. Hence, the assumption of uncertain and correlated abatement costs is reason-
able. Furthermore, the implementation and design of the EU ETS has been criticized due
to numerous ﬂaws. One of the most crucial is the overallocation of EU emissions allowances
in the ﬁrst two phases of the EU ETS. This was due to the limited information about ﬁrms'
abatement costs and business-as-usual emissions before Phase I (2005-2007) but also due to
the non-adjustable supply of allowances during the recent economic downturn in Phase II
(2008-2012).
This paper addresses the role of ﬁrms' private information when a new regulatory instrument
for pollution is designed and implemented. To my knowledge, the previous literature does not
distinguish clearly whether ﬁrms learn their abatement costs before or after the regulation is
designed and implemented and how the information structure aﬀects the optimal regulation.
In particular, I ask the following questions. How should the regulation be designed when the
permit market is imperfect, abatement costs are uncertain, and ﬁrms are better informed than
the regulator at the outset? Under what conditions is the private information of regulated
ﬁrms valuable to the regulator and are there any mechanisms that provide incentives for
regulated ﬁrms to reveal their information to the regulator?
To answer these questions, I propose a two-stage regulation. In the ﬁrst stage, the regulator
conducts an auction mechanism. The main goal of the auction is to collect private informa-
tion from regulated ﬁrms. In addition, the auction mechanism serves as an initial allocation
method for pollution permits. In the second stage, given the information on the expected
abatement costs, the regulator implements a quantity regulation, where permit supply sched-
ules adjust to the abatement cost shocks and take into account the frictions of the permit
market.
There is a broad literature on regulating externalities under incomplete information. In a
seminal paper, Weitzman (1974) deﬁnes a rule for choosing between price and quantity reg-
ulation. With a price regulation, a uniform tax rate is set at the constant level, regardless
of the quantity of emissions. Respectively, in a quantity regulation, which could be imple-
mented through a tradeable permit program, the supply of permits is constant regardless
a program of tradeable permits. If all permits that will be issued to the market are eligible for the whole
regulation period (banking of permits is allowed) and if emission reduction activities are independent of each
other, it is then possible to simplify the analysis to the static case. Then we just calculate the net present
value of every single abatement activity conducted at diﬀerent points in time.
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of the price. These two simple regulation alternatives may be called constant regulations.
Roberts and Spence (1976), Weitzman (1978) and, more recently, Kennedy et al. (2010) and
Yates (2012) provide examples of non-constant regulatory schemes that improve the out-
comes relative to constant regulations. In a non-constant tax regulation, the tax rate varies
with the quantity of emissions. In a non-constant quantity regulation, the permit supply is
deﬁned as a function of price. Kennedy et al. and Yates show that, when the permit market
is perfect, non-constant permits with free trading lead unambiguously to lower total expected
social costs than non-constant taxes. The intuition is clear. In equilibrium, when the ag-
gregate permit supply equals the expected marginal damage and when the permit market is
perfect, the marginal abatement costs are equal across ﬁrms, and they are also equal to the
expected marginal damage. Thus the expected welfare is maximized. However, when using
non-constant taxes, the marginal abatement costs may not be equal across ﬁrms. On the
other hand, when the permit market does not function properly or is absent, optimal permit
supply schedules will coincide with optimal non-constant taxes.
All the aforementioned papers use a similar model structure in many respects. Abatement
costs and pollution damage are quadratic and their functional forms are common knowledge.
Apart from Yates (2012), pollution is assumed to be uniformly mixed. Intercepts of marginal
abatement costs and marginal damage are uncertain to the regulator but the slopes are
common knowledge.2 The regulator knows only the distribution functions of the unknown
parameters of the abatement costs, whereas ﬁrms know their abatement costs exactly. Firms
may learn their abatement costs either before or after the regulation is designed. However, the
timing of the learning is not in the focus in these papers. Finally, if the quantity regulation
is considered, the permit market is assumed to be perfect.
The second strand of literature this paper is related to considers multi-unit auctions and, in
particular, Vickrey-Clarke-Groves (VCG) mechanisms3 (Vickrey 1961, Clarke 1971, Groves
1973). In a pollution regulation setup, Dasgupta et al. (1980) and Montero (2008) provide
eﬃcient mechanisms applying the VCG pricing rule. Both Dasgupta et al. and Montero
consider the model of pure private values, i.e. each ﬁrm has complete information about its
own abatement costs. Dasgupta et al. propose a tax scheme applying a direct VCG mech-
anism and Montero examines indirect implementation of a VCG mechanism by proposing a
simple sealed-bid auction mechanism for emissions permits with endogenous (non-constant)
supply. With pure private values, the VCG mechanism implements eﬃcient allocation of
permits in dominant strategies. Thus it is in each ﬁrm's private interest to reveal its true
2In Kennedy et al. (2010) and Yates (2012) the damage function is not uncertain.
3The VCG mechanism is a multi-unit extension of a single-unit Vickrey auction. In this paper these are
used as synonyms.
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information, whatever the other ﬁrms do. Due to the Vickrey pricing rule, each ﬁrm pays
exactly the externality it imposes on other agents. In the case of pollution regulation, the
payment includes the pecuniary externality to other ﬁrms and the residual damage of the
ﬁrm's own emissions.
In this paper, the model structure is diﬀerent in three important ways. First, I relax the
assumption of a perfect permit market. However, I keep the model relatively general in this
respect and do not specify the source or nature of the market imperfections. However, these
market frictions aﬀect symmetrically both the demand and the supply side of the permit
market. The frictions are modeled as linear marginal trading cost functions. If the frictions
are modest, the regulation in the second stage is close to the Roberts and Spence (1976)
non-constant permit regulation and if the frictions are very large, the optimal second-stage
regulation is Weitzman's (1978) non-constant tax regulation.4
Second, I assume that ﬁrms are better informed than the regulator about abatement costs
when the regulation is designed and implemented. In the absence of frictions, the regulator
does not need the private information of ﬁrms in order to implement the optimal second-
best regulation. However, when market frictions are present, the expected welfare loss is
reduced due to better information from the ﬁrst-stage auction mechanism. Then the private
information of ﬁrms is valuable to the regulator when designing the regulation.
Third, I assume that regulated ﬁrms do not have complete information about their own abate-
ment costs before the regulation is implemented. Each ﬁrm has only a noisy estimate of its
own abatement costs. Furthermore, the abatement costs between ﬁrms are correlated. Due
to these uncertain and correlated abatement costs, the ﬁrms' expected marginal valuations
of permits in the ﬁrst-stage auction mechanism are interdependent. Without any regulation,
ﬁrms do not reduce emissions and the true abatement costs will never be revealed. Besides,
it is not known to any ﬁrm or to the regulator when the true costs will be revealed to ﬁrms,
even when ﬁrms start to abate their emissions. Thus it is not possible for the regulator to
wait for the values to become private. Unfortunately, the eﬃciency property of the VCG
mechanisms is not generally sustained when agents have common or interdependent values
(Jehiel and Moldovanu, 2001). However, when the bidders' private information can be sum-
marized by one-dimensional signals and the marginal value functions satisfy continuity, value
monotonicity and the single-crossing properties, then a generalized Vickrey auction without
a resale market is ex-post eﬃcient (Dasgupta and Maskin 2000, Ausubel and Cramton 2004).
Moreover, I allow the uncertain beneﬁts and costs of emissions reductions to be correlated.
4In Chapter 2, I examine a two-stage regulation with either a constant quantity regulation or a constant
price regulation in the second stage. However, in Chapter 2 I assume a perfect permit market. Otherwise
the models have a similar structure.
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Stavins (1996) presents examples of statistical dependence between the marginal beneﬁts
and marginal costs of environmental protection.5 I show that, if the correlation between the
aggregate abatement costs and pollution damage is not too high (negatively or positively),
it is the best response to bid sincerely in the Vickrey auction if every other ﬁrm is bidding
sincerely. Hence the Vickrey auction is incentive compatible and ex-post eﬃcient even if the
auction is followed by the regulation stage and thus the resale market of permits.
In Section 3.2, I introduce a two-stage regulation model with trade frictions and the aﬃne
linear structure of the model. The model is solved backwards. In Section 3.3, I describe a
non-constant quantity regulation in the second stage. The Vickrey auction in the ﬁrst stage
is elaborated in Section 3.4. Section 3.5 concludes.
3.2 Model
The model consists of n ≥ 2 risk-neutral polluting ﬁrms indexed with i = 1, ..., n.6 Pollution
is denoted by a vector q = (q1, . . . , qn) and the aggregate pollution is given byQ =
∑n
i=1 qi. In
order to reduce emissions, ﬁrms have to install new and cleaner technology, change production
processes, use more expensive inputs or perhaps even reduce production to some extent.
Hence, ﬁrm i's value of its pollution qi is based on the avoided costs of reducing emissions
from the business-as-usual level of pollution, qbaui . The gross value of avoided abatement
costs of ﬁrm i, i.e. the gross value of pollution, is denoted by Ui (qi; θi), where the ﬁrm-
speciﬁc cost paramater is θi. Let θ = (θ1, . . . , θn) denote the vector of cost parameters. I
assume that these cost parameters are correlated. U ′i =
dUi
dqi
= ui (qi; θi) is the marginal value
of avoided abatement costs (or the marginal abatement cost function). Furthermore, the
pollution damage function is DF (Q; γ). DF ′ = dDF
dQ
= MDF (Q; γ) is the marginal damage
function and γ is a damage parameter. Pollution is assumed to be uniformly mixed. I assume
that U ′i =
dUi
dqi
> 0, U ′′i ≤ 0, and DF ′ = dDFdQ > 0, DF ′′ ≥ 0.
With complete information about the costs and beneﬁts of emission reductions, the ultimate
problem is to maximize the social welfare with respect to the pollution vector q:
max
q
W (q) =
n∑
i=1
Ui (qi; θi)−DF
(
n∑
i=1
qi; γ
)
. (3.1)
5Consider again the example of climate change. The consequences of climate change are very uncertain.
It has implications for economic growth and for local climate and weather conditions, among other things.
Even if it is diﬃcult to determine the causal relations between diﬀerent factors, it is reasonable to argue that
ﬁrms' investment costs and possible damage caused by climate change have some common factors, and thus
there may be a statistical dependence between them.
6There could also be only one ﬁrm, but I assume for now that there are a number of ﬁrms.
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The ﬁrst-best (interior) solution to this problem is denoted by a vector q? = (q?1, . . . , q
?
n),
where 0 < q?i < q
bau
i for all i and Q
? =
∑n
i=1 q
?
i . In the ﬁrst-best, the pollution of each
ﬁrm is reduced to a level where the marginal value of pollution equals the ﬁrst-best price,
i.e. ui (q?i ; θi) = p
?. In addition, the ﬁrst-best price equals the value of the marginal damage
function, i.e. p? = MDF (Q?; γ).
The ﬁrst-best solution is unknown to the regulator and ﬁrms, while they do not have exact
information about the true damage function nor about the true emission reduction costs.
However, even if the cost parameters θi are unknown to ﬁrms and to the regulator when the
regulation is implemented, ﬁrms are privately better informed than the regulator at the outset
and learn their true abatement costs when they start to put the new abatement technologies
into operation. Hence, I assume that each ﬁrm receives a noisy estimate, i.e. signal si, of its
cost parameter before the regulation is implemented. I denote by s = (s1, . . . , sn) the signal
vector and by s−i = (s1, . . . , si−1, si+1, . . . , sn) the signal vector of every other ﬁrm but ﬁrm
i.
Suppose that the regulator implements a regulation denoted by r. Let pii,r (qi; θi) denote the
proﬁts of ﬁrm i given the regulation r. Thus the proﬁt-maximizing solution of ﬁrm i after the
revelation of θi is denoted by qi,r = arg max pii,r (qi; θi). Respectively, let qr = (q1,r, . . . , qn,r)
denote the vector of proﬁt-maximizing pollution levels. Qr =
∑n
i=1 qi,r is the total level of
pollution. The regulator chooses a regulation that maximizes the expected welfare given
the reactions of ﬁrms to the regulation. An equivalent problem is to minimize the expected
deadweight loss:
min
r
E [DWLr] = E [W (q
?)−W (qr)] (3.2)
= E
[
n∑
i=1
Ui (q
?
i ; θi)−
n∑
i=1
Ui (qi,r; θi)−DF (Q?; γ) +DF (Qr; γ)
]
s.t.
qi,r = arg max pii,r (qi; θi) .
The regulation I consider in this paper is implemented in two stages. The regulation takes
into account the imperfections of the permit market and the information structure of the
regulatory environment. In order to derive tractable results I introduce an aﬃne linear
model. These are described next.
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3.2.1 Two-stage regulation with an imperfect permit market
To begin with, I introduce the timing of the regulation. The two-stage regulation is conducted
by the following steps:
• t0: All ﬁrms and the regulator learn the distribution functions of uncertain parameters
and the functional forms of ﬁrms' abatement costs. Each ﬁrm receives its own signal
si.
• t1: The ﬁrst stage - the information stage. The regulator conducts an auction, in
which emission permits are initially allocated to ﬁrms. The regulator announces both
the rules of the auction mechanism and rules of the regulation during the regulation
period. In the auction, each ﬁrm i simultaneously submits a demand schedule to the
regulator. The regulator sets the clearing price and the total quantity of permits to be
allocated. Then it distributes permits to ﬁrms and collects the auction payments from
ﬁrms. The regulation period starts after the auction.
• t1 − t2: The second stage - the regulation stage. Firms are allowed to trade permits
with each other. In addition, they may purchase more permits from the regulator or
sell permits back to the regulator according to non-constant permit supply schedules.
Firms learn their cost parameters during the regulation period.
• t2: All ﬁrms have learned their cost parameters. The time point t2 is not known to any
ﬁrm or the regulator at the outset. The true pollution damage is not revealed.
In the information stage, the regulator conducts a mechanism, the main goal of which is
to collect private information from regulated ﬁrms. In addition, the ﬁrst-stage mechanism
serves as an initial allocation method for permits. Utilizing a generalized Vickrey auction,
the initial allocation is ex-post eﬃcient, if the incentive compatibility conditions are satisﬁed.
The incentive compatibility of this regulation is deﬁned as follows.
Deﬁnition 3.1. The Vickrey auction in the information stage is said to be incentive com-
patible (IC) if bidding sincerely in the auction is the best response to other bidders' strategies
when they bid sincerely.
Three important issues must be addressed. First, without any regulation, no abatement and
thus no learning about the abatement costs will occur. Second, the regulator is not able
to conduct auctions continuously one after another. There is always a time period between
two consecutive auctions. During this period between two possible auctions, ﬁrms take
diﬀerent actions. They make decisions about abatement technologies, they produce products
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for primary markets, they trade inputs, outputs and, perhaps, emissions permits with each
other. Most importantly, ﬁrms learn and want to adjust their permit holdings. Due to the
learning and ﬁrms' actions, the regulator is willing to implement a second-stage regulation
in the period following an auction. Hence, at the beginning of the regulation period, the
regulator allocates non-constant permit schedules to ﬁrms. After the initial allocation, ﬁrm
i may purchase more permits from the regulator or sell excess permits back to the regulator
according to the schedule allocated to it. In addition, ﬁrm i is free to make transactions in
the permit market with other ﬁrms.
Third, at least with the structure of this paper, the regulator does not need the private
information of ﬁrms in order to implement the second-best regulation if the permit market
is perfect and if the regulator uses a non-constant regulation.7 However, ﬁrms' private in-
formation is valuable to the regulator if the permit market is not perfect. Optimal permit
schedules take into account the frictions of the permit market as well as the information from
the ﬁrst-stage auction.
With an imperfect permit market, it is reasonable to reduce the amount of trading in the
permit market and to make the initial allocation of permits as eﬃcient as possible. I model
permit market trade frictions as increasing costs of actual trades in the market. The costs
of trading aﬀect symmetrically both the seller and the buyer side of the market. I keep the
model relatively general and I do not specify the nature or source of trade frictions. Frictions
can be a consequence of transaction costs (e.g. Stavins 1995), market power (e.g. Malueg and
Yates 2009), asymmetric information between traders (Myerson and Satterthwaite 1983) or
any other source of market imperfection. However, to give a name to these costs, I call them
trading costs. The trading cost function is equal for all ﬁrms and is denoted by TC (∆qi),
where ∆qi ≥ 0 is the amount of trading in the permit market of ﬁrm i. The more ﬁrm i trades
in the market, the higher the costs of the transactions are. Hence TC ≥ 0 and TC ′ ≥ 0. The
functional form of the trading costs is explained in the following section.
Also, the information about signals and distribution functions related to abatement costs is
valuable to the regulator if there is a statistical dependence between the beneﬁts and costs
of emissions reductions. The signals are jointly aﬀected by uncertain abatement costs and
pollution damage, which should be taken into account when implementing the regulation.
Without proper information, the regulator is not able to derive the relevant expected marginal
damage function and hence optimal permit schedules. In this paper I assume that the
regulator does know the distribution functions of the unknown cost parameters and the
functional forms of ﬁrms' abatement costs. However, the regulator does not know the ﬁrms'
7I explain the result of a perfect permit market in Appendix 3.A.
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signal realization.8
3.2.2 Aﬃne linear model
I follow previous literature (e.g. Weitzman 1974, 1978) and linearize the unknown marginal
functions around the ﬁrst-best. As Weitzman (1978, p. 686) puts it:
A linear approximation might be rationalized on one of two grounds. The amount
of uncertainty could be small enough to keep the range of output responses suf-
ﬁciently limited to justify a ﬁrst-order approximation. Or, it might just happen
that total cost and beneﬁt functions are almost quadratic to begin with. At any
rate, the possibility of sharply characterizing an optimal solution makes the linear
case a natural preliminary to any more general analysis.
In addition, I apply the aﬃne information structure from Vives (2010, 2011). In this model all
random variables are normally distributed. Although fairly detailed, this is convenient when
calculating the conditional expectations of the payoﬀ-relevant variables. The conditional
expectations of the value parameters are linear functions of the agents' information. With
linear marginal value functions and with linear strategies it is then possible to construct a
Linear Bayesian Demand Function Equilibrium for the model (see Vives 2011).
Deﬁnition 3.2. The aﬃne linear model is deﬁned by equations (3.3) - (3.14), where the
distribution functions of the uncertain variables and the functional forms of abatement costs
and pollution damage are common knowledge.
Taking a second-order approximation of Ui (qi; θi) around the ﬁrst-best gives the following
linear marginal value function (or the marginal abatement cost function):
ui (qi; θi) = θi − βqi. (3.3)
Cost parameter θi and slope β are such that θi ≡ U ′i (q?i ; θi) − U ′′i (q?i ; θi) q?i > 0 and β ≡
−U ′′i (q?i ; θi) ≥ 0. To simplify the model, the slope parameter is assumed to be constant and
common knowledge to all ﬁrms and to the regulator. As noted already, the cost param-
eters are uncertain, but they are drawn from the same prior distribution, θi ∼ N
(
θ¯, σ2θ
)
.
Moreover, the cost parameters are symmetrically correlated between ﬁrms with a covariance,
cov [θi, θj] = ρσ
2
θ , where only positive correlations are assumed, i.e. ρ > 0. Thus the average
8Cases where the distribution functions of the unknown parameters, the performance of the permit market
and the functional forms of abatement costs are unknown to the regulator are left for future work.
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cost parameter θm = 1n
n∑
i=1
θi is normally distributed with an expected value E [θm] = θ¯ and
a variance var [θm] = 1n (1 + (n− 1) ρ)σ2θ .
At the initial time point t0, each ﬁrm receives a noisy signal of its own cost parameter, si = θi+
εi. The noise terms are identically and independently distributed around zero, εi ∼ N (0, σ2ε).
The average signal is denoted by sm = 1n
n∑
i=1
si. Its distribution has an expected value
E [sm] = θ¯ and a variance var [sm] = 1n (σ
2
ε + (1 + (n− 1) ρ)σ2θ).9 The expected marginal
values are interdependent and I thus assume that σ2ε > 0 and 0 < ρ < 1.
10
Initially ﬁrms can condition their cost parameters only on their own signals. However, given
the structure of the model and given that the Vickrey auction is incentive compatible (Def-
inition 3.1), the clearing price of the auction reveals the average signal sm. In other words,
the clearing price p is suﬃcient statistics for sm and E [θi| sm] is informationally equivalent
to E [θi| p]. I explain the procedure later in more detail (see also Chapter 2 of this thesis and
Vives 2011). Furthermore, due to the symmetric correlation between ﬁrms' cost parameters,
we may also write E [θi| s] = E [θi| sm] = E [θi| p]. Thus ﬁrms are able to update their beliefs
about their own cost parameters conditional on information from the auction. The expected
value of θi conditional on signal si and the clearing price of the Vickrey auction (or the
average signal sm, or the whole signal vector s) writes as11
E [θi| s] = Aθ¯ +Bsi + Cnsm, (3.4)
where
A =
σ2ε
σ2ε + (1 + (n− 1) ρ)σ2θ
B =
(1− ρ)σ2θ
σ2ε + (1− ρ)σ2θ
C =
ρσ2θσ
2
ε
(σ2ε + (1− ρ)σ2θ) (σ2ε + (1 + (n− 1) ρ)σ2θ)
.
The variance of θi conditional on s is
var [θi| s] = (B + C)σ2ε . (3.5)
9Note also that var [sm] = cov [si, sm].
10The model would be one with independent private values if ρ = 0. The pure common values case is when
cost parameters are perfectly correlated and thus ρ = 1.
11See Appendix 2.A and e.g. DeGroot (1970). The expected value of θi conditional only on signal si is
E [θi| si] = σ
2
ε
σ2ε+σ
2
θ
θ¯ +
σ2θ
σ2ε+σ
2
θ
si. Note also that A+B + nC = 1 and thus 1−A = B + nC.
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From (3.4) the conditional expected value and the variance of the average cost parameter are
written as, respectively,
E [θm| s] = θ¯ + (1− A)
(
sm − θ¯
)
, (3.6)
var [θm| s] = A · var [θm] = (B + nC) 1
n
σ2ε . (3.7)
I denote the remaining uncertainty of ﬁrm i's cost parameter by εsi = θi − E [θi| s], which
has a normal distribution, i.e. εsi ∼ N (0, (B + C)σ2ε). The covariance between εsi and εsj is
cov
[
εsi , ε
s
j
]
= Cσ2ε . Respectively, the distribution of the remaining aggregate uncertainty, i.e.
nεsm =
∑n
i=1 ε
s
i , has parameters nε
s
m ∼ N (0, (B + nC)nσ2ε).
From (3.3) and (3.4) the expected marginal value function conditional on s is written as
vi (qi; s) ≡ E [ui (qi; θi)| si, s−i] . (3.8)
= Aθ¯ +Bsi + Cnsm − βqi.
Respectively, the damage function is also approximated around the ﬁrst-best. The ﬁrst-order
linear approximation of the marginal damage function is written as
MDF (Q; γ) = γ + δQ, (3.9)
where slope δ ≡ DF ′′ (Q?; γ) ≥ 0 is common knowledge. The damage parameter γ ≡
DF ′ (Q?; γ)−DF ′′ (Q?; γ)Q? is, however, uncertain. It is a draw from the distribution with
parameters γ ∼ N(γ¯, σ2γ). Furthermore, I allow γ to be correlated with θm and I denote
the covariance by cov [γ, θm] = σγθ. Using these, the expected marginal damage function
conditional on the sum of all signals nsm =
n∑
i=1
si is
y (Q; s) ≡ E [MDF (Q; γ)| s] (3.10)
= γ¯ + nZ
(
sm − θ¯
)
+ δQ,
where E [γ| s] = γ¯ + nZ (sm − θ¯) and
Z =
cov [γ, nsm]
var [nsm]
=
σγθ
σ2ε + (1 + (n− 1) ρ)σ2θ
. (3.11)
I assume that the true damage parameter remains uncertain in the model. The uncertainty
related to the damage parameter conditional on s is εsγ = γ− γ¯−Z
(
nsm − nθ¯
)
. Furthermore,
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the variance of γ conditional on s is
var [γ| s] = var [εsγ] = σ2γ − nZσγθ, (3.12)
and the conditional covariance between the average cost and damage parameters is simply
cov [γ, θm| s] = Aσγθ. (3.13)
I also assume that the marginal trading cost function is linear:
MTC (∆qi) = ω∆qi, (3.14)
where MTC (∆qi) = TC ′ (∆qi) and ω denotes the coeﬃcient of market performance. For
simplicity, I assume that ω is common knowledge and exogenous to the other parameters of
the model. Note that the assumption about the linear and increasing marginal trading costs
is just a simpliﬁcation. For instance, Stavins (1995) discusses transaction costs in tradeable
permit markets with either an increasing, decreasing or constant marginal transaction cost
function. However, to my understanding, using a trading cost function with decreasing or
constant marginal trading costs would not change the results qualitatively.
Now, given this structure, the pollution of ﬁrm i in the ﬁrst-best is given by q?i =
1
β
(θi − p?),
where p? is the ﬁrst-best price:
p? =
δθm +
β
n
γ
β
n
+ δ
. (3.15)
Furthermore, the welfare maximizing pollution level may write
Q? =
θm − γ
β
n
+ δ
. (3.16)
Moreover, the second-best regulation minimizes the following linear approximation of the
expected deadweight loss equation:
min
r
E [DWLr] = E
[
n∑
i=1
{ˆ q?i
qi,r
ui (x; θi) dx
}
−
ˆ Q?
Qr
MDF (X; γ) dX
]
(3.17)
≈ E
[
n∑
i
θi (q
?
i − qi,r)−
β
2
n∑
i
(
q?2i − q2i,r
)− γ (Q? −Qr)− δ
2
(
Q?2 −Q2r
)]
.
This problem is a linearized version of (3.2).
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The main objective of this paper is to derive conditions in which the information mechanism
of the two-stage regulation is incentive compatible. If this is the case, the regulator learns
the ﬁrms' private information and is able to provide an ex-post eﬃcient allocation of permits
after the auction. The ex-post eﬃcient allocation, conditional on the revelation of signals,
is denoted by qe (s) = (qe1 (s) , . . . , q
e
n (s)) ≡ E [q?| s]. I show in Proposition 3.1 that given
the aﬃne linear model, the information mechanism is incentive compatible whenever the
correlation between emissions reduction beneﬁts and costs is not too high. More precisely,
the IC condition is satisﬁed if
−nδ
β
≤ σγθ
var [θm]
≤ 1. (3.18)
Particularly, the latter inequality σγθ
var[θm]
≤ 1 ensures that the aggregate quantity rule of the
ﬁrst-stage auction is weakly increasing in each bidder's signal. Note that nZ ≤ 1 − A is
equivalent to σγθ
var[θm]
≤ 1. Moreover, the former inequality −nδ
β
≤ σγθ
var[θm]
guarantees that
the optimal permit supply schedules of the second-stage regulation are weakly increasing in
permit purchases. This, on the other hand, is equivalent to −nδ
β
(1− A) ≤ nZ.
I solve the problem backwards. In the next section, I derive the optimal permit supply
schedules given the information the regulator has at the time of implementing the non-
constant quantity regulation. I also examine the value of ﬁrms' private information to the
regulator in diﬀerent information structures and permit market conditions. In Section 3.4,
I then describe the Vickrey payment rule, which gives incentives to ﬁrms to reveal their
expected values to the regulator in the information stage.
3.3 Regulation stage
In this section, I derive the second-best regulation in the second stage given the information
the regulator has. The regulator's information parameter is denoted by I. In particular,
I = 0 denotes that the regulator knows only the prior information. Then the regulation is
implemented in the absence of the private information of ﬁrms. In contrast, if I = s, the
regulator has complete information about signal vector s and is able to implement the ex-post
eﬃcient allocation of permits at the beginning of the regulation period. Following Roberts
and Spence (1976; later RS), Weitzman (1978; later W) and Yates (2012), I assume that the
regulator uses the following linear permit schedules in the regulation stage:
Ti (qi; I) = p¯ (I) + τ (qi − q¯i(I)) . (3.19)
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The price p¯ (I) = E [p?| I] denotes the expected ﬁrst-best price and q¯i(I) = E [q?i | I] the
expected ﬁrst-best allocation of permits to ﬁrm i conditional on information I. The slope of
the permit supply schedule is τ . Weitzman (1978) uses general tax functions but the optimal
schedules are linear in his model due to the linearized system, but also due to regularity
assumptions about the distributions of the random variables. In contrast, Yates (2012) does
not make any assumptions about distributions of uncertain parameters, but he restricts his
analysis to linear schedules. Due to the linearized system and normal distributions of the
random variables, the linear schedules are optimal in this model. With knowledge of prior
information only, the expected ﬁrst-best price is
p¯ (0) =
nδθ¯ + βγ¯
β + nδ
. (3.20)
Respectively, if I = s, the expected ﬁrst-best price is
p¯ (s) =
nδθ¯m (s) + βγ¯ (s)
β + nδ
(3.21)
= p¯ (0) +
nδ (1− A) + βnZ
β + nδ
(
sm − θ¯
)
.
The last line comes from inserting θ¯m (s) = E [θm| s] from (3.6) and γ¯ (s) = E [γ| s] from
(3.10). The initial allocation is given by q¯i (I) = 1β
(
θ¯i (I)− p¯ (I)
)
, where θ¯i (I) = E [θi| I].
Without any information about signals, θ¯i (0) = θ¯ for all i and the regulator allocates an
equal amount of permits to each ﬁrm:
q¯i (0) = q¯ =
θ¯ − γ¯
β + nδ
. (3.22)
On the other hand, when the regulator knows the signal vector, θ¯i (s) = Aθ¯ + Bsi + Cnsm
from (3.4), the regulator can implement an ex-post eﬃcient allocation:
q¯i (s) = q
e
i (s) (3.23)
= q¯ +
(
1− A− nZ
β + nδ
)(
sm − θ¯
)
︸ ︷︷ ︸
q¯m(s)
+
B
β
(si − sm) ,
where q¯m (s) = 1nQ¯ (s) is the allocation of the average ﬁrm indexed with m and receiving
signal sm. Firm i may purchase (or sell back) permits from (to) the regulator according to
the price schedule (3.19). The net purchases of ﬁrm i from the regulator are denoted by
hi. This is a sum of the initial allocation q¯i(I) and transactions with the regulator in the
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regulation period. In addition, ﬁrms are allowed to trade permits with each other. I assume
full compliance. At the end of the regulation period each ﬁrm holds an amount of permits
equal to its emissions in the regulation period. Firms report their emissions honestly to the
regulator. Hence, ∆qi = |qi − hi| ≥ 0 is ﬁrm i's amount of trading in the permit market.
Firm i is a buyer of permits if qi > hi and a permit seller if hi > qi.12
The problem of the regulator is to ﬁnd a slope τ that minimizes the expected deadweight loss
from (3.17). It has to take into account the reactions of ﬁrms. Firm i maximizes its proﬁts
with respect to pollution qi and purchases from the regulator hi given the supply schedule
Ti (qi; I) and the market performance of the secondary market deﬁned by ω:
max
qi,hi
pii,τ (qi, hi; θi) =
ˆ qi
q¯i(I)
ui (x; θi) dx−
ˆ hi
q¯i(I)
Ti (x; I) dx (3.24)
+
ˆ ∆qi
0
{pτ − ωx} dx1{hi>qi} −
ˆ ∆qi
0
{pτ + ωx} dx1{qi>hi},
where pτ is the equilibrium price of the secondary market and 1 is the indicator function with
a value of 1 if its argument is true and otherwise 0. The ﬁrst-order conditions with respect
to pollution qi and permit purchases hi are given by, respectively,
dpii,τ (qi, hi; θi)
dqi
= ui (qi; θi)− pτ + ω (hi − qi) = 0 (3.25)
and
dpii,τ (qi, hi; θi)
dhi
= −Ti (hi; I) + pτ − ω (hi − qi) = 0. (3.26)
Let qi,τ and hi,τ denote the proﬁt-maximizing outcomes. From the ﬁrst-order conditions it is
easy to see that ui (qi,τ ; θi) = Ti (hi,τ ; I), which implies
τhi,τ + βqi,τ = (β + τ) q¯i (I) +
(
θi − θ¯i (I)
)
. (3.27)
Summing (3.27) from 1 to n and using the market-clearing condition
∑n
i=1 hi,τ =
∑n
i=1 qi,τ =
Qτ gives the total level of pollution:
Qτ = Q¯ (I) +
(
n
β + τ
)(
θm − θ¯m (I)
)
. (3.28)
12Note that if τ = 0 the permit supply schedule reduces to constant tax Ti = p¯ (I). On the other hand,
if τ →∞, the regulation is a constant quantity regulation. Then, in the beginning of the regulation period,
the regulator allocates pollution permits to ﬁrms according to q¯ (I) = (q¯1 (I) , . . . , q¯n (I)) and lets ﬁrms trade
permits freely in the secondary market. These two constant regulations following the information mechanism
are examined in Chapter 2.
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The average ﬁrm (with cost parameter θm) does not trade in the equilibrium:
qm,τ = hm,τ = q¯m (I) +
(
1
β + τ
)(
θm − θ¯m (I)
)
. (3.29)
Plugging (3.29) into the ﬁrst-order condition pτ = um (qm,τ ; θm) gives the equilibrium price:
pτ = p¯ (I) +
(
τ
β + τ
)(
θm − θ¯m (I)
)
. (3.30)
Moreover, using (3.25), (3.27) and (3.30) the equilibrium outcomes of ﬁrm i are
qi,τ = q¯i (I) +
(
1
βτ + ωβ + ωτ
){
(τ + ω)
(
θi − θ¯i (I)
)− ( τ 2
β + τ
)(
θm − θ¯m (I)
)}
, (3.31)
and
hi,τ = q¯i (I) +
(
1
βτ + βω + τω
){
ω
(
θi − θ¯i (I)
)
+
(
βτ
β + τ
)(
θm − θ¯m (I)
)}
. (3.32)
Together these imply
qi,τ − hi,τ =
(
τ
βτ + ωβ + ωτ
){
(θi − θm)−
(
θ¯i (I)− θ¯m (I)
)}
. (3.33)
Let us assume that τ ≥ 0. Firm i is then on the demand side of the permit market (qi,τ > hi,τ ),
if the positive deviation of ﬁrm i's cost parameter from the average value, i.e. θi − θm, is
greater than the diﬀerence between the expected cost parameter of ﬁrm i and the expected
average cost parameter, i.e. θ¯i (I) − θ¯m (I). Hence, even if the cost parameter of ﬁrm i
decreases from the expected value, ﬁrm i may be a demander of permits in the secondary
market if, on average, the cost parameters decrease even more.
Figure 3.1 describes the equilibrium outcomes in a three-ﬁrm market (ﬁrms j, m and k)
in diﬀerent market conditions, where θj < θm < θk with θm = 12 (θj + θk). Figure 3.1a
presents the extreme cases of a perfect (ω = 0) and collapsed (ω → ∞) permit market,
whereas Figure 3.1b presents the case where 0 < ω < ∞. Suppose, for simplicity, that the
regulator has no information about ﬁrms' signals and thus I = 0.13 When the regulator
has only prior information available, it implements the same permit supply schedule for each
ﬁrm, i.e. Ti (qi) = p¯ + τ (qi − q¯i) for all i = j,m, k. In Figure 3.1, the slope of the permit
supply schedule τ is ﬁxed in diﬀerent cases of ω. Respectively, from the regulator's point of
13To simplify notation, I have omitted the argument of the information parameter I = 0 in Figure 3.1 and
in what follows. The market performance ω ∈ (0,∞) is denoted with a superscript.
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view, each ﬁrm has the same expected marginal value function vi (qi). I have also assumed
that θm > θ¯ and, hence, the equilibrium price is greater than the expected ﬁrst-best price,
pτ > p¯. Due to symmetry, market frictions do not aﬀect the equilibrium price, but they
reduce trading in the market.
Suppose ﬁrst that the permit market is perfect (ω = 0, Figure 3.1a). Then all ﬁrms purchase
an equal amount of permits from the regulator h0i,τ . Furthermore, in the absence of permit
market trade frictions, the market mechanism provides a cost-eﬃcient solution where pτ =
ui
(
q0i,τ
)
= Ti
(
h0i,τ
)
for all i. The average ﬁrm m does not trade in the permit market,
whereas ﬁrm k buys ∆qk = q0k,τ −h0i,τ = h0i,τ − q0j,τ = ∆qj permits from ﬁrm j. In equilibrium,
purchasing one more unit from the regulator or reducing one more unit of pollution is more
costly for every ﬁrm than the beneﬁts it receives by selling one more permit in the market.
The problem of the regulator is then only to care about the aggregate eﬃciency, because the
permit market trading equalizes the marginal abatement costs of ﬁrms.
With positive trading costs (ω > 0, Figure 3.1b), each ﬁrm's beneﬁts of purchasing permits
from the regulator and selling them to other ﬁrms is reduced. Hence, the seller of permits
in the secondary market, i.e. ﬁrm j, reduces its purchases from the regulator to hωj,τ < h
0
i,τ .
Respectively, ﬁrm k buys less permits from the market and more units from the regulator
hωk,τ > h
0
i,τ . Hence, trading between ﬁrms reduces as ω increases. In equilibrium, the marginal
abatement cost function is equal to the marginal costs of purchasing permits from the regu-
lator, i.e. ui
(
qωi,τ
)
= Ti
(
hωi,τ
)
. Moreover, for the permit buyer (ﬁrm k), these must be equal
to the marginal cost of purchasing permits from the market, i.e. pτ + ω∆qk. For the permit
seller (ﬁrm j), on the other hand, uj
(
qωj,τ
)
= Tj
(
hωj,τ
)
= pτ − ω∆qk. Thus the equilibrium is
not cost-eﬃcient, while uj
(
qωj,τ
)
< um (qm,τ ) < uk
(
qωk,τ
)
.
In another extreme case, the permit market is totally collapsed (ω → ∞, Figure 3.1a) and
every ﬁrm purchases all the permits it needs from the regulator h∞i,τ = q
∞
i,τ . This increases
the deviation of equilibrium pollution from the cost-eﬃcient solution.
Hence, the regulator has to take into account the expected deviations when choosing the
permit schedule functions. This is done by lowering the slope of the permit schedules when
ω increases. However, at the same time the aggregate pollution becomes more price-sensitive
and the risks of high environmental damage increase. Hence there is a trade-oﬀ between
cost-eﬃciency and aggregate eﬃciency when the permit market is imperfect.
Using qi,τ from (3.31) and Qτ from (3.28) and plugging these into (3.17) gives the expected
deadweight loss of the non-constant regulation deﬁned in equation (3.19). I derive the ex-
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Figure 3.1: Equilibrium of the regulation stage.
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pected deadweight loss in Appendix 3.B. It is written as
E [DWLτ (I, ω)] =
1
2
(
1
β
n
+ δ
){(
nδ − τ
β + τ
)2
var [θm| I] + var [γ| I]
}
(3.34)
+
(
1
β
n
+ δ
)(
nδ − τ
β + τ
)
cov [γ, θm| I]
+
n
2β
(
τ
βτ
ω
+ β + τ
)2
{var [θi| I]− var [θm| I]} .
The optimal τ , given information I and market performance ω, solves d(E[DWLτ (I,ω)])
dτ
= 0 or,
respectively, the following equation:
fτ (τ | I, ω) ≡
(
nδ − τ
β + τ
)
var [θm| I] + cov [γ, θm| I] (3.35)
−
(
τ (β + τ)2(
βτ
ω
+ β + τ
)3
)
(var [θi| I]− var [θm| I]) = 0.
The optimal slope is denoted by τ (I, ω) ≡ (τ : fτ (τ | I, ω) = 0). Note that, when I = s,
equation (3.35) yields
fτ,s (τ) ≡ fτ (τ | I = s, ω) (3.36)
=
(
nδ − τ
β + τ
)
(1− A) + nZ −
(
τ (β + τ)2(
βτ
ω
+ β + τ
)3
)
(n− 1)B = 0.
I use equation (3.36) when I later derive the main results of the paper. However, the main
results of this section are provided in the following four lemmas.
Lemma 3.1. Given the aﬃne linear model, the slopes of the permit supply schedules in the
Weitzman (1978) and Roberts and Spence (1976) models, respectively τW and τRS, are the
lower and upper bounds of the permit supply schedule slope τ (I, ω), when ω moves from 0
to ∞. Given that −nδ
β
≤ σγθ
var[θm]
≤ 1, Weitzman's non-constant tax schedule provides the
lower bound of the slope, 0 ≤ τW (I) ≤ τ (I, ω) ≤ τRS (I). If σγθ
var[θm]
< −nδ
β
, Weitzman's non-
constant tax schedule provides the upper bound of the slope, τRS (I) ≤ τ (I, ω) ≤ τW (I) < 0.
Proof. Suppose ﬁrst that the resale market performs perfectly and thus ω = 0. Then the
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regulator chooses τ (I, 0) ≡ τRS (I) such that
fτ (τ | I, ω = 0) =
(
nδ − τ
β + τ
)
var [θm| I] + cov [γ, θm| I] = 0
⇒ τRS (I) = β · cov [γ, θm| I] + nδ · var [θm| I]
var [θm| I]− cov [γ, θm| I] .
This is the optimal slope of the RS non-constant permit supply model when pollution damage
and abatement costs are correlated. When σγθ = 0, the slope is τRS = nδ. On the other
hand, when the resale market is collapsed or absent (ω →∞), we get for τ (I,∞) ≡ τW (I):
fτ (τ | I, ω →∞) =
(
nδ − τ
β + τ
)
var [θm| I] + cov [γ, θm| I]
−
(
τ
β + τ
)
(var [θi| I]− var [θm| I]) = 0
⇒ τW (I) = β · cov [γ, θm| I] + nδ · var [θm| I]
var [θi| I]− cov [γ, θm| I] .
This is equal to the slope of Weitzman's (1978) non-constant tax regulation. Note that
var [θm| s] = A · var [θm] and cov [γ, θm| s] = A · cov [γ, θm| 0]. While var [θi| I] ≥ var [θm| I],
it always holds that
∣∣τW (I)∣∣ ≤ ∣∣τRS (I)∣∣, when σγθ
var[θm]
≤ 1. These prove the latter part of
the Lemma. 
The cases where σγθ
var[θm]
> 1 are not considered in Lemma 3.1. However, when var [θm| I] <
cov [γ, θm| I] < var [θi| I] the non-constant taxes are increasing (τW (I) > 0) and the permit
supply schedules of the RS model are decreasing (τRS (I) < 0). When cov [γ, θm| I] >
var [θi| I] all these functions are decreasing such that τW (I) < τRS (I) < −β.
Lemma 3.2. Given the aﬃne linear model and a perfect permit market, the regulator does
not need the private information of ﬁrms in order to implement the second-best regulation.
Proof. Using again var [θm| s] = A · var [θm] and cov [γ, θm| s] = A · cov [γ, θm| 0] gives
τRS (s) =
βAσγθ + nδA · var [θm]
A · var [θm]− Aσγθ =
βσγθ + nδ · var [θm]
var [θm]− σγθ = τ
RS (0) . (3.37)
Denoting τRS (I) = τRS we get
nδ − τRS
β + τRS
=
−nσγθ
(1 + (n− 1) ρ)σ2θ
= − nZ
1− A.
Furthermore, given a perfect secondary market (ω = 0), the deadweight loss depends on the
price diﬀerence pτ − p? (see equation 3.61 in Appendix 3.B). Hence, if this price diﬀerence is
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independent of information I, the regulator is able to implement the second-best regulation
without the information I = s. Thus, in order to show that DWLτ (s, 0) = DWLτ (0, 0)
when using τ = τRS, it remains to show that pτ (s) = pτ (0) . From (3.30) we get
pτ (s) = p¯ (s) +
(
τRS
β + τRS
)(
θm − θ¯m (s)
)
= p¯ (0) +
(
τRS
β + τRS
)(
θm − θ¯
)
︸ ︷︷ ︸
pτ (0)
+
(
nδ (1− A) + βnZ
β + nδ
−
(
τRS
β + τRS
)
(1− A)
)(
sm − θ¯
)
= pτ (0) +
(
1
1 + nδ
β
){(
nδ − τRS
β + τRS
)
(1− A) + nZ
}
︸ ︷︷ ︸
=0
(
sm − θ¯
)
.
Lemma 3.3. Given the aﬃne linear model, the expected deadweight loss is decreasing in the
slopes of the marginal damage function δ and the aggregate abatement cost function β
n
, and
increasing in the conditional variance of the damage parameter var [γ| θm], when the permit
market is perfect and the regulator uses permit schedules from (3.19) with τ = τRS.
Proof. Plugging nδ−τ
RS
β+τRS
= − nZ
1−A into (3.34) when ω = 0 and, for instance, I = 0 the expected
deadweight loss reduces to
E [DWLτ (0, 0)] =
1
2
(
1
β
n
+ δ
){(
nδ − τRS
β + τRS
)2
var [θm| 0] + var [γ| 0]
}
+
(
1
β
n
+ δ
)(
nδ − τRS
β + τRS
)
cov [γ, θm| 0]
=
1
2
(
1
β
n
+ δ
){
σ2γ −
(σγθ)
2
1
n
(1 + (n− 1) ρ)σ2θ
}
=
1
2
(
1
β
n
+ δ
)
var [γ| θm] .
Lemma 3.3 implies that the correlation between emission reduction costs and beneﬁts, whether
negative or positive, improves welfare when the permit market performs perfectly. The regu-
lator is able to use the private information of ﬁrms, which reveals valuable information about
pollution damage and thus improves the outcome of the regulation.
Lemma 3.4. Given the aﬃne linear model, the slopes of the optimal permit supply schedules
are not independent of information in the absence of a permit market.
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Proof. With non-constant taxes from the Weitzman (1978) model, we have
τW (0) =
βσγθ + nδ · var [θm]
σ2θ − σγθ
. (3.38)
Note that var[ θi|s]
A
= var [θm] + (n− 1)B · var [sm] , and thus when −nδβ <
σγθ
var[θm]
< 1,
τW (s) =
βσγθ + nδ · var [θm]
(n− 1)B · var [sm] + var [θm]− σγθ (3.39)
=
βσγθ + nδ · var [θm]
(1 + (n− 1) ρB)σ2θ − σγθ
< τW (0) .
Lemma 3.4 implies that E [DWLτ (s,∞)] < E [DWLτ (0,∞)]. More generally, the slopes
of the optimal permit supply schedules are not independent of information when ω > 0,
which further implies E [DWLτ (s, ω)] < E [DWLτ (0, ω)] whenever ρ, σ2θ > 0. See Appendix
3.D for the numerical simulations. Finally, if there was only one ﬁrm (n = 1), the slope of
the Weitzman non-constant tax regulation would coincide with the slope of the Roberts and
Spence non-constant quantity regulation.
3.4 Information stage
Now I turn to the auction mechanism of the information stage.14 I consider a generalized
VCG mechanism (or Vickrey auction). With interdependent values, ﬁnding a mechanism
that is able to implement eﬃcient allocation may not be possible (Jehiel and Moldovanu
2001). However, Ausubel and Cramton (2004) prove in their Theorem 1 that for any value
functions satisfying continuity, value monotonicity and the single-crossing property, a Vickrey
auction with reserve pricing has truthful bidding as an ex-post equilibrium. This holds for
any monotonic aggregate quantity rule Q¯ (s) and associated monotonic eﬃcient assignment
rule qei (s).
In addition, even if an equilibrium in an auction without resale is typically not an equilibrium
in a auction followed by a resale market, the resale market does not distort the equilibrium of
a Vickrey auction. In particular, Ausubel and Cramton state in their Theorem 2 that if the
Vickrey auction with reserve pricing is followed by any resale process that is coalitionally-
rational against individual bidders, truthful bidding remains an ex-post equilibrium.
14In Chapter 2 I use the same information structure and auction mechanism and explain the Vickrey
auction in more detail.
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In this section, I will derive conditions in which it is optimal for a ﬁrm to bid sincerely in
a Vickrey auction, when every other bidder is bidding sincerely and when the auction is
followed by the regulation stage.
3.4.1 Vickrey auction
I model the auction using the indirect interpretation of the generalized VCG mechanism
introduced by Montero (2008). Montero applied the auction in a pure private values envi-
ronment, whereas the values are interdependent in this model. Nevertheless, the rules of the
auction mechanism are similar. Let us assume for a moment that every ﬁrm bids sincerely.
Hence, each ﬁrm is a price-taker in the auction. Given this assumption I characterize the
auction equilibrium strategies of ﬁrms. Then I examine whether an individual ﬁrm has in-
centives to deviate from the strategy of sincere bidding, given that every other ﬁrm is bidding
sincerely. This gives the conditions of incentive compatibility.
Before describing the auction mechanism, ﬁrst note that the expected marginal abatement
cost function vi (qi; s) from (3.8) satisﬁes continuity, value monotonicity and the single-
crossing property. Secondly, in this model the aggregate quantity rule may be written as
Q¯ (s) =
y−1
(
v−i
(
qe−i (s) ; s
)
; s
)
, if qei (s) = 0
y−1 (vi (qei (s) ; s) ; s) , if q
e
i (s) > 0.
(3.40)
According to the aggregate quantity rule (3.40), the price-elastic supply of permits is thus
QS (p; s) = y
−1 (p; s) (3.41)
=
1
δ
(
p− γ¯ − nZ (sm − θ¯)) .
Given that the Vickrey auction is ex-post eﬃcient, it must hold that the clearing price is
given by pv (s) = p¯ (s) = p¯ (0) +
(
δ(1−A)+βZ
β
n
+δ
) (
sm − θ¯
)
. From this it is easy to see that the
aggregate quantity rule Q¯ (s) is weakly increasing in each bidder's signal if
dpv (s)
dsi
≥ Z ⇒ var [θm] ≥ σγθ.
This gives the second inequality of (3.18).
In the auction, ﬁrms report continuous and decreasing bid functionsDi (p; si) to the regulator.
The inverse bid function is written Pi (qi; si) ≡ D−1i (qi; si). The regulator clears the auction
and determines the clearing price pv at which total demand equals supply. Winning bids
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are all bids equal or above the clearing price. Total demand in the auction is D (p; s) =
Di (p; si) +D−i (p; s−i) where D−i (p; s−i) =
∑
j 6=iDj (p; sj) is the aggregate demand of every
other bidder but bidder i.
The ﬁnal price ﬁrms have to pay for the units received is not the clearing price. In a private
values case, the marginal payment is the opportunity cost of each particular unit won by
bidder i. I explain later how of the Vickrey price in the private values model diﬀers from the
model of interdependent values. Montero (2008) derives the Vickrey pricing rule as follows.
In addition to the clearing price and the allocation of permits, the regulator determines
paybacks for each ﬁrm. The share of the paybacks is deﬁned by
αi = 1−
´ qi
0
RS−1i (x; s−i) dx
RS−1i (qi; s−i) qi
, (3.42)
where RSi (p; s−i) = QS (p; s)−D−i (p; s−i) is the residual supply for bidder i. While pv (s) =
RS−1i (qi; s−i) in the equilibrium, the total payment of bidder i in the auction writes as
Ri,v = (1− αi) pv (s) qi (3.43)
=
ˆ qi
0
RS−1i (x; s−i) dx.
The payback mechanism induces bidders to bid with their expected marginal value functions,
conditional on the aggregate information. The payback function of ﬁrm i is determined by
the strategies of other bidders and thus the Vickrey price is equal to the residual supply
function. The clearing price of the auction contains the information of other bidders' signals.
Given the linear aﬃne model, ﬁrms utilize linear strategies deﬁned by
Di (p; si) = a+ bsi − cp, (3.44)
where a, b and c are some positive constants. Thus the aggregate demand in the auction is
D (p; s) = na+ nbsm − ncp. (3.45)
Furthermore, using (3.41) and (3.45) yields
nsm =
(
1
b+ Z
δ
)(
1
δ
(
p− γ¯ + Znθ¯)− na+ ncp) . (3.46)
With the aﬃne linear model, the clearing price is suﬃcient statistics for nsm and hence
E [θi|s] is informationally equivalent to E [θi|si, p] (Vives, 2011). The ﬁrst-order condition in
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the price-taking auction equilibrium is
E [θi|si, p]− βqi − p = 0. (3.47)
Furthermore, plugging equation (3.4) into the ﬁrst-order equation (3.47) and solving for qi
yields the equilibrium allocation. This must be equal to Di(p; si) = a+ bsi− cp and we hence
get
a+ bsi − cp = 1
β
{
Aθ¯ +Bsi + Cnsm − p
}
.
Plugging in nsm from (3.46) and solving this three equation system15, gives the linear
Bayesian demand function equilibrium strategy Di(p; si) = a+ bsi − cp, where
a =
1
β
(
1
B + nC + β
δ
Z
){(
AB +
β
δ
(A+ nC)Z
)
θ¯ − β
δ
Cγ¯
}
(3.48)
b =
1
β
B (3.49)
c =
1
β
(
B − β
δ
C + β
δ
Z
B + nC + β
δ
Z
)
. (3.50)
Using (3.41) and (3.45) the clearing price is
pv (s) =
nδa+ γ¯ + nδbθ¯ + n (δb+ Z)
(
sm − θ¯
)
nδc+ 1
. (3.51)
Plugging (3.48) - (3.50) into (3.51), it is easy to show that pv (s) = p¯ (s). Also, Di(pv (s) ; si) =
q¯i(s) = q
e
i (s) where p¯ (s) and q
e
i (s) are given by (3.21) and (3.23).
Note that with interdependent values the total payment of ﬁrm i in the Vickrey auction is
not the full externality cost, in contrast to the pure private values case. With pure private
values the total payment is the sum of the pollution externality of increased pollution and the
pecuniary externality, i.e. the value to other bidders of those units which are not assigned to
them due to ﬁrm i's participation (Montero 2008). With interdependent values the payment
does not include the informational externality of signal si to other bidders' values and to
pollution damage (see Chapter 2, Figure 2.1).
15See the derivation in Chapter 2.
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3.4.2 Incentive compatibility of the two-stage regulation
Next I explore the question of the incentive compatibility of a Vickrey auction followed by
the regulation stage. First note that the auction payment Ri,v (s) =
´ q¯i(s)
0
RS−1i (x; s−i) dx
depends only on si through its end point q¯i (s). Let s˜−i = 1n−1
∑
j 6=i sj denote the average
signal of every other ﬁrm but ﬁrm i. Consider for a moment that ﬁrm i receives a signal sˆi.
Given that every other bidder is bidding sincerely, it is then easy to derive the clearing price
pv as a function of sˆ = (sˆi, s−i) from (3.51):
pv (sˆ) =
nδa+ γ¯ − nZθ¯ + (n− 1) (δb+ Z) s˜−i
nδc+ 1
+
δb+ Z
nδc+ 1
sˆi, (3.52)
where δb+Z
nδc+1
= δ(1−A)+βZ
β+nδ
. In the auction equilibrium
q¯i (sˆi, s−i) = QS (pv (sˆ) ; sˆi, s−i)−D−i (pv (sˆ) ; s−i) ,
and we may further write
sˆi (s−i, qi) =
(
ncδ + 1
(ncδ + 1) b− c (bδ + Z)
)
(3.53)
×
{−a+ cγ¯ − ncZθ¯ + c (n− 1) (bδ + Z) s˜−i
ncδ + 1
+ qi
}
.
Hence, while the inverse residual supply function goes through the equilibrium point (pv (s) , qei (s)),
it can be written as
RS−1i (qi; s−i) = pv (s) + τv (qi − qei (s)) . (3.54)
Thus, plugging (3.53) into (3.52) gives the slope:
τv =
δb+ Z
(ncδ + 1) b− c (δb+ Z) (3.55)
=
βσγθ + nδ · var [θm](
1 + nδ
β
)
(n− 1)B · var [sm] + var [θm]− σγθ
.
Note that in the absence of the second stage, sincere bidding in the Vickrey auction would
be incentive compatible if τv ≥ −β. This holds whenever(
1 +
nδ
β
)
(n− 1)B · var [sm] + var [θm]− σγθ ≥ 0. (3.56)
Note also that if there was only one ﬁrm (n = 1), equation (3.56) reduces to σγθ
var[θm]
≤ 1. In
119
that case the slope of the inverse (residual) supply function is equal to the slope of the Roberts
and Spence non-constant quantity regulation and, in fact, the information mechanism is not
needed. In that case the information mechanism coincides with the second-best regulation
in the regulation stage.
Now, suppose that ﬁrm i bids according to signal s′i when its true signal is si, and, thus, ﬁrm
i uses a deviation strategy Di (p; s′i, si).
16. The initial allocation of permits to ﬁrm i, given
s′ = (s′i, s−i), is
q¯i (s
′) = a+ bs′i − cpv (s′) (3.57)
= qei (s)−
(
b− δb+ Z
nδ + 1
c
)
(si − s′i)
= qei (s)−

(
1 + nδ
β
)
(n− 1)B · var [sm] + var [θm]− σγθ
(β + nδ) var [sm]
 1
n
(si − s′i) .
Hence from (3.56), sincere bidding in a Vickrey auction without the regulation stage is incen-
tive compatible if the equilibrium allocation q¯i (s) is increasing in si. However, the condition
σγθ
var[θm]
≤ 1 gives a lowest upper bound for σγθ that guarantees the incentive compatibility of
the Vickrey auction also when the auction mechanism is followed by the secondary market.
Let pii,v (s′i; si, s−i) denote the proﬁt of ﬁrm i in the Vickrey auction when using the deviation
strategy Di (p; s′i, si). The loss in the Vickrey auction may thus be written as
Li (s
′
i; si, s−i) = pii,v (si; si, s−i)− pii,v (s′i; si, s−i) (3.58)
=
ˆ qei (s)
q¯i(s′)
{
vi (x; s)−RS−1i (x; s−i)
}
dx.
From (3.24) the expected proﬁt in the secondary market is
pii,τ (s
′
i; si, s−i) =
ˆ qi,τ (s′)
q¯i(s′)
vi (x; s) dx−
ˆ hi,τ (s′)
q¯i(s′)
Ti (x; s
′) dx
+
ˆ ∆qi(s′)
0
{pτ (s′)− ωx} dx1{hi,τ (s′)>qi,τ (s′)}
−
ˆ ∆qi(s′)
0
{pτ (s′) + ωx} dx1{qi,τ (s′)>hi,τ (s′)},
where pτ (s′) is the expected equilibrium price of the permit market given the initial allocation
according to s′. Respectively, qi,τ (s′), hi,τ (s′) and ∆qi (s′) = |qi,τ (s′)− hi,τ (s′)| are the
16Note that ﬁrm i may use any bid function that goes through the point (pv (s
′) , q¯i (s′)).
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corresponding expected equilibrium outcomes of the secondary market.
When all bidders bid sincerely in the Vickrey auction the allocation is ex-post eﬃcienct and
the expected proﬁts of ﬁrm i in the secondary market are zero, pii,τ (si; si, s−i) = 0. Hence
the Vickrey auction in the ﬁrst stage is incentive compatible if the loss from (3.58) is greater
than the expected proﬁts in the secondary market:
∆IC = pii,v (si; si, s−i) + pii,τ (si; si, s−i)− pii,v (s′i; si, s−i)− pii,τ (s′i; si, s−i) (3.59)
= Li (s
′
i; si, s−i)− pii,τ (s′i; si, s−i)
≥ 0.
Proposition 3.1. Given the aﬃne linear model, the information mechanism of the two-
stage regulation is incentive compatible whenever the aggregate quantity rule of the ﬁrst stage
auction is weakly increasing in each bidder's signal and the optimal permit supply schedules of
the second-stage regulation are weakly increasing in permit purchases, i.e. whenever −nδ
β
≤
σγθ
var[θm]
≤ 1.
Proof. See Appendix 3.C.
Suppose that −nδ
β
≤ σγθ
var[θm]
≤ 1 and ﬁrm i uses a deviation strategy according to s′i < si
when every other ﬁrm is bidding sincerely in the Vickrey auction. Then qi,τ (s′) > hi,τ (s′)
and the IC condition writes as
∆IC =
ˆ hi,τ (s′)
q¯i(s′)
{
Ti (x; s
′)−RS−1i (x; s−i)
}
dx︸ ︷︷ ︸
∆IIC
(3.60)
+
ˆ qi,τ (s′)
hi,τ (s′)
{
pτ (s
′) + ω (x− hi,τ (s′))−RS−1i (x; s−i)
}
dx︸ ︷︷ ︸
∆IIIC
+
ˆ qei (s)
qi,τ (s′)
{
vi (x; s)−RS−1i (x; s−i)
}
dx︸ ︷︷ ︸
∆IIIIC
.
These terms are described in Figure 3.2. ∆IIC denotes the excess payments for permits
which ﬁrm i purchases from the regulator due to the deviation strategy. ∆IIC is non-negative
for all s′i < si, because the permit supply schedule Ti (qi; s
′) crosses the inverse residual
supply RS−1i (qi; s−i) from below at q¯i (s
′), when these functions are increasing and thus
when −nδ
β
≤ σγθ
var[θm]
≤ 1.
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Figure 3.2: Incentive compatibility of the Vickrey auction.
∆IIIIC denotes the net loss of Vickrey payoﬀs due to the deviation strategy. When s
′
i < si,
the expected equilibrium pollution of ﬁrm i after using the deviation strategy in the auction
qi,τ (s
′) is lower than the ex-post eﬃcient level of pollution qei (s). ∆
III
IC is non-negative for all
s′i < si, when −nδβ ≤
σγθ
var[θm]
≤ 1.
Finally, (the negative of) ∆IIIC denotes the net gains from trading due to the deviation strat-
egy. However, the sign of ∆IIIC is not clear. When the permit market is perfect (ω = 0), it is
non-negative. When ω →∞, the limit value of ∆IIIC is zero. Hence, ∆IC ≥ 0 in both of these
extremes. When ω increases from zero, hi,τ (s′) increases but τ , pτ (s′), and qi,τ (s′) decreases.
This implies that ∆IIIIC increases but ∆
I
IC and ∆
II
IC may either increase or decrease. From
Figure 3.2, the incentive constraint is non-negative if ∆IIC + ∆
III
IC + ∆
IIa
IC ≥
∣∣∆IIbIC ∣∣. Unfor-
tunately, I am not able to derive an analytical proof that ∆IC ≥ 0 for all ω ≥ 0. However,
applying some numerical simulations I show in Appendix 3.C that ∆IC ≥ 0 for all ω ≥ 0
when the regulator uses a two-stage regulation with a Vickrey auction in the information
stage and permit supply schedules Ti (qi; s) = p¯ (s)+ τ (qi − q¯i(s)) in the regulation stage and
whenever −nδ
β
≤ σγθ
var[θm]
≤ 1 holds.
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Suppose next that σγθ
var[θm]
< −nδ
β
. Then the regulator cannot be sure that a Vickrey auction
in the information stage followed by the regulation stage is incentive compatible. In this case
both Ti (qi; s′) and RSi (qi; s−i) are decreasing functions and Ti (qi; s′) has a steeper slope.
We thus have −β ≤ τ ≤ τv ≤ 0. In both extremes of market performance, i.e. when ω = 0
and when ω → ∞, the IC condition is negative (see Appendix 3.C). However, in Chapter
2 I show that if the regulator implements a constant price regulation in the second stage,
and thus sets τ = 0, the Vickrey auction is incentive compatible whenever σγθ
var[θm]
< −nδ
β
.
Moreover, the regulator could also set τ = τv, which guarantees incentive compatibility and
would improve the results of the constant price regulation.
Also when σγθ
var[θm]
> 1, the Vickrey auction is not incentive compatible even without a sec-
ondary market. However, at least when σγθ ≈ var [θm] and when the market performance is
not too bad (ω ≈ 0), the ﬁrms' private information is not valuable to the regulator, because
the aggregate supply in the Vickrey auction is inelastic in sm. In that case the regulator
should apply a constant quantity regulation without any auction.
3.5 Conclusions
This paper considers a commons problem, which addresses two important issues. Hence,
in addition to the pollution externality, two other market failures exist. Firstly, trading in
pollution permits suﬀers from frictions. Secondly, the information with regards to emis-
sion abatement costs is incomplete and distributed asymmetrically. To tackle these issues,
I have proposed a two-stage regulation of tradeable pollution permits. In the ﬁrst stage
the regulator conducts an information mechanism. Applying a generalized Vickrey-Clarke-
Groves (VCG) mechanism, the regulator collects private information from regulated ﬁrms
and allocates emission permits to the ﬁrms. In the second stage, the regulator implements a
quantity regulation, where the non-constant permit supply schedules take into account the
frictions of the permit market and the private information of ﬁrms. I have applied a linearized
model with an aﬃne information structure. Given this structure, the marginal abatement
cost functions and the marginal damage function are linear functions, the conditional ex-
pectations are linear in information, and the slopes and distribution functions are common
knowledge. Also, pollution is assumed to be uniformly mixed and uncertain beneﬁts and
costs of emissions reductions may be correlated. Given the aﬃne linear model, I have shown
that in the information mechanism followed by the second-best regulation, sincere bidding
satisﬁes incentive compatibility conditions whenever the correlation between emissions re-
duction beneﬁts and costs is not too high. Moreover, depending on the performance of the
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permit market, the slopes of the permit supply functions in the second stage are between
the slopes of the Weitzman (1978) non-constant tax schedules and the Roberts and Spence
(1976) non-constant quantity regulation permit supply schedules.
The model builds on the symmetric linear structure. A natural next step is to ask how much
the assumptions of the linear aﬃne model could be relaxed in order for the results of this
paper to continue to hold? In what conditions is the regulator independent of the private
information of ﬁrms when the permit market is perfect? What are the general incentive
compatibility conditions of the Vickrey auction followed by the regulation stage? Might there
be another, optimal mechanism in the environment I consider? How would the two-stage
regulation change if the distribution functions of the unknown parameters, the performance
of the permit market and the functional forms of the abatement costs were unknown to the
regulator? These issues are left for future research.
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Appendices
3.A Second-best regulation with a perfect permit market
Consider the aﬃne linear model. Suppose, for simplicity, that the abatement costs and the
pollution damage are not correlated, i.e. σγθ = 0. Hence the regulator and all ﬁrms have the
same information about the expected marginal damage function:
y (Q; s) = y (Q) = γ¯ + δQ.
Then, given that the permit market is perfect, the solution to the regulator's problem (3.17) is
to i) oﬀer a non-constant aggregate permit supply that equals the expected marginal damage
function, T (Q) = y (Q), and ii) let ﬁrms trade permits freely with each other in the regulation
period (e.g. Roberts and Spence 1976, Yates 2012). When the permit market is perfect, it is
irrelevant in terms of eﬃciency how the regulator distributes permits initially between ﬁrms.
The permit market allocates permits cost-eﬃciently among polluting ﬁrms. For instance,
if the ﬁrms are identical ex-ante, the regulator may implement an equal individual permit
supply function for each ﬁrm such that
Ti (qi) = y (nqi) .
Firms may thus purchase permits from the regulator according to this schedule. Let hi denote
ﬁrm i's permit purchases. In the equilibrium, each ﬁrm buys an equal amount of permits from
the regulator, i.e. hi = hm = 1nQ
??, where Q?? denotes the second-best aggregate pollution.
The equilibrium is thus deﬁned by
Ti (hm) = ui (qi; θi) = p
??
where p?? is equilibrium (second-best) price in the permit market. Hence ﬁrms that have
low abatement costs and thus uj (hm; θj) < Tj (hm) sell ∆qj = hm − qj permits in the
secondary market. Respectively, high-cost ﬁrms, i.e. ﬁrms with uk (hm; θk) > Tk (hm), buy
∆qk = qk − hm from the permit market. The average ﬁrm (indexed with m and receiving
signal θm) does not buy or sell any permits in the permit market and it thus has Tm (hm) =
um (hm; θm). In equilibrium, buying one more permit from the regulator or abating one more
unit of emissions is more costly than the beneﬁt of selling the permit in the market. The
solution is second-best, while the marginal abatement costs are equal across ﬁrms and the
aggregate abatement cost is equal to the expected marginal damage. Most importantly, the
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regulator does not need the private information of ﬁrms in order to implement the second-
best regulation. This feature remains true even if the aggregate abatement costs and the
pollution damage are correlated. However, the regulator needs to be able to derive the
expected marginal damage function conditional on the average abatement costs (θm).
3.B Derivation of the expected deadweight loss
In order to derive the expected deadweight loss and the optimal slope τ , it is easy to see
using q?i =
1
β
(θi − p?), and from (3.3), (3.31) and (3.33) that
q?i − qi,τ =
1
β
(pτ − p?) +Oi,τ ,
where Oi,τ = 1β
(
ωτ
βτ+ωβ+ωτ
) ((
θi − θ¯i (I)
)− (θm − θ¯m (I))). Furthermore,
q?2i − q2i,τ =
1
β
(pτ − p?)
(
2q?i −
1
β
(pτ − p?)
)
+ 2Oi,τ
1
β
(θi − pτ )−O2i,τ .
For the market as a whole we get
Q? −Qτ = n
β
(pτ − p?) ,
Q?2 −Q2τ =
n
β
(pτ − p?)
(
2Q? − n
β
(pτ − p?)
)
.
Plugging these into the deadweight loss equation (3.17) results in
DWLτ (I, ω) =
1
2
(
1 +
nδ
β
)
n
β
(pτ − p?)2︸ ︷︷ ︸
DWL0τ
+
β
2
n∑
i
O2i,τ . (3.61)
We may ﬁrst examine the term DWL0τ . From (3.15) and (3.30), the price diﬀerence is written
as
pτ − p? = − β
(β + nδ)
((
nδ − τ
β + τ
)(
θm − θ¯m (I)
)
+ (γ − γ¯ (I))
)
,
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and we hence get
DWL0τ =
1
2
(
1
β
n
+ δ
){(
nδ − τ
β + τ
)2 (
θm − θ¯m (I)
)2
+ (γ − γ¯ (I))2
}
(3.62)
+
(
1
β
n
+ δ
)(
nδ − τ
β + τ
)(
θm − θ¯m (I)
)
(γ − γ¯ (I)) .
Taking the expectation from (3.62) yields
E
[
DWL0τ
]
=
{(
nδ − τ
β + τ
)2
var [θm| I] + var [γ| I]
}
(3.63)
+
(
1
β
n
+ δ
)(
nδ − τ
β + τ
)
cov [γ, θm| I] .
However, the expected value of the second term in (3.61) is not zero if ω > 0. It may write
as
β
2
E
[
n∑
i
O2i,τ
]
=
n
2β
(
τ
βτ
ω
+ β + τ
)2
{var [θm| I]− 2cov [θm, θi| I] + var [θi| I]}
=
n
2β
(
τ
βτ
ω
+ β + τ
)2
{var [θi| I]− var [θm| I]} . (3.64)
Thus taking the expected value of (3.61) and plugging in (3.63) and (3.64) results in the
following expected deadweight loss formula:
E [DWLτ (I, ω)] =
{(
nδ − τ
β + τ
)2
var [θm| I] + var [γ| I]
}
(3.65)
+
(
1
β
n
+ δ
)(
nδ − τ
β + τ
)
cov [γ, θm| I]
+
n
2β
(
τ
βτ
ω
+ β + τ
)2
{var [θi| I]− var [θm| I]} .
3.C Proof of Proposition 3.1
Suppose that other ﬁrms bid sincerely in the information stage and ﬁrm i bids according to
signal s′i when its true signal is si. Suppose also that s
′
i < si. Before the actual proof, I derive
the expected permit market price and the expected equilibrium outcomes of ﬁrm i when it
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uses a deviation strategy Di (p; s′i, si) in the information stage. Note that
θ¯i (s)− θ¯i (s′) = (B + C) (si − s′i) ,
and
θ¯m (s)− θ¯m (s′) =
(
B
n
+ C
)
(si − s′i) .
Thus from (3.30):
pτ (s
′) = pv (s)−
(
nδ (1− A) + βnZ
β + nδ
)
1
n
(si − s′i)︸ ︷︷ ︸
pv(s′)
(3.66)
+
(
τ
β + τ
)
(1− A) 1
n
(si − s′i)
= pv (s)−

(
nδ−τ
β+τ
)
(1− A) + nZ(
1 + nδ
β
)
 1
n
(si − s′i) .
The expected equilibrium price is lower than the expected ﬁrst-best price pτ (s′) ≤ pv (s)
whenever s′i ≤ si and τ > 0. This follows from equation (3.36), which yields(
nδ − τ
β + τ
)
(1− A) + nZ =
(
τ (β + τ)2(
βτ
ω
+ β + τ
)3
)
(n− 1)B ≥ 0.
130
The expected equilibrium pollution qi,τ (s′) may derive from (3.31) and (3.57):
qi,τ (s
′) = q¯i (s′) (3.67)
+
{(
τ + ω
βτ + ωβ + ωτ
)(
n− 1
n
)
B +
(
1
β + τ
)(
B
n
+ C
)}
(si − s′i)
= qei (s)−
{
1
β
(n− 1)B +
(
1
β + nδ
)
[1− A− nZ]
}
1
n
(si − s′i)
+
(
τ + ω
βτ + ωβ + ωτ
)
(n− 1)B 1
n
(si − s′i)
+
(
τ + ω
βτ + ωβ + ωτ
)
(1− A) 1
n
(si − s′i)
−
(
1
βτ + ωβ + ωτ
)(
τ 2
β + τ
)
(1− A) 1
n
(si − s′i)
= qei (s)−
1 + nδβ −
(
β + τ
βτ
ω
+ β + τ
)2
×
(
1
β + nδ
)(
1
1 + β
τ
+ β
ω
)(
n− 1
n
)
B (si − s′i) .
Respectively, the expected equilibrium purchases from the regulator may derive from (3.32):
hi,τ (s
′) = q¯i (s′) (3.68)
+
{(
ω
βτ + ωβ + ωτ
)(
n− 1
n
)
B +
(
1
β + τ
)(
B
n
+ C
)}
(si − s′i) .
Hence, a deviating ﬁrm is expected to be on the demand side of the permit market and thus
q¯i (s
′) ≤ hi,τ (s′) ≤ qi,τ (s′) ≤ qei (s), if
(
1 + β
τ
+ β
ω
) ≥ 0 and (1 + nδ
β
)
≥
(
1
1+ βτ
ω(β+τ)
)2
. These
hold for all τ ≥ 0.
According to (3.60), we may decompose the incentive condition into three parts, ∆IC = ∆IIC+
∆IIIC + ∆
III
IC . First, ∆
I
IC is non-negative if the permit schedule Ti (qi; s
′) is above the inverse
residual supply function RS−1i (qi; s−i) for qi ≥ q¯i (s′). Note that these are equal at q¯i (s′),
when the bid functions are based on s′ = (s′i, s−i). Then, in order for Ti (qi; s
′) ≥ RSi (qi; s−i)
for qi ≥ q¯i (s′), it is enough to show that τ ≥ τv. Moreover, when I = s and τ ≥ 0, the
slope τ is bounded by the optimal slopes of the Roberts and Spence (1976) and Weitzman
(1978) models from (3.37) and (3.39). Then ∞ ≥ τRS ≥ τ ≥ τW (s) ≥ τv ≥ 0 whenever
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−nδ
β
≤ σγθ
var[θm]
≤ 1. The ﬁrst part of the IC condition is then non-negative:
∆IIC =
ˆ hi,τ (s′)
q¯i(s′)
{
Ti (x; s
′)−RS−1i (x; s−i)
}
dx
=
1
2
(τ − τv) (hi,τ (s′)− q¯i (s′))2
≥ 0.
Second, ∆IIIIC is always non-negative if vi (qi; s) ≥ RS−1i (qi; s−i) for all qi ≤ qei (s) and
vi (qi; s) ≤ RS−1i (qi; s−i) for all qi ≥ qei (s). This holds if τv ≥ −β. This, on the other
hand, is satisﬁed whenever σγθ
var[θm]
≤ 1, which also guarantees that the aggregate quantity
rule is weakly increasing in each bidder's signal. Hence if σγθ
var[θm]
≤ 1,
∆IIIIC =
ˆ qei (s)
qi,τ (s′)
{
vi (x; s)−RS−1i (x; s−i)
}
dx
=
1
2
(β + τv) (q
e
i (s)− qi,τ (s′))2
≥ 0.
Third, the second part of the IC condition writes as
∆IIIC =
ˆ qi,τ (s′)
hi,τ (s′)
{
pτ (s
′) + ω (x− hi,τ (s′))−RS−1i (x; s−i)
}
dx
= (β + τv) (q
e
i (s)− qi,τ (s′)) (qi,τ (s′)− hi,τ (s′))−
1
2
(ω − τv) (qi,τ (s′)− hi,τ (s′))2 .
The sign of ∆IIIC is not clear. However, I show next that when (3.18) holds, the incentive
constraint ∆IC is non-negative for all ω.
Firstly, ∆IC is clearly positive when ω = 0, because then qi,τ (s′) = qei (s) which implies
pτ (s
′) = pv (s) ≥ RS−1i (qi; s−i) for all qi ≤ qi,τ (s′). Thus,
∆IIIC
∣∣
ω=0
=
ˆ qi,τ (s′)
hi,τ (s′)
{
pv (s)−RS−1i (x; s−i)
}
dx ≥ 0,
and
∆IC |ω=0 = ∆IIC + ∆IIIC ≥ 0.
Respectively, when ω →∞ the limit value of the incentive constraint is positive, while then
lim
ω→∞
{qi,τ (s′)− hi,τ (s′)} = 0. This gives lim
ω→∞
∆IC = ∆
I
IC + ∆
III
IC ≥ 0.
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Further, when τ > 0, the slope τ is decreasing in ω. From (3.36) we get
dτ
dω
= −∂fτ,s
∂ω
/
∂fτ,s
∂τ
= −
 3β
(
τ
ω
)2
(n− 1)B( βτ
ω
+β+τ
β+τ
)4
(β + nδ) (1− A) + β
{
1− 2β
ω
(
τ
β+τ
)}
(n− 1)B
 .
It is easy to show that dτ
dω
∣∣
ω=0
= 0 and lim
ω→∞
dτ
dω
= 0. According to the numerical simulations
(see Appendix 3.D) and also by τ (s, ω)|ω=0 = τRS ≥ τ ≥ τW (s) = limω→∞τ (s, ω) we get
dτ
dω
≤ 0
when τ ≥ 0. This furthermore gives
dpτ (s
′)
dω
∣∣∣∣
ω=0
=
(
β
(β + τRS)2
)(
B
n
+ C
)
(si − s′i)
dτ
dω
∣∣∣∣
ω=0
= 0.
Hence taking a derivative of the incentive constraint with respect to ω yields
d∆IC
dω
= −dpii,τ (s
′
i; si, s−i)
dω
= {pτ (s′) + ω (qi,τ (s′)− hi,τ (s′))− vi (qi,τ (s′) ; s)}︸ ︷︷ ︸
=0
dqi,τ (s
′)
dω
+{Ti (hi,τ (s′) ; s′)− pτ (s′)− ω (qi,τ (s′)− hi,τ (s′))}︸ ︷︷ ︸
=0
dhi,τ (s
′)
dω
+
ˆ hi,τ (s′)
q¯i(s′)
dTi (x; s
′)
dω
dx+
ˆ ∆qi(s′)
0
{
dpτ (s
′)
dω
+ x
}
dx
=
1
2
(hi,τ (s
′)− q¯i (s′))2 dτ
dω
+ (qi,τ (s
′)− hi,τ (s′)) dpτ (s
′)
dω
+
1
2
(qi,τ (s
′)− hi,τ (s′))2 .
Thus ∆IC is positive and increasing in ω when evaluated at ω = 0, while
d∆IC
dω
∣∣∣∣
ω=0
=
1
2
((
n− 1
n
)
B
β
(si − s′i)
)2
≥ 0.
Note also that lim
ω→∞
d∆IC
dω
= 0. Moreover, according to the numerical simulations there is only
one point where d∆IC
dω
= 0 when ω ≥ 0. Thus ∆IC ﬁrst increases and then decreases when ω
increases from zero. This implies that ∆IC ≥ 0 for all ω ≥ 0 when the regulator uses permit
schedules Ti (qi; s) = p¯ (s) + τ (qi − q¯i(s)) and when (3.18) holds.
Suppose, on the contrary, that the permit supply schedules and inverse residual supply func-
tions are decreasing and −β < τ < τv < 0. I thus relax the assumption −nδβ ≤
σγθ
var[θm]
. With
decreasing inverse residual supply functions and permit schedules, Ti (qi; s′) ≤ RS−1i (qi; s−i)
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for all qi ≥ q¯i (s′) and pv (s) ≤ RS−1i (qi; s−i) for all qi ≤ qei (s). I next show that ∆IC ≤ 0 when
the permit market is perfect (ω = 0) and also when it is collapsed (ω →∞) if σγθ
var[θm]
< −nδ
β
.
Consider ﬁrst that ω = 0. This case is presented in Figure 3.3a. From (3.66) and (3.67) we
get pτ (s′) = pv (s) and qi,τ (s′) = qei (s). Furthermore,
hi,τ (s
′) = qei (s)−
1
β
(
n− 1
n
)
B (si − s′i)
≤ qei (s).
Hence the IC condition is non-positive:
∆IC |ω=0 =
ˆ hi,τ (s′)
q¯i(s′)
{
Ti (x; s
′)−RS−1i (x; s−i)
}
dx+
ˆ qei (s)
hi,τ (s′)
{
pv (s)−RS−1i (x; s−i)
}
dx ≤ 0.
Moreover, if s′i < si and
σγθ
var[θm]
< −nδ
β
the IC condition is strictly negative and sincere bidding
is not incentive compatible.
Suppose next that ω →∞ (see Figure 3.3b). This gives
qi,τ (s
′) = hi,τ (s′) = qei (s) +
 nδβ
(β + nδ)
(
β
|τ | − 1
)
(n− 1
n
)
B (si − s′i)
≥ qei (s).
The limit value of the IC condition is then non-positive:
lim
ω→∞
∆IC =
ˆ qei (s)
q¯i(s′)
{
Ti (x; s
′)−RS−1i (x; s−i)
}
dx+
ˆ qi,τ (s′)
qei (s)
{Ti (x; s′)− vi (x; s)} dx ≤ 0.
With s′i < si and
σγθ
var[θm]
< −nδ
β
we get lim
ω→∞
∆IC < 0. Thus the regulator cannot guarantee
that the Vickrey auction in the information stage is incentive compatible if σγθ
var[θm]
< −nδ
β
.
Similar arguments hold when s′i > si.
3.D Simulations
In order to give some intuition of the results I have run some numerical simulations. I have
used nine diﬀerent information structures, where I have varied the standard deviation of
the signal noise (σε ) and the correlation coeﬃcient of the aggregate abatement costs and
pollution damage (ργθ). The other parameters of the aﬃne linear model are kept ﬁxed.
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Figure 3.3: Incentive compatibility of the Vickrey auction when σγθ
var[θm]
< −nδ
β
and when the
permit market is (a) perfect (ω = 0) or (b) collapsed (ω →∞).
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The ﬁxed parameter values are presented in Table 3.1 and the values of the two variating
variables in Table 3.2. For example in Simulation 5, I have used σε = 10 and ργθ = 0. For each
information structure (simulations 1-9) I have let the coeﬃcient of the market performance ω
to rise from 0 to 30. The simulation results are presented in Figures 3.4, 3.5 and 3.6. Figures
3.4 and 3.5 present the results from Section 3.3 and thus the expected deadweight losses and
slopes of the permit supply schedules of the second-best regulation, Weitzman's (1978) non-
constant tax regulation and Roberts and Spence's (1976) non-constant quantity regulation.
The results are calculated given that the regulator knows only the prior information (I = 0)
and when the regulator is aware of the private information of ﬁrms (I = s). Figure 3.6
presents the IC conditions of the Vickrey auction followed by the second-best regulation.
Table 3.1: Simulations - ﬁxed parameter values
Variable Value
n Number of ﬁrms 10
σθ Standard deviation of the abatement cost parameter 10
ρ Correlation coeﬃcient of the abatement costs 0.5
β/n Slope of the aggregate abatement costs 1
σγ Standard deviation of the damage parameter 10
δ Slope of the pollution damage 1
Table 3.2: Simulations - values of variating variables
Variable σε Standard deviation of the signal noise
Value 5 10 20
ργθ Correlation coeﬃcient -0.2 Simulation 1 Simulation 2 Simulation 3
of abatement costs 0 Simulation 4 Simulation 5 Simulation 6
and pollution damage 0.2 Simulation 7 Simulation 8 Simulation 9
In Figure 3.4 the bold curves describe the deadweight losses of the second-best regulation
when the regulator knows only the prior information (red curve) and when the regulator
knows the private information of ﬁrms (blue curves). The solid thin curves are the results of
the Roberts and Spence non-constant quantity regulation and the dashed curves the Weitz-
man non-constant tax regulation. When moving from the left panels to the right panels, and
thus when the signals become more noisy, less is gained from the information mechanism
and the closer the red and blue curves come to each other when the permit market is not
perfect. Also, the more noisy the signals are and the better the permit market performs the
greater the diﬀerence is between the Weitzman non-constant tax regulation and the second-
best regulation. On the other hand, when the correlation between emission abatement costs
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and pollution damage increases from negative to positive (from the top panels to the bottom
panels) the wider the gap between results with and without private information becomes
outside the case of a perfect permit market.
Figure 3.5 presents the slopes of the permit supply schedules. According to the numerical
simulations, the slope of the second-best regulation (τ > 0) is decreasing in ω and increasing
in ργθ and σε (when I = s and ω > 0). Moreover, the diﬀerence between the slopes of the
Weitzman, and Roberts and Spence regulations increases in ργθ but decreases in σε (if I = s).
Figure 3.6 presents the IC condition from equation (3.59) in the form of ∆IC
(si−s′i)
2 . Hence it
is independent whether s′i is greater or smaller than the true signal si. According to the
simulations, ∆IC
(si−s′i)
2 ﬁrst increases and then decreases when ω increases if −nδβ ≤
σγθ
var[θm]
≤ 1
is satisﬁed. Thus in all simulations ∆IC
(si−s′i)
2 ≥ 0.
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Figure 3.4: Expected deadweight losses of the second-best regulation (SB), the Weitzman
(1978) non-constant tax regulation (W ), and the Roberts and Spence (1976) non-constant
quantity regulation (RS) when the coeﬃcient of market performance ω increases. The red
curves describe the cases when the regulator knows only the prior information (I = 0) and
the blue curves the cases when the regulator knows the private information of ﬁrms (I = s).
The parameter values of the various simulations are presented in Tables 3.1 and 3.2. In the
simulations the signal noise increases from left to right and the correlation between emission
reduction costs and beneﬁts from top to bottom.
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Figure 3.5: Slopes of the permit supply schedules when the coeﬃcient of market performance
ω increases. The second-best regulation (τ), the Weitzman (1978) non-constant tax regula-
tion (τW ), the Roberts and Spence (1976) non-constant quantity regulation (τRS) and the
inverse residual supply of the Vickrey auction (τv). The red curves describe the cases when
the regulator knows only the prior information (I = 0) and the blue curves the cases when
the regulator knows the private information of ﬁrms (I = s). The parameter values of the
various simulations are presented in Tables 3.1 and 3.2. In the simulations the signal noise
increases from left to right and the correlation between emission reduction costs and beneﬁts
from top to bottom.
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Figure 3.6: Incentive compatibility condition of the Vickrey auction followed by the second-
best regulation, ∆IC/ (si − s′i)2. The parameter values of the various simulations are pre-
sented in Tables 3.1 and 3.2. In the simulations the signal noise increases from left to right
and the correlation between emission reduction costs and beneﬁts from top to bottom.
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Chapter 4
Collusion in emission allowance auctions
Abstract
I examine the Vickrey auction and the uniform price auction in allocations of emission allowances
without an allowance resale market. I study oligopolistic competition in an allowance auction and
build a demand function equilibrium model with linear strategies and private values. In the model,
the market consists of two parts, a competitive fringe and a number of strategic ﬁrms. The fringe
balances the market and hence I do not have to consider Wilson's (1979) low price equilibria. I link
the auction model with a coalition formation game, where any subgroup of ﬁrms may coordinate
their bids in the auction. I calculate the impact of collusion on the eﬃciency of the allowance
allocation and auction revenues. Montero (2008) shows, with a similar kind of private values model,
that the Vickrey auction provides eﬃcient allocation of allowances even if ﬁrms collude. However, all
strategic ﬁrms have strong incentives to form one big coalition in a Vickrey auction, which reduces
revenues. The uniform price auction creates a coalition game with positive externalities. The
more concentrated the coalition structure is, the better oﬀ coalition outsiders are. I examine three
examples of coalition formation game in a uniform price auction: a cartel game with either myopic
or farsighted ﬁrms and an open membership game with multiple coalitions. The stable coalition
structure and hence the eﬃciency and revenues of the uniform price auction depend heavily on the
coalition game and the structure of the market.
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4.1 Introduction
In many emissions trading programs, auction mechanisms are used to allocate emission
allowances to ﬁrms. For instance, the European Union Emissions Trading System (EU
ETS), California's Cap-and-Trade Program and the U.S.'s Regional Greenhouse Gas Ini-
tiative (RGGI) use a uniform price format to auction emission allowances. The primary
objective of pollution regulation is the eﬃcient allocation of pollution rights. The total costs
of emission reductions will be minimized if the marginal abatement costs, or the marginal
values of the right to pollute, are equal across ﬁrms. Also, an eﬃcient allocation creates the
right price signal for emissions reductions in other sectors of the economy. Contrary to many
other auctions, maximizing auction revenues is not the main objective of pollution regula-
tion. However, revenues may be important if revenues can be recycled into the economy in a
proﬁtable way. For instance, the revenues from auctions can be used to reduce distortionary
taxes such as labour taxes or increase ﬁrms' incentives for research and development activities
of cleaner and more eﬃcient technologies.
Collusion is one of the concerns of eﬃcient markets and auctions. In this paper, collusion
means that ﬁrms can communicate prior to an auction, but cannot make binding agreements,
because such agreements are illegal. By communicating, strategic ﬁrms or subgroups of ﬁrms,
i.e. coalitions, may coordinate their bidding behavior in the auction. This, on the other hand,
has consequences for the eﬃciency and revenues of the auction. However, while agreements
are not binding, it is easy for an individual ﬁrm to deviate from the agreement. Thus a
stable coalition structure must be self-enforcing and it must beneﬁt all coalition members.
The objective of this paper is to examine two diﬀerent auction designs for allocating pollution
rights to ﬁrms where ﬁrms may collude. I make comparisons between the commonly used
design of the uniform price auction and the Vickrey auction, in terms of eﬃciency and
revenues. In addition, I study three examples of coalition formation games: a cartel game
with myopic ﬁrms, a cartel game with farsighted ﬁrms and an open membership game with
multiple coalitions.
The contribution of this paper is to link multi-unit auction mechanisms to non-cooperative
coalition games. Papers studying collusion in multi-unit auctions are surprisingly scarce.
However, Wilson (1979) and Back and Zender (1993), and subsequent papers, have shown
that demand reduction or collusive-seeming bidding may result in very low equilibrium prices
in uniform price auctions. Furthermore, Fabra (2003) and Dechenaux and Kovenock (2007),
for instance, examine tacit collusion in inﬁnitely repeated uniform price auctions1. They
study how perfect collusion can be sustained among the capacity-constrained ﬁrms. However,
1Fabra (2003) also studies discriminatory price auctions.
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these are equilibria in non-cooperative games between individual ﬁrms. On the other hand,
Montero (2008) shows that collusion does not distort the eﬃcient solution of the Vickrey
auction.
The model of this paper is a static one. I examine the non-cooperative auction game of
coalitions, and how this game aﬀects the formation of coalitions by ﬁrms. I apply the partition
function approach (e.g. Yi 2003). Thus the coalition formation is a two-stage game. In the
ﬁrst stage, strategic ﬁrms decide on their participation in coalitions. In the second stage,
coalitions play a non-cooperative auction game, which is assumed to have a unique Nash
equilibrium outcome for any coalition structure. Hence the whole game can be interpreted
as a one-stage game, where ﬁrms need to choose their membership strategies, because the
payoﬀs of the second-stage auction can be calculated given the information about the auction
design and the coalition structure. Moreover, to simplify the model, I assume that coalition
members may transfer emission allowances between themselves inside each coalition, but
there is no other resale market after the auction. To my knowledge, coalition formation has
not been studied in the context of multi-unit auction models in a similar set-up before.
In uniform price auctions, bidders pay the uniform clearing price for all the units they win.
In general, this makes uniform price auctions rather complex to model. Bidders will not bid
with their true valuations if they can inﬂuence the clearing price and, consequently, their
payoﬀs by their bidding. The uniform pricing creates strong incentives for bid-shading and
demand reduction, which may cause ineﬃcient allocation of allowances and decrease the
revenues. Bidders shade their bids more, the relatively larger they are. Due to bid-shading,
the clearing price is lower than the competitive price and large bidders receive less units than
in the eﬃcient outcome. (E.g. Ausubel et al. 2013.)
Under-pricing can be eliminated or reduced e.g. 1) if inelastic supply can be adjusted after
the submission of bids (Back and Zender 2001, McAdams 2007); 2) by making the supply
elastic (LiCalzi and Pavan 2005); or 3) by forcing the bid functions to be discrete (Kremer and
Nyborg 2004). Moreover, strategic bidding models with a uniform price format have often
applied the supply function equlibrium (SFE) models developed originally by Klemperer and
Meyer (1989). If there are n strategic agents, the solution of SFE is a system of n diﬀerential
equations. Usually, these models have a continuum of equilibria bounded by the Bertrand
and Cournot equilibria. However, the number of equilibria can be reduced by assumptions
about the initial conditions or end-conditions of the supply functions. For instance, in models
of electric power markets, capacity and price constraints reduce the range of equilibria (e.g.
Green and Newbery 1992, Holmberg 2008, 2009). Also, assuming linear model and linear
bid schedules simpliﬁes the model and oﬀers tractable solutions (e.g. Green 1996, Baldick
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et al. 2004, Ausubel et al. 2013). Another important feature of the uniform price auction
is that coalitions are beneﬁcial for members of coalitions, but they are even more beneﬁcial
for those ﬁrms that stay outside. Hence, under uniform pricing coalition formation is a game
with positive externalities. In these games, large coalitions are hard to sustain, because ﬁrms
have strong incentives to deviate.
In addition to the uniform price auction, I study the Vickrey auction, or its multi-unit
extension the Vickrey-Clarke-Groves (VCG) mechanism (Vickrey 1961, Clarke 1971, Groves
1973). In particular, I apply the indirect interpretation of the VCG mechanism introduced by
Montero (2008). When bidders' values are private, i.e. each bidder knows its valuations2 and
these valuations do not depend on other bidders' valuations, the VCG mechanism implements
eﬃcient allocation in dominant strategies. Hence it is the best response for each ﬁrm to bid
sincerely in a Vickrey auction whatever other bidders do. This is induced by the Vickrey
pricing rule. The marginal price bidders pay for each unit they win is the externality the
bidder causes to other bidders by participating in the auction and winning the unit. Montero
(2008) derives Vickrey prices by a particular payback rule, which determines the share of
paybacks to each bidder after the auction. The marginal payment schedule and thus the share
of the paybacks is determined by the total supply of allowances and the bid schedules of other
bidders, and is thus independent of the bidder's own bidding in the auction. The greater the
bidder's eﬀect on the auction equilibrium, the greater the share of the paybacks. Furthermore,
Montero shows that collusion does not distort the eﬃciency of the outcome. However, if
colluding ﬁrms are able to agree on the distribution of extra proﬁts due to collusion, the
Vickrey pricing rule creates incentives for stratgic ﬁrms to form as large coalitions as possible,
because coalitions do not beneﬁt outsiders but only insiders. Coalition proﬁts are greatest
with grand coalition where all strategic ﬁrms are members of a single coalition. With an
eﬃcient cartel agreement, each strategic ﬁrm is better oﬀ than if it participated in the auction
individually.
To analyze these two auction designs, I derive a linear-quadratic demand function equilibrium
with a ﬁxed supply of emission allowances. I assume that the market consists of two parts.
In addition to ex-ante symmetric strategic ﬁrms, there is a fringe of competitive ﬁrms. The
fringe ﬁrms act as price-takers in the market and thus the residual supply of allowances for
strategic ﬁrms is an increasing function of price. This reduces the possibilities for underpricing
in a uniform price auction. Furthermore, under a uniform price auction, I consider three
endogenous coalition formation games. The ﬁrst two games are cartel games, where only one
coalition, i.e. a cartel, is formed. However, the stable structures are diﬀerent depending on
2In the case of emission allowance auctions, the marginal valuations are determined by the marginal
abatement costs.
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whether the ﬁrms are myopic or farsighted. If a ﬁrm is myopic, it does not take into account
the ﬁnal result of its decisions but only the immediate reaction of the other players. A
farsighted ﬁrm, on the other hand, understands that after its actions other ﬁrms or coalitions
may react and these reactions might result in further reactions and thus aﬀect the ﬁnal
outcome of the game. In addition to these two cartel games, I consider one game with
multiple coalitions. Multiple coalition games become relatively complicated when the number
of strategic agents increases. The number of possible coalition structures increases rapidly
in the number of strategic ﬁrms (e.g. Sáiz et al. 2006). Fortunately, the analysis becomes
simpler when the strategic ﬁrms are symmetric. Another distinction in coalition formation
games is whether the coalition formation is a sequential process (e.g. Bloch 1995, 1996)
or is it a simultaneous coalition formation game (e.g. Yi 1997). Moreover, what happens
to the coalition if one of the ﬁrms or any subgroup of ﬁrms leaves the coalition? Do the
remaining members of the coalition continue as a new coalition or does the coalition break
down into singletons? For simplicity, I consider only simultaneous coalition formation games,
where deviation strategies do not break down the remaining coalition. Moreover, due to the
assumptions of ex-ante symmetric ﬁrms and a simultaneous coalition formation game, I do
not have to consider transfers among coalition members. Each member of the same coalition
gets the same payoﬀ.
Applying a numerical example, I show the existence of stable structures in all three coalition
formation games with a linear-quadratic model. Due to eﬃcient allocation, there is no welfare
loss in the Vickrey auction. However, the revenue loss increases in the market share of the
strategic ﬁrms. In a uniform price auction, on the other hand, the stable coalition structure
and hence the eﬃciency and revenues depend heavily on the coalition game as well as the
structure of the market. If ﬁrms are not able to make binding agreements (a cartel game
with myopic ﬁrms and an open membership game), the allocation of allowances is almost
eﬃcient and the auction revenues are almost as great as in a competitive market, at least
for a large enough number of strategic ﬁrms and a large enough market share of fringe ﬁrms.
If ﬁrms are farsighted and can agree on the least competitive cartel agreement, the uniform
price auction will not oﬀer an eﬃcient allocation and the auction revenues will be relatively
low, at least if strategic ﬁrms have a large market share.
This chapter is organized as follows. In Section 4.2, I introduce the linear-quadratic model.
Section 4.3 explains the payment schedules of the two auction designs and Section 4.4 the
three coalition formation games. In Section 4.5, I run a numerical simulation and derive the
results of the paper. Section 4.6 concludes.
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4.2 Model
I consider an auction model with a large number of ﬁrms, which are divided into two types,
namely ﬁrms in a competitive fringe acting as one market participant indexed with f and a
number of n ≥ 3 identical strategic ﬁrms indexed with i ∈ N = {1, . . . , n}. Allowances will
be allocated to ﬁrms by two alternative auction designs: the Vickrey auction (VA) and the
uniform price auction (UPA). The auction and payment rules are described later.
Pollution in the industry is denoted by a vector qI = (qf ,q), where q = (q1, . . . , qn) is a
vector of strategic ﬁrms' pollution and the total pollution of the fringe is denoted by qf .
The aggregate pollution is thus Q = qf +
∑n
i=1 qi. At the outset, the ﬁrms' (business-as-
usual) pollution is denoted by Q0 = q0f +
∑n
i=1 q
0
i , where q
0
i denotes the pollution of strategic
ﬁrm i and q0f is the business-as-usual pollution of the competitive fringe. Hence, I denote
the market share of strategic ﬁrms by λ ≡
∑n
i=1 q
0
i
Q0
and the market share of the fringe is
respectively 1− λ = q
0
f
Q0
.
Reducing emissions is costly to ﬁrms. The total costs of reducing pollution below the business-
as-usual levels, for ﬁrm i, are given by the abatement cost function ACi (qi) =
´ q0i
qi
ui (x) dx,
where ui (qi) is the marginal abatement cost function in terms of emissions, i.e. the marginal
value of the avoided abatement costs.3 Thus the gross value of the avoided abatement costs
of ﬁrm i, i.e. the gross value of pollution, writes Ui (qi) = ACi (0)− ACi (qi) =
´ qi
0
ui (x) dx.
4.2.1 Linear-quadratic model and auction rules
For simplicity, I use a linear-quadratic model. I thus assume that Ui (qi) is given by the
equation:
Ui (qi) = θiqi − 1
2
βiq
2
i , (4.1)
where the intercept of the marginal value function is assumed, for simplicity, to be constant for
every ﬁrm in the economy and thus θi = θ for all i and for all fringe ﬁrms. This speciﬁcation
deﬁnes the linear-quadratic auction model.
Deﬁnition 4.1. The model described in equations (4.1) - (4.7) is called the linear-quadratic
model.
The marginal abatement cost function of the entire industry, or the aggregate inverse demand
3Let zi denote emission reductions and AC
z
i (zi) is the abatement cost function in emission reductions, i.e.
ACi (qi) ≡ ACzi (zi (qi)), where zi (qi) = q0i − qi ≥ 0. The marginal abatement cost function is MACzi (zi) =
dACzi (zi)
dzi
≡ dACi(qi)dqi
dqi
dzi
= −ui (qi). Thus, dAC
z
i (zi)
dqi
=
dACzi (zi)
dzi
dzi
dqi
= ui (qi).
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function for emission allowances, is written as
u (Q) = θ − βQ. (4.2)
Hence, the true demand function of the industry is u−1 (p) = θ
β
− 1
β
p.
Pollution causes damage. The pollution reduction target is determined by the regulator's
expectations about marginal abatement costs and the marginal damage of pollution. I assume
that the regulator observes Q0 but has no exact information about θ or β. Hence the regulator
allocates a ﬁxed supply of allowances L = δQ0, such that:
E [u (L)] = E [MDF (L)] , (4.3)
where MDF (Q) is the marginal damage function and 0 < (1− δ) < 1 is the reduction
target as a share of business-as-usual emissions. Note that while MDF is uncertain in the
model, we live in a second-best world. Hence L = Q? = q?f +
∑n
i=1 q
?
i , where the second-best
solution, i.e. the cost-minimizing solution given the ﬁxed supply of allowances L, is denoted
by a vector q?I =
(
q?f ,q
?
)
. Business-as-usual emissions are found at the point where the
marginal value of pollution falls to zero. Hence Q0 = θ
β
, which further gives
L =
δθ
β
. (4.4)
Given the market share of the fringe 1− λ, the aggregate marginal value of pollution of the
fringe is written as
uf (qf ) = θ − βfqf , (4.5)
where βf = 11−λβ. All the strategic ﬁrms are symmetric and each of them thus has a true
inverse demand for allowances as follows:
ui (qi) = θ − βiqi. (4.6)
Furthermore, while the strategic ﬁrms are identical, the slope of an individual strategic ﬁrm
is βi = nλβ.
In the auction, either in VA or UPA, each bidder x reports its demand schedule Dx (p) to
the regulator. The inverse demand schedule is written Px (qx) ≡ D−1x (qx). The schedules
are limited to be linear and strictly decreasing in p. Furthermore, I assume that the bid
functions have an equal constant term θ, which is common knowledge among bidders. Thus
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the reported demand schedules are written as
Px (qx) = θ − bxqx, (4.7)
where the strategy of bidder x is determined solely by the slope of the inverse bid function
bx. In the Vickrey auction it is a dominant strategy to bid sincerely, and thus bx = βx. In
the linear equilibrium of the uniform price auction, on the other hand, bidders do not shade
their bids at qx = 0 and bid-shading increases in quantity (Ausubel et al. 2013). Hence, the
bid function coincides with the marginal valuation at qx = 0 and is steeper than the marginal
valuation for qx > 0. Thus the linear bid function from (4.7) with bx ≥ βx is well justiﬁed in
both auction designs.
Moreover, the relative size of a single fringe ﬁrm is so small that I assume it to bid with
its marginal costs. Hence, Pf (qf ) = uf (qf ) from (4.5). Given the pollution target L, the
residual supply of emissions allowances for the oligopolistic market, i.e. for all the strategic
ﬁrms, is thus
RSs (p) = L− u−1f (p) (4.8)
= (δ + λ− 1) θ
β
+
(
1− λ
β
)
p,
and the inverse residual supply for the oligopolistic market is RS−1s (qs) =
(
1− δ
1−λ
)
θ +(
β
1−λ
)
qs, where qs =
∑n
i=1 qi.
4
Respectively, given the bid schedules of other bidders, the residual supply function for bidder
x is
RSx (p) = L−D−x (p) , (4.9)
where, D−x(p) is the aggregate demand reported by every other bidder but bidder x.
The regulator computes the total demand from the bid schedules and clears the auction. The
auction equilibrium is deﬁned by the clearing rule:
p = RS−1x (lx)

≥ Px (lx) , if lx = 0
= Px (lx) , if 0 < lx < L
≤ Px (lx) , if lx = L
, (4.10)
4A ﬁxed supply of allowances is one special case in Montero (2008). He studies a more general model
where the supply of allowances is deﬁned by the marginal damage function of pollution. Note that the model
of this paper also generalizes to the case of a non-constant supply of allowances. For example, in the absence
of the fringe, we could also write RS−1s (qs) ≡MDF (Q) where qs = Q.
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where lx is the number of emission allowances allocated to bidder x and RS−1x (qx) is the
inverse residual supply. In a uniform price auction bidders pay the clearing price for all the
allowances they win. In a Vickrey auction, bidders receive paybacks after the auction and
the marginal price that bidders pay for units is called the Vickrey price. The total costs of
a ﬁrm are the sum of its abatement costs ACx (lx) and its auction payments RAx in auction
A = va, upa. In the Vickrey auction the costs are
TCvax (b
?
x) =
q0xˆ
l?x
ux (z) dz
︸ ︷︷ ︸
ACx(l?x)
+ (1− αx) p?l?x︸ ︷︷ ︸
Rvax
, (4.11)
where p? is the clearing price of the Vickrey auction, l?x is the equilibrium allocation of
pollution permits and αx is the share of the paybacks to bidder x after the auction. Due to
eﬃcient allocation, the clearing price of the Vickrey auction is the second-best price. In the
uniform price auction total costs of bidder x are
TCupax
(
bˆx
)
=
q0xˆ
lˆx
ux (z) dz
︸ ︷︷ ︸
ACx(lˆx)
+ pˆlˆx︸︷︷︸
Rupax
, (4.12)
where, respectively, pˆ is the clearing price of the uniform price auction and lˆx is the equilibrium
allocation of pollution permits. I explain later how the payment schedules aﬀect the ﬁrms'
bidding behavior and, respectively, their strategies in coalition formation.
4.2.2 Coalition structure
Strategic ﬁrms may co-operate when reporting their schedules to the regulator in the auction.
If this is the case, a coalition of co-operating ﬁrms reports one joint demand schedule or one of
the collusive ﬁrms reports the aggregate schedule while the others report null schedules. After
the auction, the coalition shares the costs and allowances between its members using some
internal mechanism which I assume to be eﬃcient and equal with respect to the member
ﬁrms' cost functions. Other than transactions inside coalitions, I assume that there is no
other resale market. Due to the symmetry, each ﬁrm inside a coalition earns equal proﬁts.
The joint true inverse demand of coalition ci, consisting of ni strategic ﬁrms, can be written
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as
uci(qci) = θ − βciqci , (4.13)
where βci =
n
niλ
β. The pollution of coalition ci is qci and the pollution of ﬁrm j in coalition ci
is denoted by qci(j) =
qci
ni
. I assume that ﬁrms may form multiple coalitions of diﬀerent sizes. I
assume that the intercept θ and the slopes βx are common knowledge among polluting ﬁrms,
given the knowledge related to the coalition structure C.
Deﬁnition 4.2. The coalition structure C ≡ {n1, n2, . . . , nm} is a partition of strategic
ﬁrms, such that coalition ci includes ni strategic ﬁrms; ci ∩ cj = Ø, ∀i 6= j;
∑m
i=1 ni = n; and
n ≥ n1 ≥ n2 ≥ · · · ≥ nm ≥ 1.
Hence I assume that each strategic ﬁrm is a member of one and only one coalition. Also,
coalitions are ordered such that the largest coalition is c1 and the smallest is cm, where m is
the number of coalitions. If m = 1, then there is only one coalition and it is called a grand
coalition, i.e. c1 ≡ cgc and n1 ≡ ngc = n. On the other hand, if m = n, then all coalitions are
singletons, i.e. ni = 1 for all i. To simplify the notation, consider the following structure:
C =
n1, . . . , nm1︸ ︷︷ ︸
m1 coalitions
, nm1+1, . . . , nm1+m2︸ ︷︷ ︸
m2 coalitions
, . . . , n(m1+...+mh−1+1), . . . , nm︸ ︷︷ ︸
mh coalitions
 (4.14)
≡
{
η
(m1)
1 , η
(m2)
2 , . . . , η
(mh)
h
}
,
where η1 = n1 = · · · = nm1 and ηi = n(1+∑i−1j=1mj) = · · · = n(∑ij=1mj) with η1 > η2 > · · · > ηh
and m =
∑h
i=1mi. Hence each of the ﬁrst m1 symmetric coalitions denoted by κ1 ≡ η(m1)1
has exactly η1 members, the next m2 coalitions denoted by κ2 ≡ η(m2)2 have η2 members each
and so forth.5
I assume that coalitions of equal size apply symmetric strategies in auctions, i.e. bcj = bκi
for all nj = ηi. Thus the inverse residual supply for coalition cj is
RS−1cj
(
qcj
)
= max
0,
θ −
 1∑m
i 6=j
{
1
bci
}
+ 1
βf
L+
 1∑m
i 6=j
{
1
bci
}
+ 1
βf
 qcj
 , (4.15)
5Respectively, coalition cj can be denoted by cj ≡ n(1)j . Hence cj ≡ κi if nj = ηi.
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or respectively using notation with κi:
RS−1κi (qκi) = max
0,
θ −
 1
mi−1
bκi
+
∑h
j 6=i
{
mj
bκj
}
+ 1
βf
L (4.16)
+
 1
mi−1
bκi
+
∑h
j 6=i
{
mj
bκj
}
+ 1
βf
 qκi
 .
Suppose that the total costs TCAκi (bκi) of coalition κi, given the coalition structure C ={
η
(m1)
1 , . . . , η
(mh)
h
}
, are determined by the unique Nash equilibrium of the non-cooperative
auction game A and thus are derived from (4.11) or (4.12). Hence each coalition structure
maps the total costs for every coalition and, consequently, for every individual ﬁrm, given the
equilibrium of auction A. The per-member costs of coalition κi, given the coalition structure
C and the auction design A = va, upa, are thus given by the following partition function:
TCA (ηi;C) ≡
TCAκi (bκi)
ηi
.
I omit the superscript A when it is not relevant. Due to the symmetry, each member of
a coalition is assumed to earn equal proﬁts. I consider three diﬀerent coalition formation
games. However, I ﬁrst explain the payment rules of the second-stage auction game and
derive two metrics for comparing auction designs. These are the relative welfare loss and
the relative revenue loss. The aggregate abatement costs are compared to the abatement
costs by the eﬃcient allocation of allowances (i.e. the second-best allocation) denoted by
ACe. Auction revenues are compared to competitive revenues, which are the revenues if
the regulator received the second-best price p? from all the allowances it sells in the auction,
i.e. Re = p?L.
4.3 Auction
4.3.1 Vickrey auction
In the Vickrey auction (see Montero 2008), in addition to the auction procedure described in
the previous section, every bidder gets paybacks after the auction. The share of the paybacks
151
to coalition ci is deﬁned as
αci = 1−
lci´
0
RS−1ci (z)dz
RS−1ci (lci)lci
. (4.17)
In equilibrium RS−1ci (lci) = p. Hence the total costs of coalition ci in a Vickrey auction are
TCvaci (bci) =
q0ciˆ
lci
uci (z) dz + (1− αci) plci (4.18)
=
q0ciˆ
lci
{θ − βciz} dz +
lciˆ
0
RS−1ci (x)dx.
The ﬁrst term is the abatement costs of reducing emissions from q0ci to lci and the second term
is the auction payment. By Proposition 3 in Montero (2008), it is optimal for each bidder to
report its true demand curve irrespective of the other bidders' reports due to the paybacks.
Thus the mechanism implements eﬃcient allocation in dominant strategies. In equilibrium,
all ﬁrms face the same clearing price and receive the eﬃcient amount of allowances, but the
ﬁnal (average) prices, i.e. (1− αj) p, diﬀers between bidders, unless they all have identical bid
schedules. The marginal price, i.e. the Vickrey price, is determined by the inverse residual
supply function RS−1ci (qci). The ﬁnal payment is equal to the externality the bidder causes
to other bidders. When the total supply of allowances is ﬁxed, it is the external cost due to
the increase in allowance price.6 If the number of strategic ﬁrms increases to the limit and if
ﬁrms do not coordinate their bids, the share of paybacks closes to zero and the Vickrey price
for all units is equal to the uniform second-best price p?.
Due to truthful reporting, the Vickrey auction implements eﬃcient allocation of allowances
and thus a cost-minimizing solution for pollution control. The second-best allocation holds
even if ﬁrms coordinate their bids in the auction. Still, the dominant strategy is to report
truthfully and the outcome will be the second-best. However, compared to a competitive
market, the paybacks to coalitions are greater due to their greater impacts on aggregate
demand and the larger residual supply at every price. Under collusion, the auction revenues
of the regulator will be lower than in a more competitive market structure.
The paybacks to an individual fringe ﬁrm are zero, i.e. αf = 0. The share of paybacks to
6If we had an emission damage function in the model, as in Montero (2008), the externality would consist
of two factors: an increase in the allowance price and the total damage of the bidder's own pollution.
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coalition ci is (see Appendix 4.A for derivation)7
αci =

niλδ
2(n−niλ)(1−δ) if D
va
−ci(0) ≥ L
niλδ
2(n−niλ)(1−δ)
[
1−
(
n−niλ−nδ
niλδ
)2]
, if Dva−ci(0) < L
. (4.19)
Keeping the number of strategic ﬁrms n ﬁxed, the share of paybacks to coalition ci increases
in the size of collusive ﬁrms ni, in the market share of strategic ﬁrms λ and in the stringency of
the environmental policy δ. Thus it is proﬁtable for strategic ﬁrms to form a grand coalition
cgc with ngc = n. The share of paybacks to the grand coalition is
αgc =

λδ
2(1−λ)(1−δ) , if 1− λ ≥ δ
λδ
2(1−λ)(1−δ)
[
1− (1−δ−λ
λδ
)2]
, if 1− λ < δ
.
The total costs of bidder x = f, cgc are from (4.18) TCvax =
q0x´
l∗x
{θ − βxz} dz + (1− αx) p∗l∗x,
where p∗ = (1− δ) θ; l∗gc = λ δθβ ; and l∗f = (1− λ) δθβ . Due to the eﬃcient allocation, the total
abatement costs of the entire industry are minimized:
ACva = ACe =
Q0ˆ
L
{θ − βz} dz (4.20)
=
(1− δ)2 θ2
2β
.
Hence there is no welfare loss due to eﬃcient allocation in the Vickrey auction,
∆ACva =
ACva − ACe
ACe
= 0.
Furthermore, the competitive revenues are Re = p?L = (1−δ)δθ
2
β
. The share of paybacks and
thus the relative revenue loss compared to there being competitive revenues is
∆Rva =
Re −Rva
Re
= λαgc =

λ2δ
2(1−λ)(1−δ) , if 1− λ ≥ δ
λ2δ
2(1−λ)(1−δ)
[
1− (1−δ−λ
λδ
)2]
, if 1− λ < δ
. (4.21)
7The correction, when Dva−ci(0) < L, is due to the fact that the inverse residual supply cannot be negative.
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4.3.2 Uniform price auction
In a uniform price auction it is no longer proﬁtable to report demand truthfully as long as
ﬁrms can inﬂuence the auction price. The objective of coalition ci is to minimize its total
costs with respect to the slope of the bid function bci :
min
bci
TCupaci (bci) =
q0ciˆ
lci (bci )
uci(z)dz + lci(bci)RS
−1
ci
(lci(bci)). (4.22)
However, bidders have to take into account other bidders' actions and how their own actions
aﬀect other bidders' actions. Hence coalitions play a non-cooperative game. The ﬁrst-order
condition of (4.22) is written as
0 = −uci(lci)
dlci
dbci
+RS−1ci (lci)
dlci
dbci
+ lci
dRS−1ci (lci)
dlci
dlci
dbci
(4.23)
RS−1ci (lci) = uci(lci)− lci
dRS−1ci (lci)
dlci
.
Consider coalition structure C =
{
η
(m1)
1 , η
(m2)
2 , . . . , η
(mh)
h
}
. By symmetry, coalitions of equal
size use symmetric strategies. In equilibrium, Pκi(lκi) = RS
−1
κi
(lκi). Assuming RS
−1
κi
(lκi) > 0
and lκi > 0, this yields from (4.23):
bκi = βκi +
 1
mi−1
bκi
+
∑h
j 6=i
{
mj
bκj
}
+ 1
βf
 .
Solving this for bκi gives a quadratic equation:
Γκib
2
κi
+ ((mi − 2) βf − Γκiβκi) bκi − (mi − 1) βfβκi = 0,
where Γκi = 1 + βf
∑h
j 6=i
{
mj
bκj
}
. Because bκi ≥ βκi we get the best response strategy for
coalition κi as
bκi ≡ BRκi(b−κi) (4.24)
=
1
2
βκi − (mi − 2Γκi
)
βf +
√(
βκi +
(
mi − 2
Γκi
)
βf
)2
+ 4
βfβκi
Γκi
 ,
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where b−κi =
(
bκ1 , . . . , bκi−1 , bκi+1 , . . . , bκh
)
denotes the vector of strategies other than coali-
tions κi.
The slopes of the bid functions are strategic complements. Thus the best response functions
are increasing in other bidders' strategies. The less aggressive other bidders play (the steeper
their bid functions), the steeper the bid function of bidder κi. Without the fringe, the bid
functions of strategic ﬁrms could have inﬁnite slopes. Wilson (1979) has shown the possibility
of extreme low price equilibria in uniform price auctions. With a big enough fringe or with
an endogenous supply, this can be avoided.
The BRκi(b−κi) function is derived similarly as in Klemperer and Meyer (1989), where
they deﬁne unique supply function equilibrium using exogenous uncertainty in the industry
demand (see also Akgün 2004). The demand in Klemperer and Meyer is analogous to the
residual supply for strategic ﬁrms RSs(p) ≡ L− u−1f (p) in this paper. Without uncertainty,
Klemperer and Meyer show with a general model that there is an inﬁnite number of supply
functions which satisfy the suﬃcient and necessary conditions for the optimum. In this model,
I restrict the demand functions to be linear and to have a constant intercept parameter θi = θ.
This is common knowledge to all bidders. Thus the demand function is fully deﬁned for the
whole support by a single parameter, i.e. the slope of the bid function. By this construction,
I deﬁne the unique demand function equilibrium as bˆ =
(
bˆκ1 , . . . , bˆκh
)
and the equilibrium
price is thus written as
pˆ = θ − 1(
1
βf
+
∑h
i=1
mi
bˆκi
)L. (4.25)
The allocation of allowances to bidder x = f, κi is lˆx = θbx − 1bx pˆ, where bf = βf . The total
costs from (4.12) can be decomposed into the abatement costs ACupax =
q0x´
lˆx
{θ − βxz} dz and
into the auction payments (revenues) Rupax = pˆlˆx. The relative welfare loss due to ineﬃcient
allocation is thus
∆ACupa =
q0f´
lˆf
{θ − βfz} dz +
∑h
i=1 mi
q0κi´
lˆκi
{θ − βκiz} dz
Q0´
L
{θ − βz} dz
− 1, (4.26)
and the relative revenue loss is
∆Rupa = 1− pˆ
p∗
. (4.27)
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4.3.3 Comparison of the Vickrey and uniform price auctions - a
numerical example
Figure 4.1 illustrates the diﬀerence between the Vickrey auction (the left panel) and the
uniform price auction (the right panel) in the case of a grand coalition (a cartel). Initially,
the market is equally shared between the fringe and strategic ﬁrms. Thus the initial emissions
of the cartel and the fringe are equal q0f = q
0
gc and they both have identical (true) inverse
demand functions ugc (qgc) = uf (qf ). The pollution target is to halve total emissions from
business-as-usual Q0. Hence, the parameter values of this numerical example are λ = δ = 0.5
and the abatement costs are normalized such that θ = 100 and β = 1.
In the Vickrey auction, both bidders (the cartel and the fringe) bid truthfully and the al-
lowance allocation is cost-eﬃcient. The abatement costs of both the fringe and the cartel
are illustrated by ACvagc (the red triangle). In the auction they both pay ﬁrst the amount of
Rf = p
?l?f , but the cartel receives paybacks and the ﬁnal payment of the cartel is R
va
gc (the
blue triangle).
In the uniform price auction, the cartel reduces its demand and reports schedule P upagc (qgc),
which lies below the true demand function ugc (qgc) at every positive qgc. Due to demand
reduction (or bid-shading), the cartel receives allowances of an amount which is strictly less
than in the Vickrey auction. The abatement costs of the cartel, ACupagc , are thus higher than
in the second-best. However, the equilibrium price of allowances is lower than the second-best
price and the auction revenues from the cartel are only Rupagc = pˆlˆgc. Interestingly, the strategic
behavior of the cartel makes fringe ﬁrms strictly better oﬀ because the allowance price is lower.
The abatement costs of the fringe are reduced to the triangle ACupaf ≡ 4(Xlˆfq0f ) and the
regulator collects revenues from the fringe amounting to Rupaf = pˆlˆf . The total costs of the
fringe are lower than in the Vickrey auction and the costs are lower than the total costs of
the cartel.
Comparing the results of the example drawn in Figure 4.1, we may conclude that the Vickrey
auction is strictly a better auction design from the regulator's point of view in the case of a
grand coalition, if the objective of the regulator is to achieve eﬃcient allocation of allowances
and to maximize the revenues of the auction. The total abatement costs are minimized and
the revenues are larger than in a uniform price auction. Given these parameter values, the
total abatement costs are ACva = 1250 and ACupa = 1389, and the revenues are Rva = 1875
and Rupa = 1667. However, a grand coalition may not be stable in the case of a uniform price
auction, because each member of the cartel may have incentives to deviate from the cartel
due to the positive externality the cartel provides for outsiders. The willingness to deviate
depends on the coalition formation game. Three examples of these games are described next.
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4.4 Coalition formation
The coalition formation game is denoted by G =
{
N, (Σi)i∈N , (TCi)i∈N
}
, where N =
{1, . . . , n} is the set of strategic ﬁrms, Σi is the set of membersip strategies of ﬁrm i in
the game, and TCi = TC
(
ηl(i), C (σ)
)
is the payoﬀ of ﬁrm i for being a member of coalition
ηl given the coalition structure C (σ). The coalition structure C (σ) is deﬁned by the strategy
vector of all ﬁrms σ ∈ Σ ≡ Πi∈NΣi.
Before introducing the three coalition formation games, let me note that there are several
useful equilibrium concepts when explaining the stable coalition structures in these games.
In Appendix 4.B the reader will ﬁnd deﬁnitions of Nash equilibrium (NE), strong Nash
equilibrium (SNE), and coalition-proof Nash equilibrium (CPNE), as well as deﬁnitions of
stand-alone stability and the concentration of a coalition.
In uniform price auctions, ﬁrms inside coalitions are better-oﬀ the more concentrated, and
thus the less competitive, the coalition structure is. However, in order to sustain large
coalitions, problems arise due to the positive externalities large coalitions provide to outsiders.
The more concentrated the coalition structure is, the more the outsiders gain. The stable
coalition structure should thus be such that no member of any coalition wants to deviate.
4.4.1 Cartel game with myopic ﬁrms
The coalition formation game is called a cartel game if there is only a single coalition with
η1 ∈ [1, n] members. The rest of the strategic ﬁrms are singletons, i.e. η2 = 1. Thus, the set
of membership strategies in the cartel game is Σi = {0, 1}, where σi = 0 means that ﬁrm i
is a singleton in the auction game, whereas σi = 1 implies that ﬁrm i joins the cartel. Hence
the coalition structure of the cartel game is C =
{
η
(1)
1 , 1
(n−η1)
}
, where η1 =
∑n
i=1 σi. The
total costs of each cartel member TC (η1;C) and each individual strategic ﬁrm TC (1;C) are
deﬁned by the size of the cartel. If strategic ﬁrms are myopic in the cartel game, two stability
conditions are required. These are internal and external stability (D'Aspremont et al. 1983).
Deﬁnition 4.3. Let η˜1 denote the number of cartel members in the stable coalition struc-
ture of a cartel game with myopic ﬁrms. In particular, the coalition structure CCGM ={
η˜
(1)
1 , 1
(n−η˜1)
}
of the cartel game is internally stable if
TC
(
η˜1;C
CGM
) ≤ TC (1;C ′) , (4.28)
where C ′ =
{
(η˜1 − 1)(1) , 1(n−η˜1+1)
}
.
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Deﬁnition 4.4. Let η˜1 denote the number of cartel members in the stable coalition struc-
ture of a cartel game with myopic ﬁrms. In particular, the coalition structure CCGM ={
η˜
(1)
1 , 1
(n−η˜1)
}
of the cartel game is externally stable if
TC
(
1;CCGM
) ≤ TC (η˜1 + 1;C ′′) , (4.29)
where C ′′ =
{
(η˜1 + 1)
(1) , 1(n−η˜1−1)
}
.
The ﬁrst rule (4.28) implies that no individual cartel member wants to deviate from the
cartel. It is thus equivalent to the deﬁnition of stand-alone stability (see Appendix 4.B). The
second rule (4.29) implies that no individual strategic ﬁrm wants to join the cartel. Hence
the coalition structure CCGM =
{
η˜
(1)
1 , 1
(n−η˜1)
}
is a stable structure in a cartel game with
myopic ﬁrms if it is both internally and externally stable according to Deﬁnitions 4.3 and
4.4.
Table 4.1 provides an example of a uniform price auction with a cartel game of n = 30
strategic ﬁrms. In the example, the market share of strategic ﬁrms is λ = 0.5, the cost
parameters are θ = 100 and β = 1, and the pollution target is δ = 0.5. The stable structure
of the cartel game with myopic ﬁrms is only η˜1 = 3 members in the cartel. Deviation from
the cartel is not proﬁtable, because from (4.28)
TC
(
3;
{
3(1), 1(27)
})
= 62.1270 < 62.1273 = TC
(
1;
{
2(1), 1(28)
})
.
Also, for an individual ﬁrm it is not proﬁtable to join the three-ﬁrm cartel, while from (4.29)
TC
(
4;
{
4(1), 1(26)
})
= 62.096 < 62.079 = TC
(
1;
{
3(1), 1(27)
})
.
In fact, the stable structure is independent of the model structure and the number of strategic
ﬁrms for n ≥ 3. In every model I consider, the stable structure of the cartel game with myopic
ﬁrms is CCGM =
{
3(1), 1(n−3)
}
and thus the Nash equilibrium (NE) of the game is all the
strategy proﬁles where exactly three ﬁrms have σi = 1, where {i} ⊂ c1 and remaining ﬁrms
have σj = 0, where {j} ⊂ N \ c1. This is also a coalition-proof Nash equilibrium (CPNE),
because there are no self-enforcing deviations by any group from CCGM =
{
3(1), 1(n−3)
}
.
However, no strong Nash equilibria (SNE) can be found for this game. For every coalition
structure it is possible to ﬁnd a proﬁtable deviation strategy for some group of ﬁrms (see
Thoron 1998).8
8See the deﬁnitions of NE, SNE and CPNE in Appendix 4.B.
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Table 4.1: Per-member costs of the cartel game in the uniform price auction. Parameter
values: n = 30, θ = 100, β = 1, and λ = δ = 0.5.
η1 TC (η1;C) TC (1;C)
1 62.151 62.151
2 62.145 62.1273
3 62.1270 62.079
4 62.096 62.006
5 62.054 61.909
6 61.998 61.786
7 61.931 61.638
8 61.850 61.462
9 61.756 61.260
10 61.649 61.029
η1 TC (η1;C) TC (1;C)
11 61.528 60.768
12 61.393 60.476
13 61.244 60.151
14 61.079 59.792
15 60.898 59.395
16 60.701 58.960
17 60.486 58.483
18 60.253 57.961
19 60.002 57.390
20 59.730 56.768
η1 TC (η1;C) TC (1;C)
21 59.436 56.088
22 59.120 55.347
23 58.780 54.539
24 58.414 53.656
25 58.020 52.693
26 57.597 51.640
27 57.141 50.488
28 56.651 49.225
29 56.124 47.839
30 55.556 -
4.4.2 Cartel game with farsighted ﬁrms
The primitives of a cartel game with farsighted ﬁrms are similar to the cartel game with
myopic ﬁrms. Hence there is only a single coalition, with η1 ∈ [1, n] members, and remaining
strategic ﬁrms are singletons (η2 = 1). The set of membership strategies in the cartel game
is Σi = {0, 1}. Firm i is a singleton if σi = 0 and a member of the cartel if σi = 1. The
coalition structure of the game is C =
{
η
(1)
1 , 1
(n−η1)
}
, where η1 =
∑n
i=1 σi.
The cartel game with farsighted ﬁrms is similar to Carraro and Moriconi (1997) and Finus and
Rundshagen (2001). It is a special case of an equilibrium-binding agreement game (Ray and
Vohra 1997). If ﬁrms are farsighted, larger cartels can be sustained. I explain the formation
of a stable structure again with the example of the uniform price auction described in Table
4.1. Consider, for instance, that the cartel contains η1 = 5 members in a uniform price
auction. If any of the cartel members was myopic, it would ﬁnd deviation proﬁtable, because
playing as an individual strategic ﬁrm against four-ﬁrm cartel (and against the fringe, and
remaining individual strategic ﬁrms) would provide greater proﬁts than being a member of
a cartel of ﬁve ﬁrms. However, a farsighted ﬁrm would notice that members of the four-ﬁrm
cartel would also have incentives to deviate. Thus the outcome that a ﬁve-ﬁrm cartel member
should compare its outcome to is not the outcome of a four-ﬁrm cartel game but the outcome
of a three-ﬁrm cartel game, which is a stable coalition structure even if ﬁrms were myopic.
Now because
TC
(
5;
{
5(1), 1(25)
})
= 62.054 < 62.079 = TC
(
1;
{
3(1), 1(27)
})
,
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a deviation strategy would not be proﬁtable and the structure C =
{
5(1), 1(25)
}
is a stable
structure for a cartel game with farsighted ﬁrms. Using similar reasoning the structure
C =
{
8(1), 1(22)
}
is also a stable structure: 1) a ﬁve-ﬁrm cartel is stable as we already
noticed; 2) if a ﬁrm deviated from a cartel of η1 = 8 members, there would also be other
deviators until the cartel had only ﬁve members; 3) the total costs of a member of an eight-
ﬁrm cartel are lower than the costs of a singleton in a uniform price auction with a ﬁve-ﬁrm
cartel:
TC
(
8;
{
8(1), 1(22)
})
= 61.850 < 61.909 = TC
(
1;
{
5(1), 1(25)
})
.
In the case of our example, the stable structures of the cartel game are those structures for
which the number of cartel members belongs to a set ηCGF1 ∈ {3, 5, 8, 12, 18, 26} (see the rows
written in red in Table 4.1). If ﬁrms are able to agree on binding cartel agreements and ﬁrms
are farsighted, the most proﬁtable agreement is a coalition with the largest number of cartel
members: CCGF =
{
ηˆ
(1)
1,1, 1
(n−ηˆ1,1)
}
, where ηˆ1,1 = max
(
ηCGF1
)
. I call this the least competitive
stable structure and it is the most concentrated structure of the set of stable structures. The
least competitive stable structure with n = 30 would then be CCGF =
{
26(1), 1(4)
}
. Stable
structures depend on the number of strategic ﬁrms n, but also on the other parameter values.
For example, when λ = 0.7, the least competitive stable structure with otherwise the same
model (n = 30, θ = 100, β = 1, and δ = 0.5) is CCGF =
{
24(1), 1(6)
}
. Table 4.2 presents all
the stable structures for n = 3, . . . , 100 strategic ﬁrms in the example model with diﬀerent
market shares of oligopolistic ﬁrms (λ ∈ (0.3; 0.5; 0.7).
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Table 4.2: Stable structures (ηCGF1 ) of the cartel game with farsighted ﬁrms. Parameter
values: θ = 100, β = 1, and δ = 0.5.
n ηCGF1
∣∣λ = 0.3 ηCGF1 ∣∣λ = 0.5 ηCGF1 ∣∣λ = 0.7
3 3 3 3
4 3 3 3
5 3, 5 3, 5 3, 5
6 3, 5 3, 5 3, 5
7 3, 5 3, 5 3, 5, 7
8 3, 5, 8 3, 5, 8 3, 5, 7
9 3, 5, 8 3, 5, 8 3, 5, 7
10 3, 5, 8 3, 5, 8 3, 5, 8
...
...
...
...
20 3, 5, 8, 12, 18 3, 5, 8, 12, 17 3, 5, 8, 12, 17
30 3, 5, 8, 12, 18, 26 3, 5, 8, 12, 18, 26 3, 5, 8, 12, 17, 24
40 3, 5, 8, 12, 18, 26, 37 3, 5, 8, 12, 18, 26, 37 3, 5, 8, 12, 17, 24, 33
50 3, 5, 8, 12, 18, 26, 37 3, 5, 8, 12, 18, 26, 37 3, 5, 8, 12, 18, 26, 36, 48
60 3, 5, 8, 12, 18, 26, 37, 53 3, 5, 8, 12, 18, 26, 37, 52 3, 5, 8, 12, 18, 26, 37, 51
70 3, 5, 8, 12, 18, 26, 37, 53 3, 5, 8, 12, 18, 26, 37, 52 3, 5, 8, 12, 18, 26, 37, 51, 68
80 3, 5, 8, 12, 18, 26, 37, 53, 75 3, 5, 8, 12, 18, 26, 37, 52, 72 3, 5, 8, 12, 18, 26, 37, 52, 70
90 3, 5, 8, 12, 18, 26, 37, 53, 75 3, 5, 8, 12, 18, 26, 37, 53, 74 3, 5, 8, 12, 18, 26, 37, 52, 71
100 3, 5, 8, 12, 18, 26, 37, 53, 75 3, 5, 8, 12, 18, 26, 37, 53, 74 3, 5, 8, 12, 18, 26, 37, 52, 72, 96
Deﬁning the stable structure in CGF formally, we need a new deﬁnition for internal stability.
Deﬁnition 4.5. Let ηCGF1 ∈ {ηˆ1,1, ηˆ1,2, ηˆ1,3, ...} denote the set of numbers of cartel members
in all the stable coalition structures of the cartel game with farsighted ﬁrms, with ηˆ1,i > ηˆ1,j
for all i > j. In particular, the coalition structure CCGFi =
{
ηˆ
(1)
1,i , 1
(n−ηˆ1,i)
}
of the cartel game
is internally stable if
1. for all ηˆ1,i > min
(
ηCGF1
)
,
TC
(
ηˆ1,i;C
CGF
i
) ≤ TC (1;CCGFi+1 ) , (4.30)
where CCGFi+1 =
{
ηˆ
(1)
1,i+1, 1
(n−ηˆ1,i+1)
}
; and
2. for ηˆ1,i = min
(
ηCGF1
)
, the coalition structure CCGFi =
{
ηˆ
(1)
1,i , 1
(n−ηˆ1,i)
}
is stand-alone
stable.
Hence the coalition structure CCGFi =
{
ηˆ
(1)
1,i , 1
(n−ηˆ1,i)
}
is a stable structure of the cartel game
with farsighted ﬁrms if it is both internally and externally stable according to Deﬁnitions
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4.4 and 4.5. However, in Deﬁnition 4.4 one needs to change CCGM to CCGFi and thus
C ′′ =
{
(ηˆ1,i + 1)
(1) , 1(n−ηˆ1,i−1)
}
.
In a cartel game with myopic ﬁrms, the solution concept is CPNE, whereas the stable
structure in a cartel game with farsighted ﬁrms is not any of NE, SNE or CPNE, unless
ηˆ1,i = min
(
ηCGF1
)
. The notions of NE, SNE and CPNE consider only the deviation strate-
gies of deviators, keeping the other agents' strategies ﬁxed. However, in the cartel game with
farsighted ﬁrms, the stable structure is determined by the deviations of those players outside
the group of original deviators. Also, while there are several stable structures in the cartel
game with farsighted ﬁrms, the cartel agreement of the least competitive stable structure
must be more binding than the stable structures of the two other coalition formation games
considered in this paper, which both have unique stable structures.
4.4.3 Open membership game
Yi (1997), Yi and Shin (2000) and Finus and Rundshagen (2001), for instance, examine an
open membership game with positive externalities. It is a simultaneous move game, where
players are allowed to form coalitions freely, as long as no player is exluded from joining a
coalition.9 In the coalition formation process, players announce messages (or addresses). If
two or more players have announced the same message, they form a coalition. Formally, player
i ∈ N can choose any message from the strategy set Σj = {0, σ1, . . . , σn} = {0, 1, . . . , n}.
The strategy σj = 0 means that ﬁrm j is a singleton and σj = σi that ﬁrm j joins coalition
ci. Let aj be ﬁrm j's action. If ﬁrms j and l have chosen the same message, they belong to
the same coalition, i.e. if aj = al = σi, they both are members of coalition ci. For instance,
9If players can be exluded, the game is an exclusive membership game (e.g. Hart and Kurz 1983, Yi and
Shin 2000, Finus and Rundshagen 2001). These games may have multiple stable structures in the setup of
this paper, some of them more concentrated than the unique stable structure of the open membersip game.
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a strategy proﬁle
σ =
1, . . . , 1︸ ︷︷ ︸
#1=η1
, 2, . . . , 2︸ ︷︷ ︸
#2=η1
, . . . ,m1, . . . ,m1︸ ︷︷ ︸
#m1=η1
,
(m1 + 1) , . . . , (m1 + 1)︸ ︷︷ ︸
#(m1+1)=η2
, . . . ,
(
2∑
i=1
mi
)
, . . . ,
(
2∑
i=1
mi
)
︸ ︷︷ ︸
#(
∑2
i=1mi)=η2
, . . . ,
(
h−1∑
i=1
mi + 1
)
, . . . ,
(
h−1∑
i=1
mi + 1
)
︸ ︷︷ ︸
#(
∑h−1
i=1 m1+1)=ηh
, . . . ,
(
h∑
i=1
mi
)
, . . . ,
(
h∑
i=1
mi
)
︸ ︷︷ ︸
#(
∑h
i=1mi)=ηh

constitutes a coalition structure C =
{
η
(m1)
1 , . . . , η
(mh)
h
}
.
Yi and Shin (2000) prove that if the following four conditions of the positive externality game
hold, there is a unique coalition-proof Nash equilibriumin in the open membership game.10
Condition 4.1. TC (ni;C
′) < TC (ni;C), where C ′ is more concentrated than C; ni ∈ C ′;
and ni ∈ C. (C.4.1.)
Condition 4.2. TC (ni;C) < TC (nj;C), where nj > ni, for any C = {n1, . . . , nm}.
(C.4.2.)
Condition 4.3. TC (nj;C) > TC (nj − 1;C ′), where C = {n1, . . . , nm}; C ′ = C \ {ni, nj}∪
{ni + 1, nj − 1}; and ni ≥ nj ≥ 2. (C.4.3.)
Condition 4.4. Suppose that C = {n1, . . . , nm} is stand-alone stable. If n1 ≥ nm + 2,
then there exists nj, n1 ≥ nj + 2, such that TC (n1;C) > TC (nj + 1;C ′), where C ′ =
C \ {n1, nj} ∪ {n1 − 1, nj + 1}. (C.4.4.)
The ﬁrst condition (C.4.1) states that if the coalition structure becomes more concentrated
and coalition ci is not part of the concentration process, then members of ci are better-oﬀ.
According to (C.4.2), a member of a small coalition is better-oﬀ than a member of a large
coalition in any coalition structure. Condition (C.4.3) states that, if a member of a coalition
cj leaves its coalition and joins a larger or equal-size coalition ci, the remaining members of
coalition cj are better-oﬀ. Finally, by (C.4.4), if the largest coalition in a stand-alone stable
coalition structure exceeds the size of the smallest coalition by 2 or more, a member of the
largest coalition becomes better-oﬀ by joining a coalition, which is smaller by 2 or more than
10Again, see the deﬁnitions of stand-alone stability and the concentration of a coalition in Appendix 4.B.
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the largest coalition. Hence, given the conditions (C.4.1) - (C.4.4), the stable structure must
be symmetric with only one or two types of coalitions. Moreover, if there are two types of
coalitions, the size of these types must be such that η1 = η2 + 1.
Conditions (C.4.1) - (C.4.3) hold trivially in the uniform price auction game. I do not prove
analytically that condition (C.4.4) also holds. However, I apply a numerical simulation and
check that the unique coalition-proof Nash equilibrium introduced by Yi and Shin (2000) is
a stable structure in the open membership game with a uniform price auction. The stable
coalition structure can be characterized by the following proposition.
Proposition 4.1. (Yi and Shin 2000, Proposition 5.) Let I(n/m) denote the next higher
integer to n/m including n/m. Furthermore, suppose that C? =
{
k?(m
?−r?), (k? − 1)(r?)
}
is stand-alone stable, where k? = I(n/m?) and r? = m?k? − n (≥ 0). Suppose also that
C ′ =
{
k′(m
′−r′), (k′ − 1)r′
}
is not stand-alone stable, where k′ = I(n/m′) and r′ = m′k′ − n,
for all m′ = 1, . . . ,m? − 1. Then, in the open memebership game:
1. under (C.4.4), C? is the most concentrated Nash equilibrium coalition structure; and
2. under (C.4.1) - (C.4.4), C? is the unique coalition-proof Nash equilibrium coalition
structure.
Proof. Yi and Shin (2000, Appendix A).
Yi and Shin (2000) examine the formation of research coalitions with positive spillovers.
Finus and Rundshagen (2001) model coalition formation in a problem of global pollution
control. Both models use a linear-quadratic Cournout structure and are thus close to the
model of this paper. In Yi and Shin (2000) and in Finus and Rundshagen (2001) the stable
structure of the open membership game is given by k? = 3 (see Proposition 4.1). More
formally, the stable structure of the open membership game with a uniform price auction can
be characterized by the following corollary.
Corollary 4.1. Let m3 ≡ (m : I(n/m) = 3), where I(n/m) denotes the next higher integer
to n/m including n/m, and r3 ≡ 3m3 − n. Then, for n ≥ 3, the stable structure of the open
membership game with the linear-quadratic model and the uniform price auction is
COMG =
{
η¯
(m¯1)
1 , η¯
(m¯2)
2
}
=
{
3(m
3−r3), 2(r
3)
}
.
The proof of Corollary 4.1. is omitted, but it is similar to the proof of Proposition 5 in Yi and
Shin (2000) or Proposition 11 in Finus and Rundshagen (2001). However, I show in Appendix
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4.C, applying a numerical simulation that COMG =
{
η¯
(m¯1)
1 , η¯
(m¯2)
2
}
is the unique stable struc-
ture of all the symmetric coalition structures Ck =
{
k(m
k−rk), (k − 1)rk
}
, mk = 1, . . . , n,
where k = I(n/mk) and rk = mkk − n. Ignoring integer constraints, these structures may
also be written as: {n}, {n
2
, n
2
}
,
{
n
3
, n
3
, n
3
}
,
{
n
4
, n
4
, n
4
, n
4
}
,..., {2, 2, . . . , 2}, {2, 2, . . . , 2, 1, 1},...,
{2, 1, 1, . . . , 1}, and{1, 1, . . . , 1} (see Yi and Shin 2000). Even though there is a unique
coalition-proof stable structure, there is a number of strategy proﬁles which constitute this
coalition structure. Hence the coalition-proof Nash equilibrium in the coalition formation
stage is any strategy proﬁle which has a form equal to the strategy proﬁle
σ? = {1, 1, 1, 2, 2, 2, . . . , m¯1, m¯1, m¯1, (m¯1 + 1) , (m¯1 + 1) , . . . , (m¯1 + m¯2) , (m¯1 + m¯2)} .
4.5 Results
In this section I run numerical simulations of the coalition game with the two alternative
auction designs. In the simulations I use ﬁxed values for the parameters θ = 100, β = 1 and
δ = 0.5. However, I let the number of strategic ﬁrms n run from 3 to 100 and give diﬀerent
values for the share of the oligopolistic market: λ ∈ (0.3; 0.5; 0.7). I calculate the welfare
and auction revenue eﬀects from (4.21), (4.26) and (4.27) given the share of the oligopolistic
market, the number of strategic ﬁrms and the stable structures of diﬀerent coalition formation
games. With the Vickrey auction, strategic ﬁrms form a grand coaltion in every coalition
formation game. With the uniform price auction, the stable structure and thus the results
are diﬀerent depending on the coalition formation game. When comparing the results, the
benchmark case is the second-best allocation of allowances, where the equilibrium price is
p∗ = (1− δ) θ, the total abatement costs are ACe = (1−δ)2θ2
2β
and the total revenues collected
are the competitive revenues Re = (1−δ)δθ
2
β
.
Figure 4.2 shows the excess abatement costs relative to the benchmark. For instance, if
the number of strategic ﬁrms is 5, the aggregate abatement costs after UPA with the open
memebership game (UPA-OMG, the red line) are 0.6%, 2.7% and 7.8% higher than in the
second-best as the share of the oligopolistic market λ is assigned the value 0.3, 0.5 and 0.7,
respectively. However, the excess abatement costs decrease quite rapidly as the number of
strategic ﬁrms increases. Already for n = 10, the relative welfare loss is 0.1%, 0.6% and
1.3%, respectively.
The welfare loss is smaller and decreases even more rapidly with the cartel game with myopic
ﬁrms (UPA-CGM, the blue dashed line), but if ﬁrms are farsighted and form the least com-
petitive cartel agreement (UPA-CGF, the blue solid line), the welfare loss varies between 0.8
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- 2.3% for λ = 0.3, between 3.8 - 11.1% for λ = 0.5, and between 12.8 - 39.6% for λ = 0.7.
The welfare loss depends heavily on the number of members in the least competitive stable
structure. The Vickrey auction (VA, the black line) provides the second-best allocation and
thus no welfare loss.
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Figure 4.2: Welfare loss. Parameter values: θ = 100, β = 1, and δ = 0.5.
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Figure 4.3: Revenue loss. Parameter values: θ = 100, β = 1, and δ = 0.5.
Figure 4.3 shows the loss of revenues relative to the competitive revenues, i.e. if the auctioneer
received the second-best price for all the allowances auctioned. Where the Vickrey auction
did not produce any welfare loss due to the eﬃcient allocation of allowances, the revenues will
be much lower than in the competitive auction at least when the market share of strategic
ﬁrms is high. This is due to collusion. The revenue losses of the Vickrey auction are 6.4%,
25% and 55% for λ with values of 0.3, 0.5 and 0.7, respectively. The number of strategic
ﬁrms has no eﬀect on revenue losses, because in every model structure strategic ﬁrms act as
if there were only one single monopolistic ﬁrm.
Again, in the uniform price auction the revenue losses depend highly on the coalition game
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considered. With the myopic cartel game (UPA-CGM) and the open membersip game (UPA-
OMG), the revenue losses are fairly modest already for n = 20 strategic ﬁrms, irrespective
of the market share of strategic ﬁrms. Again, the revenue losses are much higher if ﬁrms
are farsighted (UPA-CGF). In that case the revenue losses ﬂuctuate around the revenue loss
of the Vickrey auction and are highly dependent on the number of strategic ﬁrms and the
number of members in the least competitive stable coalition.
We can conclude that if cartel agreements are weak and there are not too few strategic
ﬁrms, the uniform price auction may be approximately equal to the competitive market. A
weak cartel agreement means (in uniform price auctions) that strategic ﬁrms cannot make a
binding agreement on collusive bidding. Instead, some ﬁrms, individually or jointly, ﬁnd it
proﬁtable to deviate from the cartel due to the fact that cartel makes outsiders better oﬀ.
Thus, in equilibrium, the allocation of allowances is almost second-best (for large n) and the
auction revenues are almost as great as in the competitive market, at least for a large enough
market share of the fringe. If, on the other hand, farsighted ﬁrms can agree on the least
competitive cartel agreement, the uniform price auction will not oﬀer an eﬃcient allocation
and the auction revenues will be relatively low, at least for a large market share of strategic
ﬁrms. Using the Vickrey auction, the regulator can always guarantee eﬃcient allocation but
the auction revenues will decrease in increasing collusive behavior, which, on the other hand,
is proﬁtable for strategic ﬁrms.
4.6 Conclusions
I have compared two auction mechanisms to allocate emission allowances when ﬁrms are
able to collude: the Vickrey auction and the uniform price auction. Firms may form multiple
coalitions and the two-stage game reduces to a one-stage coalition formation game using the
partition function approach (Yi 2003). Firms may trade emission allowances inside but not
between coalitions after the auction. Hence I have assumed that there are no resale markets.
This is of course a very simplifying assumption and does not hold in existing emissions
markets. However, the model gives some insights into the incentives the various auction
mechanisms provide for participating ﬁrms.
With private values, the Vickrey auction provides an eﬃcient allocation of pollution rights
but at the same time strong incentives for ﬁrms to coordinate their bids in an auction. This
reduces the revenues. Modeling the uniform price auction is a more complex task even in
the relatively simple framework of this paper. I have applied a linear-quadratic model and
a fringe of competitive ﬁrms, which balances the market. By these simplifying assumptions
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I have been able to derive a unique Nash equilibrium of the auction. In addition, I have
considered three coalition formation games.
Depending on the coalition game, the results of the uniform price auction vary substantially.
It should be noted that I have considered only three examples of coalition formation games.
However, the interpretation of the results of the uniform price auction is the following. The
regulator should understand the market structure in order to estimate the risk of collusion
and low price equilibria. First, if the market share of strategic ﬁrms is relatively small, the
welfare loss and the revenue loss are naturally relatively low. Second, even if the market
share of strategic ﬁrms is high, but not too high, and if coalition formation is free, the
market behaves almost competitively, unless there are only a few strategic ﬁrms. However, if
(farsighted) ﬁrms can coordinate coalition formation and form only a single cartel, then the
collusion might be a threat to the regulation.
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Appendices
4.A Vickrey auction payback functions.
Given that truthful bidding is a dominant strategy in the Vickrey auction, the residual supply
function for coalition ci can be simpliﬁed as:
RS−1ci (qci) = max
0,
θ −
 1m∑
j 6=i
1
bcj
+ 1
βf
L+
 1m∑
j 6=i
1
bcj
+ 1
βf
 qci


= max
0,
θ −
(
nβ
n− niλ
)
L︸ ︷︷ ︸
Ωci
+
(
nβ
n− niλ
)
︸ ︷︷ ︸
τci
qci


= max [0, (Ωci + τciqci)] ,
where I have used bcj = βcj =
n
njλ
β and βf = 11−λβ. Equalizing this with the true inverse
demand function (4.13) gives the second-best solution:
lci =
niλ
n
L.
Using RS−1ci (qci) = Ωci+τciqci from above, the paybacks of coalition ci in the VCG mechanism
are derived using
αci = 1−
lci´
qˆci
(Ωci + τcix) dx
(Ωci + τcilci) lci
=
1
2
 1
1 +
Ωci
τci lci
+ Ωci qˆci + 12τci qˆ2ci
Ωcilci + τcil
2
ci
,
where qˆci = max
[
0,−Ωci
τci
]
. Now, provided that Dva−ci(0) ≥ L, and thus qˆci = 0, the share of
the paybacks is
αci =
1
2
(
niλ
n− niλ
)(
δ
1− δ
)
,
where I have used Ωci ,τci , and L = δQ
0 = δ θ
β
. If, on the other hand, Dva−ci(0) < L, then
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qˆci = −Ωciτci =
θ(δ−1+niλn )
β
> 0, and we thus get
αci =
1
2
(
niλ
n− niλ
)(
δ
1− δ
)
− qˆ
2
ci
2lci (lci − qˆci)
=
1
2
(
niλ
n− niλ
)(
δ
1− δ
)
−
(
1− δ − niλ
n
)2
2δ
(
niλ
n
)
(1− δ) (1− niλ
n
)
=
niλδ
2 (n− niλ) (1− δ)
[
1−
(
n− niλ− nδ
niλδ
)2]
.
For example, in the case of a grand coalition c1 ≡ cgc (and thus n1 = n), we get lgc = λ δθβ ;
Ωgc =
(
1− δ
1−λ
)
θ; and τgc =
β
1−λ . Furthermore, if 1− λ ≥ δ,
αgc =
λδ
2 (1− λ) (1− δ) ,
and if 1− λ < δ the share of the grand coalition paybacks is
αgc =
λδ
2 (1− λ) (1− δ)
[
1−
(
1− δ − λ
λδ
)2]
.
4.B Equilibrium concepts of coalition formation games
Consider a coalition formation game G =
{
N, (Σi)i∈N , (TCi)i∈N
}
. Moreover, consider any
group of ﬁrms S ⊂ N and let σN\S = (σj)j∈N\S denote a proﬁle of strategies of all ﬁrms not
included in coalition S. For every coalition S ⊂ N , the restriction of game G to ﬁrms in S
is deﬁned as
G¯S =
{
S, (Σi)i∈S ,
(
TCi
)
i∈S
}
,
where the strategies of other ﬁrms outside S, i.e. (σ¯j)j∈N\S, are held ﬁxed and, for every ﬁrm
i ∈ S and every strategy σi ∈ Σi,
TCi = TC
(
ηl(i), C
(
(σi)i∈S , (σ¯j)j∈N\S
))
.
Deﬁnition 4.6. The proﬁle of strategies σ? = (σ?1, . . . , σ
?
n) is a Nash equilibrium (NE) of
game G if for all i ∈ N and every σi ∈ Σi
TC
(
ηl(i), C (σ
?)
) ≤ TC (ηl(i), C (σi, σ?N\{i})) .
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Deﬁnition 4.7. The proﬁle of strategies σ? = (σ?1, . . . , σ
?
n) is a (strictly) strong Nash equi-
librium (SNE) of game G if there exists no S ⊂ N and σS ∈ Πi∈SΣi, such that
TC
(
ηl(i), C (σ
?)
) ≥ TC (ηl(i), C (σS, σ?N\S)) ,
for all i ∈ S, and
TC
(
ηl(i), C (σ
?)
)
> TC
(
ηl(i), C
(
σS, σ
?
N\S
))
,
for at least one i ∈ S.
Deﬁnition 4.8. (i) Suppose n = 1. Then strategy σ?1 is a (strictly) coalition-proof Nash
equilibrium (CPNE) of game G if and only if it is a Nash equilibrium.
(ii) Suppose n > 1 in game G. Then the proﬁle of strategies σ? = (σ?1, . . . , σ
?
n) is a (strictly)
self-enforcing proﬁle of strategies if for all S ⊂ N , (σ?i )i∈S is a (strictly) coalition-proof Nash
equilibrium (CPNE) of game G¯S, which is a restriction of game G to ﬁrms in S.
(iii) The proﬁle of strategies σ? = (σ?1, . . . , σ
?
n) is a (strictly) coalition-proof Nash equilibrium
of game G if it is (strictly) self-enforcing and there is no other (strictly) self-enforcing proﬁle
σ′ such that
TC
(
ηl(i), C (σ
?)
) ≥ TC (ηl(i), C (σ′)) ,
for all i ∈ N , and
TC
(
ηl(i), C (σ
?)
)
> TC
(
ηl(i), C (σ
′)
)
,
for at least one i ∈ N .
In NE no single ﬁrm ﬁnds it proﬁtable to deviate from the given coalition structure, whereas
SNE requires that deviations of any subgroup of ﬁrms are not proﬁtable. Hence a SNE is
also NE. In many games the requirement of SNE is too strict, because SNE may not exist.
CPNE requires that deviations of any subgroup, which are self-enforcing, are not proﬁtable.
Hence, SNE must also be CPNE and while any singleton {i} is also a subgroup S ⊂ N ,
we may write SNE ⊂ CPNE ⊂ NE.11 Also, the following two deﬁnitions are useful (see Yi
1997).
Deﬁnition 4.9. (Yi 1997, Deﬁnition 5.1.) Coalition structure C = {n1, . . . , nm} is stand-
alone stable if and only if TC (ni;C) ≤ TC (1;C ′) where C ′ = C \ {ni} ∪ {ni − 1, 1} for all
i = 1, . . .m.
11Note that the deviation strategies used in deﬁnitions 4.7 and 4.8 are weak deviations. Using strict
deviations instead would mean that a group of ﬁrms deviates only if all of its members are better-oﬀ, which
would give deﬁnitions of a weakly strong Nash equilibrium and a weakly coalition-proof Nash equilibrium
(CPNE) (see e.g. Konishi et al. 1999).
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Deﬁnition 4.10. (Yi 1997, Deﬁnition 2.2.) Coalition structure C = {n1, . . . , nm} is a
concentration of C ′ = {n′1, . . . , n′m′}, m′ ≥ m, if and only if there exists a sequence of
coalition structures C1 =
{
n11, . . . , n
1
m(1)
}
, C2 =
{
n21, . . . , n
2
m(2)
}
, ..., CR =
{
nR1 , . . . , n
R
m(R)
}
such that
1. C = C1 and C = CR; and
2. Cr−1 = Cr \
{
nri(r), n
r
j(r)
}
∪
{
nri(r) + 1, n
r
j(r) − 1
}
, nri(r) ≥ nrj(r), for some i (r), j (r) =
1, . . . ,m (r) and for all r = 2, . . . , R.
4.C Stable structure in the open membership game with a uniform
price auction.
Let COMG =
{
η¯
(m¯1)
1 , η¯
(m¯2)
2
}
denote the stable structure of the open membership game with a
uniform price auction introduced in Corollary 4.1. First, to give an alternative, and perhaps
a more clear, deﬁnition of this stable structure, Finus and Rundshagen (2001, Proposition
11) deﬁnes the structure COMG as follows (for n ≥ 3):
COMG =
{
η¯
(m¯1)
1 , η¯
(m¯2)
2
}
=

{
3(m
?), 2(0)
}
, if R = 0{
3(m
?−1), 2(2)
}
, if R = 1{
3(m
?), 2(1)
}
, if R = 2
,
where m? = Iˆ(n/3), with Iˆ(n/k) denoting the closest integer lower or equal to n/k , and
R = n− 3m? ∈ (0, 1, 2). Note that Iˆ(n/k) is not equal to I(n/m) in Corollary 4.1.
Consider next a symmetric coalition structure Ck =
{
η
(mk1)
1 , η
(mk2)
2
}
=
{
k(m
k−rk), (k − 1)rk
}
,
where k = I(n/mk) and rk = mkk − n. Thus C3 = COMG. Consider also the following
neighboring structures:
Ckη1,η1 =
{
(η1 + 1)
(1) , η
(mk1−2)
1 , η
(mk2+1)
2
}
, if mk1 > 1,
Ckη1,0 =
{
η
(mk1−1)
1 , η
(mk2+1)
2 , 1
(1)
}
, if mk1 ≥ 1,
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and
Ckη2,η1 =
{
(η1 + 1)
(1) , η
(mk1−1)
1 , η
(mk2−1)
2 , (η2 − 1)(1)
}
, if mk1,m
k
2 ≥ 1,
Ckη2,0 =
{
η
(mk1)
1 , η
(mk2−1)
2 , (η2 − 1)(1) , 1(1)
}
, if mk2 ≥ 1,
Ckη2,η2 =
{
η
(mk1+1)
1 , η
(mk2−2)
2 , (η2 − 1)(1)
}
, if mk2 > 1.
The ﬁrst two neighboring structures describe the deviation structures for which a member of
a larger coalition κ1 deviates. Hence in Ckη1,η1 a member of coalition κ1 joins another coalition
of the same size. In Ckη1,0 a member of coalition κ1 deviates and becomes a singleton. I do not
consider the neighboring structure Ckη1,η2 , i.e. if a member of coalition κ1 joins coalition κ2,
because the coalition structure would remain the same and it would not change the payoﬀ
of the deviating ﬁrm. The last three neighboring structures describe the structures where a
member of a smaller coalition κ2 deviates. In Ckη2,η1 the deviating ﬁrm joins a larger coalition
κ1, in Ckη2,0 it becomes a singleton and in C
k
η2,η2
it joins coalition κ2.
The structure Ck is not stable if any of the deviating strategy provides lower total costs for
a single deviating ﬁrm:
TC
(
k;Ck
)
> TC
(
k + 1;Ckη1,η1
)
,
TC
(
k;Ck
)
> TC
(
1;Ckη1,0
)
,
and
TC
(
k − 1;Ck) > TC (k + 1;Ckη2,η1) ,
TC
(
k − 1;Ck) > TC (1;Ckη2,0) ,
TC
(
k − 1;Ck) > TC (k;Ckη2,η2) .
Table 4.3 presents the per-member total costs of coalitions for the stable structure of the
model COMG = C3 =
{
3(m
3−r3), 2(r
3)
}
and for the neighboring structures described above,
with parameter values n = 3, . . . , 100; θ = 100; β = 1; and δ = λ = 0.5. The per-member
costs are normalized such that the costs are compareable for diﬀerent n. The normalized
costs are thus denoted by TCn (ηi;C) = n100TC (ηi;C). Moreover, Table 4.4 presents the
same calculations for coalition structure C2 =
{
2(m
2−r2), 1(r
2)
}
and Table 4.5 for coalition
structure C4 =
{
4(m
4−r4), 3(r
4)
}
.
In all tables 4.3 - 4.5, the per-member costs of the deviating ﬁrm are written in either
blue or red. If the per-member costs of the deviator are written in blue, the deviation
strategy is not proﬁtable for the deviator. On the other hand, the red color indicates that
the deviator is better-oﬀ if it deviates. Note that I have omitted coalition structures C2η2,0
and C2η2,η2 from Table 4.4, because C
2
η2,η2
is not feasible, and C2η2,0 is equal to C
2 and thus
TC (1;C2) = TC
(
1;C2η2,0
)
by assumption.
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The structure COMG = C3 is indeed the unique stable structure, while there are no proﬁtable
deviation strategies for a single ﬁrm. Also, deviations of any larger group of ﬁrms are not
proﬁtable. This is intuitively clear while (according to Condition 4.4) any proﬁtable deviation
from COMG = C3 must be such that the size of a new coalition of deviating ﬁrms is smaller
than the original coalition.12 Hence, if no single ﬁrm ﬁnds deviation proﬁtable, the deviation
of any subgroup of ﬁrms must not be proﬁtable either.
Moreover, given the structure C4 (see Table 4.5), there is at least one proﬁtable single-ﬁrm
deviating strategy for every n and thus C4 is not a stable structure. This is also true for all
other Ck, where k > 4, due to the breaking-down of the stand-alone stable condition.
With C2 (see Table 4.4) it is always proﬁtable for a singleton to join a larger coalition,
while TC (1;C2) > TC
(
3;C2η2,η1
)
, if m22 = 1. However, the neighboring structures will not
provide proﬁtable deviations if m22 = 0. Even though if there is no proﬁtable strategy for a
single deviator from coalition κ1 in C2, the deviation may aﬀect other players' incentives to
deviate. Thus there are proﬁtable deviation strategies for some subgroup of ﬁrms. This can
be described with the following example. Consider the case n = 6 and thus the structure
C2 =
{
2(3)
}
in Table 4.4. Suppose that one of the ﬁrms deviates and joins another coalition.
This gives a structure C2η1,η1 =
{
3(1), 2(1), 1(1)
}
. Note that this is exactly the same structure
as C3η1,0 in Table 4.3 with n = 6. According to Table 4.3, the singleton of this structure will
ﬁnd it proﬁtable to join coalition {2}, because
TCn
(
1;C3η1,0
)
= 17.306 > 17.265 = TCn
(
3;C3
)
.
Hence, even if the original deviation does not seem to be proﬁtable, while (see Table 4.4)
TCn
(
2;C2
)
= 17.712 < 17.763 = TCn
(
3;C2η1,η1
)
,
the resulting structure is not C2η1,η1 = C
3
η1,0
, but the stable structure C3. Thus, at the end of
the day, the deviation is proﬁtable, because (see tables 4.3 and 4.4)
TCn
(
2;C2
)
= 17.712 > 17.265 = TCn
(
3;C3
)
.
A similar story can be told for every n for which m22 = 0. Thus, C
2 is not a stable structure
either. Hence, C3 is the unique stable structure of all symmetric coalition structures Ck ={
k(m
k−rk), (k − 1)rk
}
, mk = 1, . . . , n, where k = I(n/mk) and rk = mkk − n.
12Suppose that one or more ﬁrms deviate to larger coalitions. If those deviations are proﬁtable, the resulting
coalition structures violate, presumably, the stand-alone stability and are thus not CPNE. Calculations are
however omitted.
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